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1.1.  Evaluation and experimentation to learn  
about development
Imagine a village where almost none of the villagers use insecticide-treated bednets 
and twenty percent of the children between 0 and 5 years die from malaria. 
Regardless of the time, it is always uncertain whether the nurses are present in the 
health centre. On top of that there exists a suspicion of embezzlement of medical 
supplies. Hence trust in health providers is relatively low. Furthermore, women are 
strongly underrepresented as leaders because of conservative gender norms, and 
trust in other community members is relatively low because of high rates of 
delinquency. Now imagine the neighbouring village with an equally low use of in-
secticide-treated bednets and malaria incidence of a similar degree. The nurses in 
this village see it as their moral duty to be present at the health centre at all times 
and there are no problems with medical supplies. Trust in health providers is 
consequently relatively high. Furthermore, women are strongly represented in the 
village council and economically successful villagers usually share their food with 
those who are suffering a bad harvest. Trust in other community members is 
relatively high.       
 Now imagine a policy maker who has to decide on the targeting of a development 
program to stimulate the use of insecticide-treated bednets in the villages described 
above. Several studies have provided evidence of the effectiveness of different kinds 
of development programs to stimulate the use of insecticide-treated bednets and 
fight malaria in different contexts (e.g., Cohen and Dupas 2010; Tarozzi et al. 2011). 
To what extent should policy makers take into account the findings in different 
contexts as in the villages discussed above for decisions about the implementation 
of development programs in the villages discussed above? Should they target the 
same development programs to the above discussed villages? How can they learn 
about the relationship between contextual characteristics and the effectiveness of 
development programs?  
 Many scholars draw attention to the importance of social context for the 
findings from evaluations of development programs (e.g., Pawson and Tilley 1997; 
Rodrik 2008; Deaton 2010a; Posner 2011; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). However, the 
meaning of the concept of ‘social context’ often remains vague when scholars argue 
that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs. For example, 
Deaton (2010a, p. 426) argues for a refocusing on “the investigation of potentially 
generalisable mechanisms that explain why and in what contexts projects can be 
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expected to work.” In addition, Pawson and Tilley (1997) argue that it is the 
combination of mechanism and context that generates outcomes, and therefore 
without understanding such combinations scientific progress is not possible. 
However, both Deaton (2010a) and Pawson and Tilley (1997) do not offer clear-cut 
suggestions as to how context could matter for the effectiveness of development 
programs. Posner (2011) becomes more concrete with his suggestion to incorporate 
community characteristics such as the density of networks, its periodicity of 
interactions, its ethnic homogeneity and its social and cultural norms into the 
design of evaluations of development programs. According to Posner (2011), 
community characteristics are a key factor in analysing the relationship between 
the context of development interventions and their impact. Nevertheless, few 
studies have empirically connected community characteristics with the effectiveness 
of development programs.    
 In this thesis we would like to go beyond the obvious but relatively vague notion 
that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs. Instead we 
would like to explore opportunities to make explicit how context matters for the 
impact of development programs. Within this terrain, we mainly pay attention to 
the relationship between social norms and the impact of development programs, 
because the development programs we evaluate focus on behavioural changes that 
are interlinked with social norms that prescribe certain behaviour. Recent qualitative 
evidence from Nicaragua, El Salvador and Turkey indicates that social norms could 
be strongly related to the effectiveness of development programs (Adato, 
Roopnaraine, and Becker 2011). Hence we argue that social norms should be one of 
the most straightforward components of context to be linked with the effectiveness 
of development programs. In accordance with the recommendations by Posner 
(2011) we focus mainly on the relationship between community characteristics and 
the effectiveness of development programs. In addition, we explore ideas on 
whether and how the design of development programs can influence social norms 
in the wider community. We use rigorous (statistically sound) impact evaluation 
techniques to identify heterogeneous impacts of development programs on 
development outcomes and their relationship with social norms. In addition, we 
pose the question of whether uniform policy implications can be inferred in 
communities with different social norms but similar problems. Finally, we provide 
some evidence of the relationship between the design of development programs 
and social norms in the wider community. 
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 By using rigorous impact evaluations we place ourselves in the 21st century 
tradition of applied micro-development economists to learn about development by 
systematically analysing the outcomes from rigorous impact evaluations (Banerjee 
and Duflo 2011; Karlan and Appel 2011). An impact evaluation is a study that tackles 
the issue of attribution by identifying the counterfactual value of the outcomes for 
beneficiaries in a statistically sound manner (White 2010). Changes in outcomes can 
usually be attributed to multiple causes. For these complex outcomes, a comparison 
group is usually required to rigorously analyse the attribution to development 
outcomes from a development program. We should make clear that we do not 
necessarily relate only to impact as the final level of the causal chain or the log 
frame. Under the definition of a log frame, impacts refer to “positive and negative, 
primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention” 
(OECD-DAC 2002). Counterfactual analyses can also attribute the impact of a 
development program to an output or outcome indicator in the causal chain. Under 
the definition of a log frame, outputs refer to the “products, capital goods and 
services which result from a development intervention”, while outcomes refer to 
“the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s 
outputs” (Ibid.). By placing emphasis on the counterfactual in our definition of 
impact evaluation, we use a definition of impact evaluation that is generally shared 
by economists (White 2009).1
 Although there is no universally accepted definition of a rigorous impact 
evaluation (Leeuw 2010), both randomised control trials (also called randomised or 
experimental evaluations) and quasi-experimental evaluations of development 
programs usually qualify as such when placing a lot of emphasis on counterfactual 
analyses (Ravallion 2001; White 2010). In randomised control trials a certain 
development program is allocated to a randomly chosen group of actors, after 
which the estimate of the average impact can be obtained by comparing the mean 
outcome of the beneficiaries of the development program with the mean outcome 
of a group of actors that was not allocated the development program. In quasi-ex-
perimental evaluations the aim is to compare the outcomes of the beneficiaries of a 
development program with the outcomes of a comparable but not randomly chosen 
control group. Different statistical techniques, which we discuss in Chapter Two, can 
be used to obtain the impact estimate of the development program using a quasi-
experimental research design. 
 Many economists nowadays are sceptical about the ability of economic theory 
to deliver useful models (Rodrik 2008; Deaton 2010a). For this reason, experimenta-
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tion has become the preferred method to learn about development (Rodrik 2008). In 
this respect, both macro- and micro-development economists have moved closer to 
the idea that economics should be more empirically oriented, with less focus on a 
unifying theory of human behaviour. However, despite favourable attitudes with 
respect to experimentation, in methodological terms, development micro 
economists put forward very different ideas about experimentation than macro 
economists in the field of development (Rodrik, 2008). 
 Banerjee (2007) argues that macro-economic studies focus too much on cross-
sectional estimation methods with little attention given to endogeneity problems, 
and that development policy should actually be based on the hard evidence that 
rigorous impact evaluations provide, instead of the “wishy-washy evidence” from 
cross-country regressions or case studies. Endogeneity problems could result in 
biased estimates in macro-economic cross-country studies. The conventional view 
amongst micro-development economists that rigorous impact evaluations are 
necessary to learn about development is based on the perception that other 
methodologies lack the rigour to learn about causal development mechanisms 
(Banerjee 2007).2 On the other hand, many microeconomic impact evaluations of 
development programs lack attention given to the importance of context character-
istics in development mechanisms (Rodrik 2008; Hausmann, Rodrik, and Vélasco 
2008; Posner 2011). By contrast, some development macro-economists currently 
embrace the identification of desirable context-specific policies to catalyse economic 
growth (e.g., Hausmann et al. 2008; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 
2008). With their emphasis on context characteristics, it becomes clearer to what 
extent the findings from one study can be extrapolated to different geographic 
areas. One of the aims of this thesis is to bring these two experimental but separate 
perspectives regarding development research closer together by performing con-
text-specific analyses at the micro level. In this approach we also pay attention to 
the advantages and disadvantages of randomised evaluations compared to other 
methods that are generally perceived to lack the same level of rigour.3 
       Discussions concerning the usefulness of rigorous impact evaluations focus 
almost exclusively on the merits of randomised evaluations (e.g., Banerjee 2007; 
Rodrik 2008; Deaton 2010a), even though randomised and quasi-experimental 
evaluations have much in common. Although experimentation is more common in 
a randomised design, both randomised and quasi-experimental evaluations allow 
for learning about development by explicitly experimenting with the design of 
development programs.4 Both randomised and quasi-experimental evaluations 
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depart from a relative agnosticism on what works and what does not, just like the 
“experimental economic regulations” from which China’s economic success 
commenced (Rodrik 2008; Heilmann 2008). 
 Whereas China’s focus lies in relatively large-scale programs, applied development 
micro-economists usually focus on the rigorous identification of the impact of 
relatively small-scale interventions. Within this focus there exists a growing 
tendency to estimate separately the impacts of different components of 
development programs. To estimate rigorously the impact of small-scale 
interventions, cooperation is mainly sought with Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). The relative flexibility of NGOs compared to governments is a major reason 
for this partnership (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). This thesis also originates 
from cooperation with the Dutch NGO Cordaid and its partner organisations in 
Ghana, India and Peru (two in each country). For each development program, we 
designed indicators to evaluate the success in cooperation with CORDAID and its 
partner organisations. Following a workshop and a series of field visits in which we 
identified these indicators and possible comparison groups, surveys were designed 
in cooperation with CORDAID and its partner organisations for each of the 
development programs discussed in this thesis. The programs that were selected for 
the impact evaluations were chosen in close cooperation with CORDAID to ensure 
that the selected programs reflect thematic variation in the programs of the partner 
organisations of CORDAID. Additionally, programs in different continents were 
selected to capture some of the geographic variation across the programs of 
CORDAID. Finally, the programs were selected in such a way that impact evaluations 
could be performed in rural as well as in urban areas.5 
 In contrast with the current trend in impact evaluation, we do not discuss 
explicit experiments with the design of development programs in this thesis. The 
development programs we discuss had already been designed before the start of 
the impact evaluation. Nevertheless, experimental evaluations form the main 
benchmark for the ex-post impact evaluations we use in this thesis. In the empirical 
case studies, we aim to learn about development mechanisms by keeping a balance 
between theory and a relative agnosticism on what works (and for whom) in 
development. 
 Earlier rigorous impact evaluations focused mainly on deriving the impact of 
large-scale development programs such as the Mexican conditional cash transfer 
program PROGRESA (e.g., Gertler and Boyce 2001; Schulz 2004; Hoddinott and 
Skoufias 2004; Todd and Wolpin 2006; Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago forthcoming), 
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rather than on the impact of specific interventions.6 Possibly because of the 
cooperation with NGOs there are currently many more impact evaluations being 
conducted than in the past. This increase might also be related to the call from the 
Center for Global Development (2006) to improve learning about development 
through an increase in the number of impact evaluations. Before the surge in impact 
evaluations, substantial funds were used for studies that are used for monitoring 
and operational assessments. However, the Center for Global Development 
(2006) spread the idea that there existed an “evaluation gap”, in the sense that 
insufficient resources were used for counterfactual analyses.7 Currently, many 
impact evaluations are up and running and most of them focus on small-scale 
interventions (Deaton 2010b).8   
 Substantial progress in economic development has been typically due to 
economy-wide reforms (Rodrik 2008). The focus on deriving the impacts of 
small-scale interventions might thus be misplaced from the point of view of policy 
makers. Yet, Banerjee (2007) argues that development policy should actually be 
based on the hard micro-evidence that rigorous impact evaluations provide. Most 
proponents of rigorous evaluations acknowledge that economy-wide reforms might 
be more important for economic development, but also claim that there is hardly 
any credible evidence as to which of these economy-wide reforms actually works 
(Rodrik 2008). For this reason, proponents of rigorous evaluations argue that it 
would be better to do research in concrete areas from which we can actually learn 
something (Ibid.). Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) argue that major interventions 
can prove ineffective, while seemingly minor situational changes can have a large 
impact. Similarly, Karlan and Appel (2011) state that small-scale interventions can 
make a large difference in a world characterised by many problems related to 
poverty. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) therefore suggest that low-quality institutions 
can improve by small incremental policy changes from below. Learning from studies 
that focus on the effectiveness of small-scale interventions could thus yield a large 
return on investment, and could result in a widespread diffusion of knowledge 
regarding the effectiveness of small-scale development programs to policy makers. 
 Deaton (2010a, 2010b) nonetheless argues that learning about development 
mechanisms requires that the investigation be targeted towards a theory, towards 
why something works, not only towards whether it works, as is the case in most 
rigorous impact evaluations. Deaton (2010a, 2010b) thus acknowledges the value of 
rigorous impact evaluations, but argues for a more theory-driven approach. He also 
acknowledges that economic theory from a rational-choice perspective is often 
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inaccurate in explaining findings from impact evaluations, but argues that 
behavioural economics has considerably strengthened economic theory in the last 
couple of years. Social-psychological mechanisms play an important role in theory 
as derived from behavioural economics. With the integration of social psychology 
into economics, nowadays it is possible to explain and model systematic behaviour 
that used to be considered irrational. 
 The greater attention given to theory would allow for a greater focus on the 
external validity of the findings from impact evaluations (Deaton 2010a; Acemoglu 
2010). Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002) define external validity as “the validity of 
inferences about whether a causal relationship holds over variations in persons, 
settings, treatment variables, and measurement variables.” Currently, rigorous 
impact evaluations focus mainly on internal validity, i.e. “the validity of inferences 
about whether the relationship between two variables is causal” (Shadish et al. 
2002). Most rigorous impact evaluations hardly focus on theoretical mechanisms, 
which could create uncertainty regarding the external validity of findings from 
rigorous impact evaluations (Deaton 2010a; Acemoglu 2010; Rodrik 2010; White 
2010). In addition, Deaton (2010a) as well as White (2010) argue for an increased 
focus on heterogeneous impacts that are derived from theory. Not only does it 
matter for policy makers whether development programs work, but also for whom 
and why. The core of this critique rests on the claim that context matters for the 
effectiveness of development programs (Posner 2011). This view suggests that more 
attention should be paid to the role of community characteristics in explaining the 
impact of development programs. Additionally, focusing on studies related to 
small-scale interventions might be most beneficial when research questions are 
asked for which studies regarding small-scale interventions have a clear comparative 
advantage. Some research questions are difficult, if not impossible, to answer using 
macro-level data. To analyse such research questions, a focus on micro-level data 
and small-scale interventions would be advisable.  
 A clear example comes from the literature on microfinance, in which we can 
distinguish between studies that focus on the impact of standardised microfinance 
loans and studies that focus on the impact of small interventions within microfinance 
programs that go beyond the standardised microfinance loans. Standardised 
microfinance loans usually require small but frequent repayment instalments and 
are thus relatively inflexible (Field et al. 2010a). Perhaps for this reason, the 
introduction of standardised microcredit in India and Morocco only resulted in 
limited benefits in terms of business investments, at least in the short run (Banerjee 
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et al. 2009; Crépon et al. 2011). By contrast, a small-scale intervention in India in 
which the treatment group received a two-month grace period before repayment 
had a strong positive impact on clients’ business investments in the short run as 
well as on income in the long run (Field et al. 2010a). Hence the non-standard 
two-month grace period has strong positive effects on investment. Yet, entrepre-
neurial risk also increases due to the grace period, resulting in more variable business 
returns (Ibid.). The findings regarding the costs and benefits of the small-scale 
grace-period intervention could contribute considerably to the available knowledge 
regarding the impact of microfinance. Perhaps the current relatively inflexible 
standardised microcredit loans can be complemented by flexible loans with grace 
periods. The knowledge on small-scale programs could thus lead to an improvement 
in large-scale microfinance programs in an incremental way.    
 That policy makers can learn from the findings of impact evaluations was also 
clearly demonstrated after a publication on the impact of deworming treatments 
on school enrolment in Kenya.  Evidence from this relatively small-scale program 
suggests that a large scale deworming program would only cost $3.50 US Dollars per 
additional year of child participation (Miguel and Kremer 2004). A follow-up study 
by Bobonis, Miguel, and Puri-Sharma (2006) in India further demonstrates that 
delivering iron supplementation and deworming pills to school children reduces 
absenteeism by one fifth. Following these results and a campaign to disseminate 
the information regarding the cost-effectiveness of deworming programs, policy 
makers became convinced that small-scale deworming programs should be scaled 
up in the developing world.9 These examples demonstrate that learning about the 
impact of small-scale interventions could often contribute to the returns to 
large-scale interventions by the scaling up of successful small-scale interventions. 
 However, the question remains as to who gains a higher income due to the 
grace period or who gains due to the higher school enrolment after deworming? The 
same question remains with respect to distribution of losses: who loses due to an 
increase in the variability of business returns after the introduction of a grace 
period? To answer these research questions we have to focus on heterogeneous 
impacts, for which experimental evaluations do not have a clear comparative 
advantage relative to quasi-experimental evaluations (Deaton 2010a; Rodrik 2010). 
This thesis focuses on a research area where the heterogeneity in the impact 
estimates could be large and where studies regarding small-scale interventions 
have a clear comparative advantage: the relationship between social norms and the 
effectiveness of development programs. With this approach we also focus on one of 
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the most pertinent criticisms of rigorous impact evaluations: the lack of attention 
given to context characteristics (Posner 2011), of which social norms are a clear example. 
 The contents of our study also provide some additional advantages in the 
analysis of the relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of 
development programs. The variation across rural and urban areas as well as the 
regional variation in the development programs allows for a stricter test of the 
relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs. 
If we were to find a relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of 
development programs in all the contexts we discuss, this would provide strong 
evidence of a more general relationship between social norms and the effectiveness 
of development programs. 
 To introduce the relation between social norms and the effectiveness of 
development programs we first pay attention to existing studies that are related to 
the broader concept of social capital – of which social norms are a component 
(Woolcock 1998) – and its relationship with the effectiveness of development 
programs.  Hereafter we discuss the concept of social norms and its relationship 
with the effectiveness of development programs, followed by a brief review of the 
existing empirical literature concerned with this relationship. Finally, the aims of the 
thesis are presented along with an outline of the thesis structure. 
1.2. Social capital
Both Putnam (2001) and Woolcock (1998) suggest that there has been a visible 
convergence among scholars in the field of social capital towards a rather broad 
definition: “the norms and networks that facilitate collective action for mutual 
benefit” (Woolcock 1998).10 The definition suggests that both social norms and 
networks can be considered components of social capital.11 Furthermore, social 
capital can also be subdivided into formal and informal social capital. Formal social 
capital can be defined as participation in formally constituted civic organisations 
(Putnam 2000; Gesthuizen, Van der Meer, and Scheepers 2008), while informal 
social capital refers to social ties between individuals and their friends, families, 
colleagues and neighbours (Coleman 1988; Gesthuizen et al. 2008).   
 Social capital (both norms and networks) can “enhance, maintain or destroy 
physical and human capital” (Woolcock 1998) and thus cannot always be considered 
a productive factor.12 Narayan and Pritchett (1999), nonetheless, demonstrate that 
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village-level membership in heterogeneous voluntary associations across kinship 
groups is related to higher income in Tanzania, which might imply that social capital 
has a positive impact on income. Related to this, Coleman (1988) argues that social 
capital could create human capital by decreasing the number of dropouts from high 
school. However, Gesthuizen et al. (2008) argue the converse, suggesting that 
educational attainment has a positive effect on social capital. The positive 
relationships between social capital and income as well as human capital could also 
indicate a positive relationship between social capital and the returns to physical 
and/or human capital.13 This would imply that social capital is only a productive form 
of capital when it is complementary to physical and/or human capital, and it would 
also indicate a low substitutability between social capital and physical and/or 
human capital. This thesis tests for a positive relationship between social capital 
and the returns to physical and/or human capital as an alternative explanation for 
the positive relationship between social capital and development outcomes.14 
Coleman (1988, p. S98) suggests that “like other forms of capital, social capital is 
productive, making possible the achievement of ends that in its absence would not 
be possible”. Yet, when the returns to social capital depend on other forms of capital, 
social capital can only be considered productive under certain conditions.   
 Although networks and norms can both be considered components of social 
capital, they might have radically different implications for aid effectiveness. 
Moreover, the impact of different development programs might be affected 
dissimilarly by networks and social norms. Therefore, this thesis separates the 
effects of social norms and networks. We mainly focus on the relationship between 
social norms and the effectiveness of development programs and pay limited 
attention to the relationship between the effectiveness of development programs 
and networks.15 However, we focus attention on the topic of networks in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. To be able to separately assess the relationship between social 
norms and the effectiveness of development programs we focus on the relationship 
at the micro level, rather than at the macro level. 
 Macro-economic cross-country studies have extensively focused on the relation 
between quality of policy, quality of institutions and effectiveness of aid (e.g., 
Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004; Bräutigam and Knack 
2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004). The study of 
Baliamoune-Lutz and Mavrotas (2009) is the only study we are aware of that relates 
effectiveness of aid to social capital. They suggest that the impact of aid on 
economic growth increases with social capital, indicating that high-quality social 
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capital is an important condition for the effectiveness of aid. However, at the macro 
level they are not able to assess the effect of social norms and networks separately. 
Additionally, the study only uses a determinant of social capital, namely, ethno-lin-
guistic fractionalisation, in the empirical research design. This raises many doubts 
about the interpretation of the results of the study. Ethno-linguistic fractionalisa-
tion could also reduce the effectiveness of aid through higher corruption and/or 
political competition. Additionally, the study is also fraught with assumptions 
regarding the exogeneity of instrumental variables that are difficult to test, which is 
precisely the reason for which cross-country studies of economic growth have 
declined in professional status in the last couple of years (Deaton 2010a).  
 At the micro level it is more feasible to estimate the differential effects of 
specific components of social capital, since often there exists the possibility to 
estimate the impact of development programs using reliable exogenous variation. 
Therefore, we estimate heterogeneous impacts of development programs at the 
micro rather than the macro level in this thesis. The heterogeneity in the impact 
estimates we present is related to social norms that are specific to a certain context, 
such as gender norms, as well as to more abstractly defined social norms that are 
definable for each context but vary across regions and individuals, such as trust and 
cooperative behaviour. Recent studies suggest that all these norms could be related 
to the effectiveness of development programs. For example, Adato et al. (2011) 
demonstrate that gender relations and beliefs about traditional and modern 
biomedical practices (which we argue later is related to trust in health providers) are 
each related to the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programs. Furthermore, 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) argue that collective action could be a key factor in 
determining the effectiveness of community-based development programs. Hence 
the social norm to cooperate might be related to the effectiveness of development 
programs. 
 We do not aim to discuss in depth the linkages between social norms. Rather, we 
focus separately on the concepts of trust, gender norms and cooperative behaviour, 
which are each related to at least one of the discussed development programs. 
Hypotheses for these relationships were developed with the help of informal 
discussions with the implementing NGOs, existing qualitative studies concerned 
with the geographic areas of intervention (Adongo, Kirkwood, and Kendall 2005; 
Alam and Verma 2007; Van der Velde 2009; Temmink 2009) and literature related to 
the subject of social norms (e.g., Das and Das 2003; Deininger and Liu 2009a; Van 
den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). Section 1.3 explains in more detail why we 
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consider trust, gender norms and cooperative behaviour to be key social norms. 
Section 1.4 outlines the specific hypotheses underlying our field work.
1.3. Social norms
Fehr and Gächter (2000a) define a social norm as “1) a behavioural regularity that is 
2) based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave, which triggers 3) the 
enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions.” Social norms 
are a sociological concept introduced by scholars like Durkheim (1897/1997). Yet, 
since the rise of behavioural economics, “Homo economicus” and “Homo sociologicus” 
have come closer together again (Rauhut and Winter 2010), as they were at the time 
of Adam Smith (Ashraf, Camerer, and Loewenstein 2005a). Nowadays, social norms 
can thus be considered an economic concept as well. For example, Kevane and 
Wydick (2001) demonstrate that women in Burkina Faso with different social norms 
respond differently to changes in farmer capital, and Platteau (1997) suggests that 
social norms to increase the costs of non-cooperation (such as sanctioning 
mechanisms) could improve the efficiency of informal risk-sharing arrangements. In 
this thesis we consider social norms to be constraints on the effectiveness of 
development programs when they reduce or prevent positive impacts, while we 
consider them catalysts for development effectiveness if they are necessary for, or 
increase, positive impacts of development programs.16 We thus introduce 
norm-specific determinants of the effectiveness of development programs.    
 Despite the increased use of the concept of social norms in economics, major 
differences persist in the ways in which economists and sociologists measure social 
norms.17 To guard us against the disadvantages of the different approaches to 
measure social norms, we use multiple methodologies to specify social norms in this 
thesis, although we make most intensive use of attitudinal questions for measuring 
social norms. This methodology is dominant in the sociologists’ toolkit (Rauhut and 
Winter 2010), but promising examples can also be found in economics (e.g., Rao and 
Ibañez 2005; Deininger and Liu 2009a; Labonne and Chase 2011). We consider 
attitudinal surveys to be suitable instruments to provide proxies for social norms, 
even though we are aware of the potential disadvantage: attitudinal surveys may 
not be a reliable reflection of actual behaviour (Rauhut and Winter 2010).18
 An alternative way to measure social norms consists of lab experiments, which 
are mainly used by economists and psychologists. Economists have moved away 
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from the traditional view that “Economists…cannot perform the controlled 
experiments of chemists and biologists because they cannot easily control other 
important factors” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1985, p. 8). For example, Fehr et al. 
(1998) use lab experiments to demonstrate that norms of reciprocity give rise to 
higher than market-clearing wages. Similarly, Rege and Telle (2004) use a lab 
experiment to demonstrate that social approval and framing affect cooperation 
among strangers.19 However, recent evidence suggests that it is questionable 
whether findings from lab experiments can be extrapolated to the “real world”. 
Levitt and List (2007) argue that behaviour in the lab is influenced by at least five 
other factors apart from monetary calculations: “1) the presence of moral and 
ethical considerations; 2) the nature and extent of scrutiny of one’s actions by 
others; 3) the context in which the decision is embedded; 4) self-selection of the 
individuals making the decisions; and 5) the stakes of the game” (Levitt and List 
2007, p. 154). Each of these factors is likely to play a different role in “the real world” 
compared to the lab, suggesting that findings from lab experiments entail potential 
biases. Additionally, Rauhut and Winter (2010) argue that lab experiments might not 
fully grasp the complexities of social norms.20
 Rather than focusing on lab experiments, Levitt and List (2007) promote the use 
of field experiments. Field experiments can be classified into three categories: 1) 
artefactual field experiments, which are “the same as conventional lab experiment 
but with a nonstandard subject pool;” 2) framed field experiments, which are “the 
same as an artefactual field experiment but with field context in the commodity, 
task or information set that the subjects can use;” and 3) natural field experiments, 
which are “the same as a framed field experiment but where the environment is one 
where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and where the subjects do not 
know that they are in an experiment” (Harrison and List 2004, pp. 1013-1014).   
 Field experiments are less sensitive to the factors that influence the outcomes 
of lab experiments (Levitt and List 2007) and therefore more credibly reflect actual 
behaviour. Moreover, field experiments might bring even greater advantages in 
developing countries, since the stakes in experiments can be raised substantially 
without a significant increase in costs (Cameron 1999). Finally, field experiments 
might also be better equipped to deal with the complexities of social norms. For 
these reasons we consider field experiments to be a better method with which to 
measure social norms than lab experiments. To guard us against the disadvantage 
of exclusively measuring social norms with attitudinal surveys, we use a framed 
field experiment to measure the social norm to cooperate. 
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 The literature concerned with field experiments has not yet developed 
sufficiently to be able to develop a fully-fledged theoretical framework from this 
perspective. Instead, we mainly pay attention to theory as derived from behavioural 
economics, which is mostly based on the findings from lab experiments. With this 
focus we follow the earlier discussed suggestion of Deaton (2010a) to use theories 
as derived from behavioural economics to interpret the findings from impact 
evaluations. Although the findings from lab experiments cannot always be 
extrapolated to the real world, lab experiments focusing on qualitative insights can 
still suggest an underlying mechanism that might be at work (Levitt and List 2007). 
The qualitative insights from lab experiments may not give a quantitatively accurate 
picture, but can still play a useful role in explaining the outcomes from impact 
evaluations. We will now discuss the different social norms we discuss in this thesis: 
trust, gender norms and cooperative behaviour.  
 
1.3.1. Trust
Trust has been related to several economic variables, such as economic growth and 
individual income (Knack and Keefer 1997; Haddad and Maluccio 2003; Algan and 
Cahuc 2010). However, not many studies have focused on the potential role of trust 
in determining the effectiveness of development programs, even though many 
development programs implicitly recognise the value of trust by focusing on 
interpersonal relations, either between beneficiaries and/or between beneficiaries 
and donors. In this section we briefly review the literature on the role of trust in 
behavioural economics with a special focus on the role of trust in behavioural 
economics studies concerning developing countries.
 Sliwka (2007) introduces trust as a signal of a social norm by explaining findings 
from experiments in which internal motivations were crowded out by monetary 
incentives. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show, for example, that weak monetary 
incentives lead to reduced performance in comparison with a fixed compensation 
for tasks such as collecting money for a charity. Crowding out of motivation could be 
explained by assuming that three different types of economic agents exist. The first 
type is strictly selfish, while the second type can be considered fair. Sliwka (2007) 
introduces a third type, “those who are influenced in their moral convictions by 
what others will do.” As such, they can be considered conformists. Trusting the 
agent as a principal can be regarded as a signal of a fair social norm, resulting in the 
generation of trustworthiness among conformists. Trust can thus be interpreted as 
a signal of a social norm (Sliwka 2007). 
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 In the applied behavioural economics literature, trust has been measured both 
through experiments and attitudinal questions. Experiments usually measure trust 
in accordance with the “investment or trust game” (Berg, Dickhaut Jr., and McCabe 
1995). Two players are endowed with money as a show-up fee. The first mover is 
then given the chance to send as much of her endowment to an anonymous second 
mover as she wishes. Next, the experimenter triples the amount of money sent. 
Finally, the second mover sends back as much as he wishes (Cárdenas and Carpenter 
2008). The endowment share that the first mover sends could be interpreted as a 
proxy for the level of trust that the first mover has in the second mover. The amount 
that the second mover sends back in the experiment is usually considered a proxy 
for trustworthiness and/or a proxy for reciprocity. Game theory predicts that the 
first mover in the trust game would not send any money, because the second mover 
has no financial incentive to return any. 
 Experiments show different outcomes. In Tanzania, non-student first movers in 
a trust game send more than half of their endowments, and second movers return 
40%, on average (Cárdenas and Carpenter 2008). Trusting second movers is thus 
clearly a good investment in this example. However, Greig and Bohnet (2008) show 
that first movers from a slum in Nairobi only send 30% of their endowments, and 
second movers only return 30%, on average. The latter finding is consistent with the 
result of a review of trust games by Camerer (2003), who provides evidence that 
sending money to the second mover in a trust game usually does not pay off in a 
financial way. The question remains as to what motivates participants to be trusting 
in the trust game if there is no positive return to investment.   
 Ashraf et al. (2005b) provide evidence that trust in Russia, South Africa and the 
United States is related to expectations of trustworthiness, but also to altruism. 
Altruism can be measured using the dictator game, in which player A is given a sum 
of money, which he can distribute between himself and player B. The sum of money 
that player A gives to player B is usually identified as a measure of altruism (Cárdenas 
and Carpenter 2008). Karlan (2005) takes a different point of view regarding the 
interpretation of the trust game. His experiment among clients of a microfinance 
bank in Peru demonstrates that trust as measured in the trust game is positively and 
significantly related to default on loans. As such, Karlan (2005) interprets the 
behaviour of the first mover in a trust game as risk-taking and not as trusting or 
altruistic behaviour. It thus remains unclear whether trust as measured in the trust 
game can actually be interpreted as a well-defined proxy for trust.21        
 An alternative, more traditional way to measure trust can be found in the 
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General Social Survey, in which respondents state their level of agreement with the 
following statement: “Generally speaking would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” Measuring trust in 
this manner has been criticised, because it only takes into account stated preferences 
(Glaeser et al. 2000). Yet, if measuring trust using revealed preferences is more 
compatible with risk-taking or altruism than with trust, it remains unclear what 
exactly is the advantage of using revealed preferences for measuring trust. 
Additionally, Karlan (2005) shows that trustworthiness in the trust game is strongly 
positively correlated with trust as measured by the General Social Survey question, 
while Cárdenas and Carpenter (2008) provide evidence that the General Social 
Survey question is positively correlated with trust as measured in the trust game. 
These findings indicate that the answer to the General Social Survey question can at 
least be considered a good proxy for some of the revealed preferences of the 
respondents. This thesis uses a slightly modified version of the question, in which 
we ask for the level of agreement with the statement “Most people can be trusted” 
on a 5-point Likert scale. More information about the level of trust can be gathered 
using a 5-point Likert scale than by using a dichotomous variable. 
 However, we are not only interested in the relationship between generalised 
trust and the effectiveness of development programs. Bohnet and Baytelman (2007) 
provide experimental evidence that the implementation of tighter institutional 
constraints decreases intrinsically motivated trust. The stimulation of institutional 
trust could thus crowd out intrinsically motivated trust, just like monetary incentives 
can crowd out motivation. In this case, the question remains as to what kind of trust 
matters for effective development programs. Additionally, trust could have different 
implications for development effectiveness depending on the type of trustees 
involved. Therefore we ask questions about a person’s trust in different groups of 
people and about a person’s trust in the (employees of) NGOs that implement the 
development programs we discuss in this thesis, to measure more specific forms of 
trust. Trust in women, other community members and doctors are all used as 
determinants of the effectiveness of development programs in this thesis. In this 
way we can analyse potential trade-offs and distinguish between the effects of 
trust in different categories of people.22 We focus on out-group trust in health 
providers in Chapter Three of this thesis and on in-group trust in other community 
members in Chapter Four of this thesis. Out-group trust relates to trust in people 
outside the village, while in-group trust relates to people inside the village. Earlier 
literature has also demonstrated that bonding social capital, which can be linked to 
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strong ties and in-group trust, and bridging social capital, which can be linked to 
weak ties and out-group trust, can have differential effects on development 
outcomes. For example, Carter and Maluccio (2003) provide evidence that 
households in communities with more bridging social capital are better able to 
informally insure against health shocks. Bonding social capital does not appear to 
make a difference in this specific context. 
1.3.2. Gender norms
A second component of social norms that we discuss in this thesis is the gender norm. 
This concept can perhaps best be explained using the economic model of identity as it 
was introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), which we discuss formally and in more 
detail in Chapter Five. Identity is associated with different social categories and how 
people in these categories should behave. As such, identity can be considered a 
mechanism that results in different norms for people in different categories. The rules 
of the game are different for people with a different ethnic background or caste, but 
also for men and women. Following the behavioural prescriptions or norms for one’s 
gender affirms one’s identity as a man or a woman.23 Violating the norm elicits anxiety 
and discomfort in oneself (Ibid.). This discomfort can be strengthened by the use of 
external sanctioning mechanisms from individuals that dislike a person breaking the 
norm. From an economic perspective gendered identities can change the pay-offs from 
actions (Ibid.). Because gendered identities vary across societies, they carry different 
consequences from one location to the other. However, the position of women in the 
developing world is weaker compared to the position of men in almost all circumstances. 
There are only few matrilineal societies in the world (Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009). 
 Gender norms can be measured with both experiments and attitudinal 
questions. For example, findings from an artefactual field experiment in a patriarchal 
society (the Maasai in Tanzania) and an identical experiment in one of the few 
matrilineal societies in the developing world (the Khasi in Northeast India) 
demonstrate that culturally determined gender norms are strongly correlated with 
competitive behaviour (Gneezy et al. 2009).24 Individuals were asked to toss a tennis 
ball into a bucket that was placed 3 meters away. Before the start of the experiment, 
participants were asked how they would like to be paid for their performance. They 
could choose between 1) a payment of X per successful shot, independently of the 
performance of a competitor and 2) a payment of 3 * X per successful shot if they 
outperformed a competitor. The second choice can be regarded as a choice for a 
competitive environment. Among the Maasai men were more inclined to choose the 
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competitive environment than women. Interestingly, however, among the Khasi, 
women were more inclined to choose the competitive environment than men, 
suggesting that traditionally defined gender norms play a large role in determining 
social preferences among men and women (Ibid.).25 
 Information asymmetries between men and women could decrease the 
influence of gender norms. This was demonstrated by an experiment regarding 
spousal control and intra-household decision-making in the Philippines. In this 
setting men are expected to turn their earnings over to their wives for budgeting 
and allocation. Both men and women were asked to allocate an endowment 
between their personal account and the account of their spouse. In one condition 
choices were private, while in another condition the spouses were required to 
communicate their choices. The results show that men secretly put money in their 
personal accounts when choices were private. When required to communicate, men 
put money in their wives’ account (Ashraf 2009). 
 Gender norms can also be partially reversed by policies of positive discrimination. 
The reservation of seats for women in village councils in India significantly improved 
the provision of public goods for women (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004). Yet, it 
remains questionable whether norms discourage leadership activities of women in 
India even under such positive circumstances. Findings from a psychological “Implicit 
Association Test”, which in this case examines the strength of association of male 
and female names with leadership and domestic tasks, suggest that men are 
significantly more likely to associate male leaders with favourable characteristics 
than female leaders. Additionally, the test also indicates that female leaders are 
perceived as less effective than male leaders (Beaman et al. 2009). However, in 
villages with female leaders, the male stereotype is weakened, suggesting that 
female leadership has a small but significant mitigating effect on male stereotypes 
concerning female leadership in India (Ibid.). 
 Because of the link with actual behaviour, experiments like those described 
above could sometimes be useful devices to measure gender norms. However, 
experiments often fall short in the measurement of more complex elements of 
social norms (Rauhut and Winter 2010). Women’s autonomy is too complex and too 
context-specific to measure this aspect of gender norms with economic or 
psychological experiments. Therefore we use attitudinal questions to measure 
women’s autonomy in Chapter Five of this thesis, in which we analyse context-spe-
cific elements of women’s autonomy in India. In India, restrictions are usually placed 
on women to limit contact with men other than their husbands. Married women 
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usually remain veiled and have restricted mobility outside the house (Field, 
Jayachandran, and Pande 2010b). Agarwal (1994) further demonstrates that 
high-caste women in India are often more prone to respect conservative gender 
norms than low-caste women. She shows that upper-caste Hindus of the northwest 
forbid marriages with close kin and practice village exogamy, resulting in a greater 
risk for women to be excluded from land ownership. To analyse the autonomy of 
women in India, we follow the methodology of Deininger and Liu (2009a), who use 
attitudinal questions to proxy for women’s autonomy and other components of 
women’s empowerment. They show that women’s self-help groups in Andhra 
Pradesh in India have a strong positive impact on women’s autonomy as well as on 
other components of women’s empowerment. Bloch and Rao (2002) further 
demonstrate that qualitative analyses can generate testable model predictions 
regarding gender norms in their study concerned with dowry violence in rural India. 
They show that women who pay smaller dowries suffer an increased risk of marital 
violence. Furthermore, Adato et al. (2011) use qualitative analyses to show that 
gender norms are important for understanding the effectiveness of conditional 
cash transfer programs in Nicaragua, Turkey and El Salvador. Given the possible com-
plementarities between quantitative and qualitative data analyses we complement 
the analyses of our quantitative survey data with analyses from existing qualitative 
studies in the areas of intervention (Van der Velde 2009; Temmink 2009) when we 
discuss gender norms.    
1.3.3. Cooperative behaviour
Cooperative behaviour can also be regarded as a component of social norms (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000a; Ostrom 2000). Usually the degree of cooperative behaviour is 
estimated using the so-called public good game (a lab experiment). Public good 
games, which we discuss in detail in Chapter Six, offer a mechanism with which 
to identify voluntary contributions to public goods. In a linear public good game, 
participants are each given an endowment with the choice to invest some, all 
or none of it in a group project and an experimenter doubles the amount of 
contributions, the total of which is to be shared equally among all participants 
(whether they contributed or not). 
 Game theory predicts that none of the participants contributes anything. 
However, practical exercises with public good games demonstrate that voluntary 
contributions are usually in the range of 40 to 60% of the group optimum (Ledyard 
1995). Evidence from artefactual field experiments in 15 small-scale societies 
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suggests that public good games can be seen as an approximation of how social 
norms are maintained and established in practice. A substantial portion of outcomes 
could be explained by group-level differences in economic organisation and the 
structure of social interaction. Whale hunters on the East-Indonesian island of 
Lamalera, for example, contributed significantly higher amounts in a public good 
game than participants in the other small-scale societies, possibly reflecting the 
dependence of the whale hunters on cooperation of large groups on non-kinship 
members in whale hunting (Henrich et al. 2005). The findings suggest that 
ethnographic anthropological research on cooperation and competition in 
small-scale societies as described in Mead (1967) could also be a useful device for the 
derivation of economic hypotheses concerned with cooperative behaviour. The level 
of cooperation in the public good game could reflect a social norm to share among 
non-kinship members. This interpretation is also reflected in the findings from 
experiments by Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994), who show that social norms 
often regulate the use of common pool resources. 
 In the public good game reciprocal altruism could provide a soft incentive for 
individuals to provide at least something to the public good. If individuals are 
reciprocally altruistic, they respond kindly towards actions that are perceived to be 
kind and in a hostile manner to actions that are perceived to be hostile (Rabin 1993). 
In public good games, individuals could thus respond kindly by contributing, if they 
expect (for example from earlier experiences in society) that others will also 
contribute to the public good. Indeed, experimental evidence from developed as 
well as developing countries suggests that contributions to the public good game 
can best be predicted by the ex-ante beliefs that players have about the level of 
contribution of other participants in the experiment (Frey and Meier 2004; Cárdenas, 
Chong, and Ñopo 2009). 
 The strong dependence of individual contributions to a public good on the 
contributions of others does not necessarily equate with reciprocal altruism, if 
individuals believe that other participants have social preferences. With such beliefs, 
contributing to the public good could also be consistent with income maximisation. 
Yet, experimental evidence indicates that individuals respond in a hostile manner to 
individuals that contribute a relatively small sum to the public good. Fehr and 
Gächter (2000b) use an experimental design in which participants in a repeated 
public good game with ten periods have a probability to be matched with other 
participants in certain rounds of the game. If they are matched with other 
participants they hear about their contribution and have the opportunity to punish 
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the other participant by taking away a part of the pay-off. However, to punish other 
participants one has to give up a part of one’s own pay-off as well. Punishing is thus 
not consistent with income maximisation, unless the punisher can reap benefits 
from the future cooperation of free riders. Fehr and Gächter (2000b) provide 
evidence that punishment is consistent with reciprocal altruism by demonstrating 
that punishment increases with low contributions to the public good. Participants 
also appear to anticipate the punishment, given that contributions to a public good 
game with a punishment option consistently exceed the contributions to a public 
good game without such possibility of retaliation. Fehr and Gächter (2000b) also 
present evidence in support of the idea that punishment in a public good game 
continues when the punisher cannot reap any benefits from future cooperation, 
suggesting that punishment is not only inflicted to gain benefits from the future 
cooperation of free riders. Punishment is thus not consistent with income 
maximisation, but with reciprocal altruism. 
 Explicit use of sanctioning has, however, also been shown to result in lower 
contributions among the punished (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and List 2004). 
This finding is consistent with reciprocal altruism. Hostile actions in the form of 
punishment elicit hostile actions in the form of low contributions to a public good. 
Including punishment options to sustain social norms to cooperate might thus be 
most effective when the punishment option is not used (Fehr and List 2004). Under 
such circumstances, participants only anticipate punishment, resulting in higher 
contributions to the public good. 
 Contributions to public good games have also been related to inequity aversion. 
Most famously, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) demonstrate that the behaviour of 
participants in public good games is consistent with self-centered inequity aversion. 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 819) define inequity aversion as “people resisting 
inequitable outcomes; i.e. they are willing to give up some material payoff to move 
in the direction of more equitable outcomes”, while they consider inequity aversion 
self-centered if “people do not care per se about inequity that exists among other 
people but are only interested in the fairness of their own material payoff relative to 
the payoff of others”. They present evidence in support of the idea that under certain 
conditions contributions to a public good might be zero, even if there is only one 
player that is selfish, while the existence of a few inequity-averse players could 
result in incentives to contribute to the public good for everybody. 
 The findings regarding reciprocal altruism and self-centered inequity aversion 
clearly demonstrate that outcomes from public good games could be strongly 
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related to social norms. Arguably, however, the findings from a lab experiment like a 
public good game cannot always be extrapolated to the real world (Levitt and List 
2007). Since we are mainly interested in the relationship between cooperative 
behaviour and the design of development programs in this thesis, the question 
remains as to whether public good games actually tell us something about the 
willingness to contribute to local public goods among beneficiaries of development 
programs. The public good game only includes monetary gains for participants, 
which does not fit well with the type of local public goods that aid recipients 
normally receive. Only a small fraction of aid is currently given directly to poor 
people in the form of cash (Riddell 2007, p. 407). This makes the results of the public 
good game vulnerable to confusion amongst participants (Harrison and List 2004). 
Field experiments might provide a better alternative for the measurement of 
cooperative behaviour. We come back to this issue in Chapter Six of this thesis, in 
which we present the findings from a field experiment to analyse the social norm to 
cooperate.  
1.4.  Social Norms and the effectiveness of  
development programs
Studies concerned with the relationship between the concept of social norms and 
the effectiveness of development programs are relatively scarce. So far, applied 
development micro-economists have mainly been analysing the relationship 
between behavioural incentives and the effectiveness of development programs 
(e.g., Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 2006; Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2011; Banerjee et al. 
2010).  
   From the few studies concerned with social norms and the effectiveness of 
development programs that were conducted at the micro level, some pay attention 
to the role of social sharing norms. Social sharing norms across family and kinship 
networks were introduced in the economics literature by Platteau (2000). Based on 
this literature, Di Falco and Bulte (forthcoming) demonstrate that households with 
more kinship links spend less of their income on liquid and sharable assets to avoid 
claims from kin. Social sharing norms may also make it more difficult for development 
programs to achieve their objectives. They may reduce the impact of market-orient-
ed income-generating activities (Bernard, De Janvry, and Sadoulet 2010).  There 
exists mixed evidence in support of this idea. Brune et al. (2011) show that social 
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sharing norms result in weak incentives to invest in profitable agricultural inputs in 
Malawi, most likely because farmers are forced to share extra profits with their kin. 
The use of a commitment savings product has a positive impact on the investment 
in profitable agricultural inputs in this context. Additionally, the positive impact is 
larger for households facing a stronger pressure to share profits among kinship 
members. By contrast, Fafchamps et al. (2011) do not find evidence in support of a 
role of social sharing norms in determining the impact of financial capital on the 
profits of micro enterprises in Ghana. Instead, they find that financial capital 
increases profits for men as well as for women without hyperbolic discount rates, 
but not for women with hyperbolic discount rates.26 In this context, psychological 
constraints appear to play a more important role for the effectiveness of 
development programs than norm-specific constraints.   
 Findings from a study in Sri Lanka nonetheless indicate that gender norms 
might play a role in determining the impact of financial capital on micro enterprises. 
De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) demonstrate that access to financial capital 
has strong positive impacts on the profitability of micro enterprises run by men, 
while female-led micro enterprises do not seem to benefit from financial capital. 
Gender norms might also play a positive role for the effectiveness of development 
programs. Agüero, Carter, and Woolard (2009) find positive impacts of unconditional 
cash transfers on the nutrition of children in South Africa. They hypothesise that the 
relatively high positive impacts could be related to the fact that cash transfers in 
this context are mostly made to women, whose preferences are presumed to be 
more child-centric. The transgression of gender norms has also been related to the 
impact of development programs, by determining the impact of women’s self-help 
groups on women’s autonomy in India. As discussed in Section 1.3.2, Deininger and 
Liu (2009a) show that women’s self-help groups in Andhra Pradesh in India have a 
strong positive impact on women’s empowerment. From a different perspective, 
Ruben, Fort, and Zúñiga-Arias (2009) show that fair trade can have a negative 
impact on women’s bargaining power. The lack of bargaining power for women 
could make it more difficult for women to break the existing gender norm.  
 A number of studies have demonstrated that a restriction on women’s autonomy 
can have consequences for fertility as well. For example, Ashraf, Field, and Lee (2010) 
provide evidence that the provision of vouchers to women to facilitate access to 
modern contraceptives was only effective in increasing contraceptive use when the 
husband was not present at the time of the handing out of the voucher. From a 
different perspective, Field et al. (2010b) present evidence in support of the idea that 
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Hindu women with severe restrictions on agency increased their business income 
following a business training program, while Muslim women with severe restrictions 
on agency failed to benefit (Field et al. 2010b). The study of Field et al. (2010b) is one 
of the few impact evaluations that explicitly aim to relate development effectiveness 
to prevailing gender norms. Yet, the study does not explicitly measure gender norms, 
but commences from the preconception that gender norms in India are more 
conservative among high-caste Hindu and Muslim women than for low-caste Hindu 
women. 
 The few studies related to trust and the effectiveness of development programs 
also fail to link levels of trust to heterogeneous impacts of development programs in 
an explicit way. Pan and Christiaensen (2011) focus on the targeting performance of 
a development program to subsidise agricultural inputs in Tanzania and demonstrate 
that the program is less vulnerable to elite capture in villages with relatively high 
levels of generalised trust. Most other studies related to trust and the effectiveness 
of development programs use trust as a dependent variable. Rao and Ibañez (2005) 
show that investments in community-based social funds in Jamaica have a positive 
impact on generalised trust. Related to this, Janssens (2010) demonstrates that 
women’s self-help groups in India can have a positive impact on generalised trust as 
well. In addition, Labonne and Chase (2011) demonstrate that community-driven 
development projects enhance generalised trust in the Philippines. By contrast, in 
the same study they find a negative impact of community-driven development on 
collective action, while Rao and Ibañez (2005) demonstrate a positive impact of the 
Jamaican Investment fund on the capacity for collective action. However, both of 
these studies use a survey-based measure of collective action. Until now, there has 
been only one study demonstrating the impact of a development program on the 
voluntary contributions to a public good game. Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein 
(2009) provide evidence that efforts to build democratic, community-level 
institutions for supporting participatory processes in Liberia have a positive impact 
on the norm to cooperate.
 Social norms might also in turn be affected by development programs. However, 
fertility programs in Bangladesh were only able to transform norms about fertility in 
the very long run (Munshi and Myaux 2006). Paluck and Green (2009) nevertheless 
demonstrate that a radio program aimed at discouraging blind obedience and 
collective action in problem solving in Rwanda had a positive impact on the 
willingness to express dissent and the way community problems were resolved. 
Additionally, development programs could also improve development in the short 
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run by mitigating the effect of conservative social norms. Miguel (2005) 
demonstrates that negative economic shocks in the form of droughts or excessive 
rainfall increase the number of ‘witch killings’ in Tanzania. In Tanzania, social beliefs 
exist that witches (mostly elderly women) could be responsible for droughts. The 
elderly could thus also be held responsible for the economic downturn following a 
drought in this context. This belief could be explained, if only subconsciously, by the 
fact that the elderly are usually the least productive household members in Tanzania, 
suggesting that killing the elderly yields the greatest economic benefit after a 
drought. Empirical evidence suggests that the provision of pensions has reduced the 
number of witch killings in South Africa (Miguel 2005). For this reason, Miguel 
(2005) argues that providing pensions to the elderly as well as insuring households 
against droughts could reduce the number of witch killings in Tanzania. 
 Based on these earlier findings, this thesis elaborates on four key hypotheses. 
First, we hypothesise that trust in health providers is positively related to the impact 
of health education on the use of insecticide-treated bednets. This hypothesis is 
based on the idea that the demand for preventive health care is low when the 
general perception is that health providers cannot be trusted (Das and Das 2003). 
Second, we hypothesise that trust in other community members is related to the 
impact of the dissemination of information in social networks about the prospects 
of new cash crops on the adoption of these new commercial crops. This hypothesis 
comes from the finding that only kinship-related social networks generate social 
effects that result in positive externalities in agricultural output in Tanzania (Van 
den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). The third hypothesis we present relates to the 
relationship between gender norms and the effectiveness of self-help groups that 
aim for the autonomy of women. We expect that the impact of self-help groups on 
the subjective well-being of their members is negatively related to the conservative-
ness of the gender norm in this context, because the violation of gender norms 
could create anxiety and discomfort for self-help group members that used to have 
restricted mobility outside the house before their membership (Akerlof and Cranton 
2000; Field et al. 2010b). Finally, we hypothesise that the introduction of small 
short-term benefits within the design of health programs with supposed long-term 
benefits is positively related to cooperative behaviour in the provision of health 
programs with supposed long-term benefits. This hypothesis comes from the 
finding that the provision of small short-term benefits can increase the demand for 
prevention, which usually has long-term rather than short-term benefits (Banerjee 
et al. 2010).
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1.5. Thesis outline
To improve the understanding regarding the relationship between social norms and 
the effectiveness of development programs, the following two questions guide our 
research:  
1) How do social norms influence the effectiveness of development programs?
2) Does the design of programs influence social norms in the wider community? 
Chapters 3-5 discuss the first research question regarding the relationship between 
social norms and the effectiveness of development programs, while Chapter Six is 
related to the second research question regarding the direct link from the design of 
development programs to social norms in the wider community. The first research 
question can be subdivided into three sub-questions: 
1a) How does out-group trust influence the effectiveness of development programs? 
1b) How does in-group trust influence the effectiveness of development programs? 
1c) How do gender norms influence the effectiveness of development programs?      
For the second research question we focus on the specific relationship between the 
design of development programs and the social norm to cooperate in the wider 
community in Peru. 
 Table 1.1 presents an overview of the development programs, geographic 
contexts and social norms that we discuss in this thesis. Additionally, the table also 
outlines in which chapter we discuss the above discussed research questions. 
Chapters 3-5 are reserved for the research question regarding the relationship 
between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs, while 
Chapters 6 is reserved for the research question concerned with the link between 
the design of development programs and social norms in the wider community.  
Introduction | 45 1
To address the research questions systematically we first provide a thorough 
introduction to the impact assessment methodology we use in this thesis and a 
review of the debate on randomised control trials and quasi-experimental 
evaluations in Chapter Two. We then present a case study from Ghana in Chapter 
Three, in which we relate individual trust in health providers to the impact of health 
education. The chapter demonstrates that trust in health providers increases the 
impact of health education on the ownership and use of insecticide-treated bednets, 
while generalised trust has no independent effect on malaria prevention measures. 
Traditional beliefs about malaria are supposedly only replaced with modern beliefs 
following health education if trust in health providers is sufficiently strong. These 
findings suggest that out-group trust in health providers is potentially more 
important for development outcomes than in-group trust. In Chapter Four we 
nonetheless focus on in-group trust and its relationship with crop adoption in the 
Indian Himalaya. We also come back to the role of networks in this chapter. We 
Table 1.1	 Development	programs,	location	and	social	norms
Chapter Research Question Social Norm Development 
Program
Geographic 
Context
3 How do social 
norms influence 
the effectiveness 
of development 
programs?
Trust in health 
providers
Health Education Ghana
4 How do social 
norms influence 
the effectiveness 
of development 
programs?
In-group trust Farmer Federation Uttarakhand,  
India
5 How do social 
norms influence 
the effectiveness 
of development 
programs? 
Gender norm Women’s Self-Help 
Group
Orissa, India
6 Does the design 
of development 
programs influence 
social norms in the 
wider community? 
Social norm to 
cooperate
Health Education Villa el Salvador, 
Lima Peru
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provide evidence in support of the idea that social networks and trust are 
complementary to each other in solving information asymmetries in agriculture. 
In-group trust appears to be more important than out-group trust in explaining the 
relationship between in-group trust, social networks and crop adoption in the 
specific context of the Indian Himalaya. Additionally, we also provide evidence that 
village level generalised trust enables the effective dissemination of information in 
social networks about the prospects of new cash crops. Nevertheless, the 
relationships between trust, social networks and crop adoption are only significant 
for risky crops with ambiguous prospects from the point of view of the farmers in 
the Indian Himalaya.      
 In Chapter Five we focus on the impact of women’s self-help groups on subjective 
well-being in Orissa, India. We find that, on average, self-help group membership 
does not affect subjective well-being. However, our results at the same time reveal 
that subjective well-being sharply declines for those members whose autonomy 
meets with relatively conservative gender norms among non-members. In addition, 
we present evidence regarding the positive impacts of self-help group membership 
on women’s autonomy. From here we conclude that conservative gender norms can 
be a constraint on development effectiveness. However, we should be careful not to 
over-interpret this result. Although our data do not allow for testing for the influence 
of self-help groups on the autonomy of non-self-help group members, evidence 
from related studies indicates that gender norms of self-help group members may 
spill over to non-members as well (e.g., Munshi and Myaux 2006; Deininger and Liu 
2009a; Janssens forthcoming). Hence, although in the medium run development 
programs aimed at the transgression of gender norms could be more effective in 
villages with relatively liberal gender norms, in the long run development programs 
could change the gender norm at the community level. Unfortunately, however, we 
are not yet able to analyse the proposition regarding the long-run relationship 
between self-help group programs and gender norms with the data available to us. 
Therefore we do not aim to answer research questions related to this proposition in 
this thesis, although some attention will be given to them.    
 In Chapter Six, we provide evidence that the stimulation of the social norm to 
cooperate could contribute to investments in health education in Peru: a local public 
good with alleged long-term benefits. We also demonstrate that willingness to 
invest in health education is higher than generally perceived, amongst other reasons 
because participants gain from the short-term benefit of learning from health 
education. Using an experimental approach, we show that the poor, when given the 
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choice and without liquidity constraints, might invest substantial amounts of 
money in public goods with expected long-term benefits without losing the agency 
to exercise control over funds. High discount rates supposedly only have a weak 
effect on voluntary contributions to local public goods with expected long-term 
benefits when long-term benefits are complemented with short-term benefits. In 
addition, we also present evidence that merely asking beneficiaries to contribute 
voluntarily to health education could also result in an increase in voluntary 
contributions, just like providing information about the likely long-term benefits of 
health education. The findings indicate that the design of development programs 
influences the social norm to cooperate in the wider community. The addition of 
complementary short-term benefits, the request to beneficiaries to contribute and 
the provision of information about supposed long-term benefits all appear to make 
a contribution to the social norm to cooperate in the provision of local public goods 
with long-term benefits. 
 Finally, in Chapter Seven we summarize the evidence concerned with the 
relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs 
as well as the findings regarding the direct relationship between development 
programs and social norms in the wider community.  Additionally, we discuss the 
main contributions of this thesis to the academic literature. Finally, we forward 
several policy implications related to the targeting of development programs and 
the tools that are needed for such targeting mechanisms. 

2
Impact Evaluation for 
Estimating Heterogeneous Effects
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Proponents of randomised evaluations tend to consider evidence from non- 
randomised events to be less credible than evidence from randomised control trials 
(e.g., Banerjee 2007; Karlan and Appel 2011; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). On the other 
hand, several scholars criticise the current focus on randomised control trials for its 
lack of attention to external validity and contextual characteristics (Rodrik 2008; 
Deaton 2010a; Posner 2011). In order to lay bare the potential trade-off between 
internal and external validity in impact evaluations, this chapter focuses on the 
estimation of heterogeneous impacts. Within this focus we do not merely discuss 
methodological issues; we also highlight the use of findings from randomised 
control trials and quasi-experimental evaluations for policy purposes. 
 In Section 2.1 we demonstrate that the internal validity of randomised 
evaluations is, on average, higher than that of quasi-experimental evaluations. In 
Section 2.2 we then present a concise overview of the different points of view 
regarding the use of randomised control trials and quasi-experimental evaluations 
in (development) economics with a focus on the external validity of impact 
evaluations. The latter mainly serves to introduce the practice of measuring 
heterogeneous impacts, to which we turn our attention in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 
provides a comparative assessment of the estimation methods we use in this thesis 
against the background of the potential trade-off between the internal and external 
validity of impact evaluations. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes with a comparison of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the quasi-experimental methods we use in this 
thesis and some final thoughts regarding the potential trade-off between internal 
and external validity in impact evaluations. 
2.1. Randomised versus quasi-experimental evaluations
The impact evaluations we present in this thesis are so-called “quasi-experimental” 
evaluations. A number of influential scholars, however, have drawn attention to the 
merits of randomised control trials relative to quasi-experimental evaluations over 
the past few years. These so-called randomistas (Deaton 2010a) question the 
statistical assumptions that are needed for the estimation of causal effects with 
quasi-experimental techniques, because a solution to the attribution problem 
requires assumptions that are difficult to test for non-randomised events (Banerjee 
2007; Banerjee and Duflo 2011; Karlan and Appel 2011).27 
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  Attribution refers to both isolating and estimating the contribution of an 
intervention to the outcome, by testing whether causality runs from the intervention 
to the outcome. The counterfactual situation of the group subject to the intervention 
(‘treatment’ group) in the absence of the intervention is by definition unobserved. 
Therefore, the attribution problem is essentially a problem of missing data. The 
counterfactual situation for the treatment group can be reconstructed by the use of 
a control group that is not subject to the intervention under study but should 
otherwise be as similar as possible. (Ravallion 2001). 
 In this thesis we focus on methodologies for impact evaluation which explicitly 
tackle the attribution problem. The availability of a control group is thus a necessary 
condition for a rigorous impact evaluation. Hence, evaluations of programs for 
which suitable control groups are not available, such as lobby and advocacy 
activities, fall outside the scope of this thesis.28 Although evaluations without the 
use of a control group can certainly be useful for different learning and accountability 
purposes, learning about the attribution of development programs to development 
outcomes is not possible without the use of a control group.29,30 Impact evaluations 
as defined in this thesis should not be confused with the impact evaluation definition 
of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD); “Positive and negative, primary and 
secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or 
indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD-DAC 2002). Many impact evaluations 
that fall under the DAC definition explicitly state that attribution is not possible 
(White 2010).
 By contrast, both randomised control trials and quasi-experimental evaluations 
aim for a solution to the attribution problem. In randomised evaluations the 
counterfactual situation of the treatment group is reconstructed by measuring the 
outcome for a randomly selected control group that was not subject to the 
intervention. In quasi-experimental evaluations the aim is to reconstruct the 
counterfactual situation by the use of a control group that is chosen such that it is 
comparable with the treatment group, but the selection does not proceed in a 
random fashion. This non-random selection of beneficiaries could distort the impact 
estimate as a result of selection bias (Ravallion 2001). Several methods are available 
to control for this bias and to derive the impact of development programs using 
quasi-experimental methods. We discuss those which we apply in this thesis 
(propensity score matching, the instrumental variable regression approach, and the 
lagged (dependent) variable regression approach) in Section 2.4.   
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The potential bias in quasi-experimental methods can be illustrated by Rubin’s 
(1974) potential outcomes framework. Formally the attribution problem can be 
defined as follows; a program is assigned to a treatment group in a population P and 
is denoted by D, the binary variable of participation in the program. D=1 if person i 
participates in the program and 0 otherwise. Person i can receive two values 
depending on her participation in the program, i.e. Y=Y1 if D=1 and Y=Y0 if D=0. The 
impact of the program on person i is the difference between the outcomes Y1 and Y0. 
However, by definition one of these outcomes is unobserved. For those who 
participated in the program we can only observe Y1, while for those who did not 
participate we only observe Y0. The individual impact of the program cannot be 
reliably estimated, but when the beneficiaries of the program are randomly selected 
from the population P the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) can be estimated by 
comparing the mean value of the outcome of the individuals that were randomly 
selected for the program with the mean value of the outcome of the individuals that 
were not selected. Mathematically, this can be illustrated as in Equation 2.1:  
1 0 1 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ATE E E Y Y E Y E Y= ∆ = − = −  (2.1)
When the beneficiaries of a program are randomly selected from a specific sub-
population, only the program impact on those who participated in the program 
from the sub-population can be estimated. This estimator is usually defined as the 
Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) and can be mathematically illustrated 
as in Equation 2.2, where S=1 for those who are part of the sub-population:  
1 0 1 0( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1) ( | 1)ATT E S E Y Y S E Y S E Y S= ∆ = = − = = = − =  (2.2)
The ATE and ATT are usually different from each other, because targeting of a 
specific sub-population typically depends on expectations regarding the potential 
impact of the intervention. Moreover, self-selection into treatment also generally 
depends on these expectations.  One would therefore expect the ATT to exceed the 
ATE in the presence of benevolent and competent policy makers or if there is 
self-selection into treatment. 
 A number of assumptions are needed to estimate the ATE and ATT using Rubin’s 
(1974) potential outcomes framework. Perhaps the most important assumption is 
that of unconfoundedness or conditional independence (Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). According to this assumption, the potential outcomes Y should be independent 
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of treatment assignment T, given a set of observable characteristics X, which are not 
affected by the treatment assignment, as illustrated in Equation 2.3 (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008) :  
 (2.3) 
With random assignment of the treatment to a group of beneficiaries the 
expectation is that the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment 
assignment. Under this condition a mean comparison of the outcome variable 
between treated subjects and the control group should be sufficient to estimate the 
ATT if the sample size is sufficiently large. However, without random assignment it 
remains questionable whether the outcome is independent of the treatment 
assignment in expectation, because of selection bias. Hence quasi-experimental 
evaluations are more susceptible to selection bias, indicating that the assumption of 
conditional independence is questionable for non-randomised events. Therefore, 
the internal validity as derived from findings from randomised evaluations is usually 
higher than the internal validity as derived from findings from non-randomised 
events.
 A second key assumption for estimating the ATE and ATT is that of overlap or 
identical equivalence. This assumption concerns the similarity of the covariate 
distributions for treated and untreated populations. In randomised evaluations the 
assumption of overlap is only true asymptotically (Bruhn and McKenzie 2009; 
Barrett and Carter 2010).31  Studies with a randomised component that are based on 
small samples might thus fail the balancing condition of an identical distribution of 
observed and unobserved variables.
 In the end all rigorous impact evaluations rely on assumptions, even when 
interventions are randomised. It is still not possible to estimate individual impacts 
with the methods presently available, and heterogeneity in unobservables can 
always bias the impact estimates. As Barrett and Carter (2010) argue “Just as the 
original gold standard depended on a range of assumptions – that ultimately proved 
untenable, leading to the collapse of the gold standard – so does the claim of internal 
validity depend on multiple, strong, often-contestable assumptions”. Additionally, 
Leamer (2010, p. 33) writes, “[y]ou and I know that truly consistent estimators are 
imagined, not real. …[But some] may think that it is enough to wave a clove of garlic 
and chant “randomisation” to solve all our problems just as  an earlier cohort of 
econometricians have acted as if it were enough to chant ‘instrumental variable.’” 
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However, this does not mean that the estimation of treatment effects is a futile 
exercise, only that we should be careful not to overstate the merits of randomised 
compared to quasi-experimental evaluations.32 Both rely on statistical assumptions. 
Nevertheless, on average, the internal validity as derived from findings from 
randomised evaluations is higher than the internal validity as derived from findings 
from non-randomised events. 
 Recent meta-analyses from medical science suggest that there is little reason to 
believe that randomised control trials result in radically different effects than 
impact evaluations based on non-randomised interventions. Concato, Shah, and 
Horowitz (2000) demonstrate that the average results of quasi-experimental 
impact estimates are similar to those of randomised evaluations. Benson and Hartz 
(2000) find similar results in their meta-analyses on a comparison of findings from 
randomised and quasi-experimental evaluations of medical interventions between 
1985 and 1998. This view runs counter to the idea of the movement for evidence-based 
medicine, which strongly endorses the use of randomised control trials to estimate 
the impact of medical therapies. This view is rooted in findings from studies in the 
1970s and 1980s demonstrating that impact estimates derived from non-randomised 
studies were much higher than those as derived from randomised control trials 
(Worrall 2007). Benson and Hartz (2000) presume that the findings are different 
because current quasi-experimental studies are methodologically superior to quasi-
experimental studies from the 1970s and 1980s. 
2.2. The costs and benefits of randomised control trials 
Despite the recent more nuanced discussion in medical science, some economists 
also label randomised evaluations as the gold standard for impact evaluation today. 
Duflo and Kremer (2005) go that far to argue that the introduction of randomised 
control trials could revolutionise social policy in the 21st century, just like it 
revolutionised medical science in the 20th century. However, as shown in the previous 
section the merits of randomised compared to quasi-experimental evaluations 
should not be overstated. Moreover, efforts to randomise often face practical 
problems (e.g. Worrall 2007; Rodrik 2008; Deaton 2010a; Barrett and Carter 2010; 
Posner 2011). The next two sections serve to introduce the problems associated with 
randomised control trials and compare them with the problems concerned with 
quasi-experimental evaluations. Although we focus mostly on problems related to 
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internal and external validity, we also highlight several other problems associated 
with rigorous impact evaluations. We then focus on the estimation of heterogeneous 
impacts to contribute to a potential solution for policy evaluation problems 
associated with internal as well as external validity. 
2.2.1. Internal versus external validity
Perhaps the most important uncertainty surrounding randomised evaluations is 
whether findings can be credibly extrapolated to different settings, i.e., whether the 
results are externally valid (Rodrik 2008; Deaton 2010a; Posner 2011).33 The criticism 
regarding the external validity of randomised evaluations rests mainly on the idea 
that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs (Posner 2011). 
Community characteristics should thus be taken into consideration to solve external 
validity problems (Barrett and Carter 2010; Posner 2011). By contrast, the current 
focus on internal validity and average treatment effects in a specific context 
complicates learning about development mechanisms in different contextual 
settings. Duflo (2004) suggests that the external validity of randomised evaluations 
could be enhanced by doing a series of experiments in different contextual settings. 
Yet, as Rodrik (2008) argues, “few randomised evaluations – if any – offer a structural 
model that describes how the proposed policy will work, if it does, and under what 
circumstances it will not, if it doesn’t. Absent a full theory that is being put to a test, 
it is somewhat arbitrary to determine under what different conditions the 
experiment ought to be repeated.” 
 Quasi-experimental evaluations might also suffer from problems related to 
external validity. However, outcomes from randomised evaluations might 
systematically overestimate the impact of development programs relative to 
outcomes from quasi-experimental evaluations. Randomised evaluations require 
extensive capacity from aid distributors. Hence aid distributors commissioning 
randomised evaluations might have significantly higher-quality development 
programs compared to aid distributors that do not have the capacity to control the 
randomised allocation of development programs. The difference in capacity might 
result in a stronger external validity for quasi-experimental evaluations compared 
to randomised control trials, because the participation of high-quality aid distributors 
will almost certainly overstate the effect of interventions evaluated by randomised 
control trials (Barrett and Carter 2010).34 Banerjee and Duflo (2011) also argue that 
NGOs that commission randomised evaluations usually offer high-quality 
development programs.  
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Ravallion (2009) and Acemoglu (2010) further argue that scaling up is a special case 
of the problem of external validity of findings from impact evaluations. Larger 
programs tend to be more prone to corruption (Deaton 2006), but program impacts 
might also become more pro-poor when the program is scaled up. The latter is 
illustrated by evidence from Argentina, Bangladesh and India indicating that the 
targeting performance of development programs improves with scale (Ravallion 
2004). The scaling up of development programs could also result in general 
equilibrium and political economy effects. Usually, impact evaluations only focus on 
a partial equilibrium, implicitly assuming that interventions will not change factor 
prices, technology and political responses from various actors and interest groups.  
 Nevertheless, development programs can certainly influence factor prices under 
certain conditions. For example, Attanasio et al. (forthcoming) incorporate general 
equilibrium effects in their discussion of the relationship between the Mexican 
PROGRESA cash transfer programme and school enrolment, suggesting that the 
program has a positive impact on the wage of child labourers. Hence, when impact 
evaluations do not account for the general equilibrium effect of educational policies on 
wages, the impact of educational programs on development outcomes could be biased. 
An example in which political economy considerations are important comes from 
southern Ghana, for which Goldstein and Udry (2008) suggest that the amount of 
fallowing in agriculture is insufficient. Failing to account for political economy 
considerations would result in the policy recommendation to stimulate fallowing. Yet, 
fallowing increases the risk of confiscation of land by powerful chiefs, suggesting that 
impact evaluations that ignore political economy issues would overestimate the welfare 
gains of fallowing in southern Ghana (Goldstein and Udry 2008; Acemoglu, 2010). 
2.2.2. Other potential problems with randomised control trials
We outline six different critical points regarding the use of randomised control trials 
in economics. First, it may be immoral to exclude some households from the benefits 
of an intervention at random. For example, the withholding of vaccines from young 
children to determine the impact of polio on economic outcomes is widely considered 
unethical because of the clear health benefits of polio vaccination. Additionally, 
randomised evaluations can also harm subjects and non-subjects alike (Barrett and 
Carter 2010), while researchers should always strive for the do-no-harm principle, 
which is not always possible when randomised control trials are expected to entail 
adverse consequences for beneficiaries and/or non-beneficiaries (Ibid.). For example, 
Bertrand et al. (2007) provide financial incentives for individuals in India without a 
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driver’s licence to obtain one, which might induce them to bribe officials in order to 
receive a licence. In this case, randomised evaluations could be considered unethical 
because the illegal acquisition of driver’s licenses could result in dangerous traffic 
situations for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. When financial constraints do not 
permit the intervention to benefit everybody and adverse consequences are not 
expected, randomisation may, on the other hand, be the fairest way to select the 
beneficiaries of a development program (Duflo et al. 2007). 
 Second, the use of randomised evaluations is currently mostly focused on 
programs that yield quick results (Ravallion 2009a), while many development 
interventions are only expected to produce results in the long run. The timing of 
evaluation is thus crucial when conducting evaluations. Woolcock (2009) explains 
the importance of timing by describing a number of impact trajectories for various 
development projects. A randomised evaluation can give a misguided idea about 
the success of a development program when it is not clear beforehand whether a 
program is likely to result in short-term benefits for beneficiaries. If, for example, a 
randomised evaluation of a program to enhance women’s empowerment is carried 
out shortly after the start of the program, one might find no or even negative 
impacts, because theory would suggest that outcomes for beneficiaries of the 
women’s empowerment program get worse before they – it is hoped – get better 
(Woolcock 2009).35 
 Third, randomised evaluations are usually more easily applicable to homogenous 
interventions with clearly defined target groups, while development interventions 
are often complex and non-linear (Vaessen 2010). For this reason, Blattman (2008) 
refers to the ‘overvaluation’ of economic, education and health interventions while 
ignoring peace-building, crime reduction and governance issues. Similarly, Ravallion 
(2009a) suggests that evaluators themselves can become lobbyists for their 
favourite methods. This lobbying behaviour might result in starting with the 
method, not the question, in the process of writing down a research proposal 
leading to a non-random selection of evaluations, namely, evaluations of programs 
that are relatively easy to evaluate with randomised control trials. A strong focus on 
randomised control trials could thus result in a substitution away from studies 
concerned with the impact of programs that are not easy to evaluate using 
randomised designs. 
 Fourth, the estimation of the impact of individual development programs does 
not account for potential complementarities between development programs 
(Ravallion 2009a). The whole of the impact of development programs might be 
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greater than the sum of the parts. However, when interactions between the impacts 
of development programs are negative, the whole of the impact of development 
programs might actually be smaller than the sum of the parts. These hypotheses 
cannot be tested with impact evaluations of individual development programs. 
However, when complementarities are expected, these could be tested by 
randomised designs with multiple control groups and combinations of interventions. 
Researchers could, for example, estimate the complementarities between two 
programs with the design of an evaluation in which Group One receives benefits 
from two programs, Group Two receives benefits from only one of the programs and 
Group Three only receives benefits from the other program. Finally, Group Four 
receives no benefits. The design of this so-called 2x2 cross-cutting randomisation 
design does nonetheless require a larger sample size to detect significant effects of 
the development programs. 
 Fifth, randomised evaluations could suffer problems from behaviour changes of 
the treatment and/or the comparison group as a result of being part of, or knowing 
about, the randomised evaluation. Changes in behaviour among the treatment 
group are usually referred to as Hawthorne effects, while changes in behaviour 
among the comparison group are called John Hendry effects. For example, when the 
treatment group knows that they are part of a treatment, this may induce them to 
work harder. By contrast, the comparison group may feel offended to be only a 
comparison group, which may induce them to work less (Duflo et al. 2007).   
 Sixth, the difficulty to learn about development mechanisms is exacerbated by 
the publication bias of academic journals. Usually, replications of impact evaluations 
in different settings are discouraged because academic journals have a preference 
for studies that discuss the newest insights in the field. These studies may receive 
more publicity. Moreover, academics as well as academic journals are usually more 
interested in publishing positive results, which also receive more publicity (Ravallion 
2009a). 
 From the criticisms discussed above, several also hold for quasi-experimental 
evaluations. This once again demonstrates that randomised and quasi-experimental 
evaluations share many similarities. Quasi-experimental evaluations are also often 
focused on homogenous interventions with clearly defined target groups that yield 
quick results and it is frequently not possible to estimate the complementary effects 
of development programs after a quasi-experimental evaluation of a single 
development program. Nevertheless, quasi-experimental evaluations are still feasible 
when ethical issues prevent the use of randomised evaluations for causal inference. 
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Moreover, Hawthorne and/or John Hendry effects are usually less of a problem in 
quasi-experimental evaluations. Publication bias may nonetheless be even larger with 
quasi-experimental evaluations, in which researchers are able to choose their own 
comparison groups. In quasi-experimental evaluations researchers who do not obtain 
positive results might try different comparison groups in order to be able to publish. 
This strategy is much harder after a randomised control trial (Duflo 2004). In order to 
reliably estimate the impact of development programs using a quasi-experimental 
research design and to prevent publication bias, researchers should always bear in 
mind the statistical assumptions underlying quasi-experimental methods. Only then 
can the researchers’ self-serving bias, which may cloud the evaluation of an 
intervention’s success, be prevented (Mullainathan 2007).   
2.2.3. An incremental research paradigm
The criticisms of randomised evaluations discussed above indicate that a future 
research agenda in development economics should be driven by relevance or 
importance for either research or policy purposes and not by the ease with which a 
research question can be addressed through randomisation (Ravallion 2009a). 
Leamer (1983, p. 31) cautioned that “[o]ne should not jump to the conclusion that 
there is necessarily a substantive difference between drawing inferences from 
experimental as opposed to nonexperimental data”. Hence, to learn about the 
effectiveness of development programs, one will need to continue conducting qua-
si-experimental impact evaluations. 
 Despite the nuances we present in this section, there is nonetheless an 
important case to be made for using randomised evaluations on many occasions, 
based on their superiority in internal validity. It is still questionable, and most likely 
untestable, which methodology results in findings with a higher external validity. 
Although Posner (2011), Barrett and Carter (2010) and Deaton (2010a) suggest that 
randomised evaluations are strong in terms of internal validity but weak in external 
validity, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) as well as Angrist and Pischke (2010), suggest that 
randomised control trials are not necessarily weak in terms of external validity. The 
latter group of authors favour a more incremental research paradigm, in which 
replication studies in different contexts should prove or disprove the external 
validity of findings from rigorous impact evaluations.36 For example, Fafchamps et al. 
(2011) demonstrate that the impact of the transfer of equipment or inventories for 
businesses on the profits of female-owned micro-enterprises is different in Ghana 
as in Sri Lanka (De Mel et al. 2008). Hence by performing a replication study, they 
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demonstrate that the findings from Sri Lanka only have a limited external validity. 
By contrast, Bobonis et al. (2006) show that the impact of deworming in India is 
comparable to the impact of deworming in Kenia (Miguel and Kremer 2004). This 
finding demonstrates that the findings concerned with the impact of deworming in 
Kenia are externally valid in India. 
 Although we are sympathetic to this incremental research paradigm, we argue 
that the estimation of heterogeneous impacts and their relation with contextual 
characteristics can result in faster learning about what development programs work 
under which circumstances. The estimation of heterogeneous impacts and their 
relation with contextual characteristics should thus be seen as a complement to a 
research paradigm in which the incremental learning about development 
mechanisms is favoured over grand conclusions on the basis of a few rigorous 
impact evaluations. 
2.3.  Estimating heterogeneous impacts to  
improve external validity
In order to fully understand the usefulness of the estimation of heterogeneous 
impacts for the external validity of impact evaluations, we first introduce the 
differences between the reduced-form and the structural approach to impact 
evaluation. Structural models as specified in structural approaches to economic 
policy analysis can be considered parametric, explicitly formulated, empirical 
economic models. Reduced-form approaches can be further subdivided into 2a) 
reduced-form approaches that use explicit economic models to motivate and 
interpret empirical analyses and approximate the economic models using simple 
econometric techniques, and 2b) program evaluations, which focus exclusively on 
the effects of programs (Heckman 2010).
 The main weakness of reduced-form approaches to impact evaluation is that 
they do not pay explicit attention to ex ante subjective expectations of economic 
agents. Partly for this reason, reduced-form approaches to impact evaluations do 
not allow for direct welfare and policy evaluations (Heckman 2010). Nevertheless, 
structural models often require restrictive assumptions, for which it is difficult to 
judge whether they are realistic before the start of an impact evaluation (Card, Della 
Vigna, and Malmendier 2011). Moreover, it often takes several years to write a good 
paper concerned with a structural approach to impact evaluation (Keane 2010). 
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Policy makers often need quick but reliable answers to questions that might be 
more easily explored with the reduced-form approach to impact evaluation. Hence 
it may not surprise that the vast majority of impact evaluations use the reduced-form 
approach.37 
 There are nevertheless some clear examples of structural approaches with very 
relevant and reliable evidence on how design changes in development programs 
could improve the welfare of the beneficiaries (e.g., Todd and Wolpin 2006; Duflo, 
Hanna, and Ryan 2010; Attanasio et al. forthcoming). Each of these studies 
demonstrates the main benefit of a structural approach to impact evaluation, i.e., 
the plausible effects of alternative policies on welfare can be demonstrated. Hence 
findings that originate from the structural approach to impact evaluation contribute 
to solutions to at least two policy evaluation problems: 1) “evaluating the impacts of 
implemented interventions on outcomes including their impacts on the well-being 
of the treated and the society at large”, and 2) “forecasting the impacts (constructing 
counterfactual states) of interventions implemented in one environment in other 
environments, including impacts on well-being” (Heckman, 2010, pp. 361-362).38 The 
first problem is related to internal validity and can also be solved by reduced-form 
approaches to impact evaluation, while the second problem is related to external 
validity. Heckman (2010) argues that the second problem can only be solved by 
structural approaches. However, as discussed before, most of the times, policy 
makers need input quickly, which is typically not possible when using the structural 
approach to impact evaluation.  
 An alternative approach is the so-called “mechanism experiment”, which 
directly tests causal mechanisms rather than testing the proposed policy as it would 
be implemented at scale (Ludwig, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). Mechanism 
experiments can thus be contrasted with policy evaluations, which perform an 
impact evaluation by the replication of a policy as it would be implemented at scale. 
For example, the “broken windows” theory states that maintaining urban 
environments in a well-ordered condition may prevent an escalation into more 
serious crime. The mechanism behind this theory could be tested by buying some 
cars, breaking the windows of half of them, parking the cars in a randomly selected 
subset of neighbourhoods, and measuring whether more serious crimes increase in 
the neighbourhoods where the cars are parked relative to the neighbourhoods 
where the cars are not parked (Ibid.). Mechanism experiments can be particularly 
useful when there is no prior knowledge regarding the mechanisms through which 
a policy influences social welfare (Ibid.). Nevertheless, when heterogeneous impacts 
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are not hypothesised and related to contextual characteristics, it remains 
questionable whether mechanism experiments can contribute to solving the second 
policy evaluation problem related to external validity.       
 We argue that the reduced-form approach to impact evaluation can contribute 
to answering this problem. Such an alternative approach requires a clear theoretical 
framework in which contextual characteristics are related to heterogeneity in the 
impact estimates. To present the alternative approach we use the terminology of 
Card et al. (2011), who distinguish between a) descriptive, b) single-model and c) 
competing-model studies. Single-model studies test a single-model-based 
hypothesis, while competing-model studies test competing-model-based 
hypotheses. Although these models do not allow for direct welfare and policy 
evaluations, they might clarify the underlying assumptions of the study. Additionally, 
single-model studies require fewer restrictive assumptions than structural models. 
However, when a single model is rejected by the empirical data, it remains unclear 
which assumptions the data reject. Similarly, when a model is not rejected, it 
remains unclear whether the predictions are unique to the single model. Laying out 
two or more competing models could partly resolve this issue by analysing potential 
differing predictions for a single manipulation (Card et al. 2011). However, formalised 
models are not always necessary for learning about development mechanisms. It 
may be sufficient to describe a theoretical mechanism instead of writing out a 
formal economic model to learn about development mechanisms (McKenzie 2011). 
For this purpose, it is possible to use a so-called descriptive study design, lacking any 
explicit model (Card et al. 2011), but including a descriptive theoretical framework. 
Single and competing-model studies as well as descriptive studies can all be linked 
to heterogeneous impacts by including interactions with the treatment variable.  
 Arguably, the methods discussed above require fewer restrictive assumptions 
than structural models. Nevertheless, they might also lack some precision in the 
estimation of economic parameters in comparison with structural models. 
Reduced-form models do not, for example, allow for direct welfare and policy 
evaluations. However, they certainly allow for a focus on qualitative insights and can 
thus suggest underlying context-specific mechanisms. Hence the methods can 
contribute to learning about the external validity of findings from impact evaluations 
when heterogeneity in the impact estimates is related to contextual characteristics. 
We apply single-model studies in Chapters Three and Five, while we apply a 
descriptive study in Chapter Four. Additionally, Chapter Five discusses a competing 
non-formalised model.       
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 This thesis focuses specifically on social norms. Nevertheless, the methodology 
we use could equally be applied to the relationship between other contextual char-
acteristics and the effectiveness of development programs. We argue that we 
should be able to learn about development mechanisms by identifying contextual 
characteristics that are necessary for or increase the effectiveness of specific 
development programs. When these contextual characteristics are necessary to 
achieve development effectiveness in one environment, they should typically also 
be necessary for achieving development effectiveness in external environments. 
Hence, by identifying these contextual characteristics through the estimation of 
heterogeneous impacts, we should be able to gain a clearer understanding of the 
likely impact of development programs in different environments. Herewith we 
should be able to learn faster about the internal as well as the external validity of 
impact evaluations. 
 The estimation of heterogeneous impacts can also be discussed within the po-
tential-outcomes framework of Rubin (1974). Equations 2.4 and 2.5, which we derive 
from Viet Cuong (2010) illustrate the estimation of the ATE and ATT for a specific 
subpopulation that is characterised by X, where X can represent both observable 
and unobservable characteristics. Additionally, X can represent both individual, 
household and community characteristics. Hence X can also relate to contextual 
characteristics.  
( ) 1 0( | ) ( | ) ( | )XATE E X E Y X E Y X= ∆ = −  (2.4) 
( ) 1 0( | , 1) ( | , 1) ( | , 1)XATT E X D E Y X D E Y X D= ∆ = = = − =   (2.5)
The ATE and the ATT can also be written as a function of the distribution of 
heterogeneous ATEs and ATTs for a specific subpopulation characterised by X, such 
as in Equations 2.6 and 2.7, which we derive from Viet Cuong (2010).
 
( ) ( )X
X
ATE ATE dF X= ∫   (2.6)
( )
| 1
( | 1)X
X D
ATT ATT dF X D
=
= =∫  (2.7)
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More statistical power is usually needed to estimate heterogeneous impacts and 
not all estimation methods are equally suitable for the estimation of heterogeneous 
impacts. Therefore we will pay attention to the estimation of average as well as 
heterogeneous impacts in the description of quasi-experimental estimation 
methods in Section 2.4. 
2.4. Estimation methods
This section serves to introduce the quasi-experimental estimation methods we 
apply in this thesis: 1) Propensity score matching, 2) Propensity-adjusted regression, 
3) The instrumental variable regression approach, and 4) The lagged (dependent) 
variable regression approach. To introduce these methods, we focus on their 
strengths and weaknesses against the background of the potential trade-off 
between the internal and external validity of impact evaluations. Hence, we pay 
attention to their ability to estimate average as well as heterogeneous impacts.     
2.4.1. Propensity score matching
If randomisation is not possible, propensity score matching (PSM) is a viable 
alternative to determine the effectiveness of development programs (e.g. Pradhan, 
Saadah, and Sparrow 2007; Janssens, 2010). Matching is usually based on the 
probability of being assigned to a development program, which can be estimated 
using logit, probit or non-parametric models with the selection into the specific 
development program as the dependent variable. The predicted probability of 
assignment can be labelled as an estimate of the “true” propensity of participating 
in the development program. If the predicted probability comes close to the “true” 
propensity, the potential outcomes of the treatment and control group are 
independent of both observed and unobserved characteristics. In this case, the 
difference in outcomes can be attributed to the program impact. However, the 
“true” propensity is by definition unobserved, because one cannot account for 
unobservable characteristics using PSM. Impact estimates using PSM could thus be 
vulnerable to self-selection into treatment or other unobservable characteristics. 
One can only estimate the impact of a development program using PSM under the 
assumption that unobservable characteristics do not influence assignment into the 
development program (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
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 PSM has a number of advantages over the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression approach. The OLS regression approach only identifies the true impact of 
a development program, if the outcome is determined linearly by the development 
program. Consider the formula in Equation 2.8 to estimate the impact of a development 
program D on the outcome Y, controlling for observable characteristics O.  
* *Y a b D c O e= + + +  (2.8)
If Z is linearly dependent on D and unobservable characteristics are not correlated 
with the residual value e, the estimate of b can be considered an unbiased impact 
estimate of the impact of the development program. In this case the impact estimate 
obtained through the OLS regression approach can be considered the best linear 
unbiased estimator (Heij et al. 2004). However, the impact of development programs 
cannot always be considered linear. The main advantage of PSM over the OLS 
regression approach is that PSM does not need assumptions about functional forms 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Moreover, the use of PSM guarantees that only 
observations in the region of the probabilities for which a valid comparison group 
can be formed are used to identify the impact of development programs. Only 
observations inside the so-called ‘common support’ are used to identify the ATT. 
Smith and Todd (2005) use a trimming procedure and define the common support 
as those values of P that have positive density within both the D=1 and D=0 
distributions. Applying different rules for common support, one can also choose to 
delete all observations of which the propensity score is smaller than the minimum 
and larger than the maximum in the opposite group (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).39 
 A limited number of studies pay attention to the internal validity of quasi- 
experimental methods by comparing benchmark impact estimates from randomised 
control trials with the impact estimates of different quasi-experimental methods. 
A number of these studies also pay attention to PSM. For example, LaLonde (1986) 
was not able to reproduce the impact estimates from a randomised evaluation of an 
employment training program using the OLS regression approach. Using the same 
data, Dehejia and Wahba (2002) come closer to the experimental impact estimates 
using PSM. This finding is supportive of the validity of PSM to estimate the causal 
impacts of development programs. However, Smith and Todd (2005) demonstrate 
that the findings from Dehejia and Wahba (2002) regarding PSM are highly sensitive 
to the set of variables included in the scores and the particular analysis sample. They 
demonstrate that the use of panel data could result in PSM impact estimates that 
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come very close to the experimental estimates. Hence, collecting panel data could 
be very useful in the derivation of valid impact estimates using PSM.40 More recently, 
McKenzie et al. (2010) compared experimental with quasi-experimental estimates 
of the impact of migration on earnings in Tonga. They show that PSM results in an 
upward bias by 19-33 percent. These PSM estimates are among the best-performing 
quasi-experimental estimators for this particular case. Only the instrumental 
variable regression approach, which we discuss in Section 2.4.3, was able to perform 
significantly better than PSM. Unfortunately, however, we are not aware of any 
similar study that compares the estimates of heterogeneous effects between 
randomised control trials and PSM. 
 Although studies that compare different kinds of methodologies could yield 
useful information about the internal validity of quasi-experimental methods, 
judging the validity of quasi-experimental methods should remain a case-specific 
affair. We argue that the bias of quasi-experimental methods could be very different 
depending on the type of intervention. Hence, in judging the validity of quasi-exper-
imental methods, one should always bear in mind the type of intervention as well as 
the assumptions underlying the specific quasi-experimental method.   
 A disadvantage of PSM is that it reduces the statistical power to identify reliable 
confidence intervals, especially when one is interested in heterogeneous impacts 
and is forced to use smaller samples. Nevertheless, in Chapter Five we have sufficient 
statistical power to use PSM for the estimation of heterogeneous impacts of 
women’s self-help groups on subjective well-being. Moreover, we also apply 
propensity score matching for the estimation of the ATT of self-help group 
membership on women’s autonomy in Chapter Five. 
2.4.2.  Propensity-adjusted regression
Propensity-adjusted regression can be considered an alternative to PSM. It is 
discussed in Wooldridge (2002, p. 617), who reports that including the predicted 
propensity p(xi) as an additional regressor in the OLS regression approach, next to 
the treatment dummy, results in consistent estimates of the ATT and avoids 
endogeneity problems from omitted-variable bias, if the estimated propensity 
contains all the information in the covariates that is relevant for estimating the ATT, 
and under the assumption that there is a linear relationship between the treatment 
dummy and the outcome of interest. To derive an unbiased impact estimate using 
propensity-adjusted regression, it is also advisable to exclude observations outside 
the common support.  
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 When estimating heterogeneous impacts, it is also possible to include 
interactions with the treatment variable as additional regressors next to the 
propensity score. Propensity-adjusted regression has a higher statistical power to 
detect heterogeneous impacts than PSM, because it remains possible to use the 
complete sample when including interactions with the treatment variable as 
additional regressors next to the propensity score. This is the main advantage of 
propensity-adjusted regression over PSM. However, the disadvantage is that it 
is necessary to make assumptions about functional forms using propensity- 
adjusted regression. Unfortunately, we are not aware of studies that evaluate the 
performance of propensity-adjusted regression in estimating causal average and/or 
heterogeneous effects by comparing impact estimates from propensity-adjusted 
regression with benchmark impact estimates from randomised control trials. 
 We use propensity-adjusted regression to identify the heterogeneous impact of 
health education on bednet use in Ghana in Chapter Three. Additionally, we also 
apply propensity-adjusted regression to estimate heterogeneous impacts of 
self-help group membership on subjective well-being in Chapter Five. 
2.4.3. Instrumental variable regression approach
The Instrumental Variable (IV) regression approach can be used when there are 
endogenous explanatory variables and can also be considered a solution to 
measurement error problems in the explanatory variables. The IV estimator can be 
computed by two successive regressions, in which the first regression explains the 
treatment variable using an instrument and a number of presumably exogenous 
explanatory variables, and the second regression explains the outcome variable 
with the predicted treatment variable and the presumably exogenous explanatory 
variables from the first stage (Angrist and Krueger 2001). The main advantage of the 
IV regression approach over PSM and propensity-adjusted regression is that it 
accounts for unobservable characteristics as well. It is nonetheless very difficult to 
find suitable instrumental variables in practice. A suitable instrument should be 
sufficiently correlated with program assignment and uncorrelated with the error 
term in the potential outcomes, i.e. it can only be correlated with the outcome 
variable through the program assignment (Ibid.). 
 If this assumption, which can also be labelled the exclusion restriction, is fulfilled, 
the IV impact estimate can be considered a consistent impact estimate under large 
sample properties (Angrist and Kruger 2001). Yet, it is not possible to test the 
assumption that the instrumental variable is uncorrelated with the outcome variable 
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through channels other than the program assignment, indicating that theoretical 
reasoning is often necessary to identify suitable instrumental variables. However, 
Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that instruments do not necessarily have to be 
grounded in theory, but can also emerge from in-depth knowledge about institutional 
mechanisms. Either way, the exclusion restriction can only be formally tested if there 
are more instrumental than endogenous variables, and only under the assumption 
that the other instrumental variables also satisfy the exclusion restriction.41 
 The consistency of IV impact estimates can be illustrated using a statistical 
model, which we derive from Angrist (2004).  In the model 0iD  and 1iD  denote 
potential treatment assignments that are defined relative to a binary instrument iZ . 
iD  can then, for example, be determined by a latent-index assignment mechanism 
as in Equation 2.9, where   is a random error independent of the instrument. 
 (2.9)
Then the potential treatment assignments are independent of iZ  and  
while . This model is restrictive because it implies that 1 0i iD D>
or vice versa. By allowing a random  for each i this restriction can be relaxed in 
which case the latent index model is just an alternative notation for 0iD and 1iD . 
0iD  then defines what treatment i would receive if 0iZ = and 1iD  defines what 
treatment i would receive if 1iZ = . iD  can then be written as in equation 2.10. 
0 1(1 )i i i i iD D Z D Z= − +  (2.10)
Finally, we can demonstrate that the expression in Equation 2.11 holds (Imbens and 
Angrist 1994), and that the IV impact estimate is consistent under the following 
three assumptions:
1) independence 0 1 0 1[( , , , ) .]i i i i iY Y D D Z  
2) first stage [ ( 1| 1) ( 1| 0)]i i i iP D Z P D Z= = ≠ = =   
3) monotonicity [ Either  or vice versa; without loss of generality, 
assume the former ] (Angrist, 2004).  
1 0 1 0
( | 1) ( | 0) ( | )
( | 1) ( | 0)
i i i i
i i i i
i i i i
E Y Z E Y Z E Y Y D D
E D Z E D Z
= − =
= − >
= − =
 (2.11)
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Although IV impact estimates are consistent, they are not unbiased. “Unbiasedness 
means the estimator has a sampling distribution centered on the parameter of 
interest in a sample of any size, while consistency only means that the estimator 
converges to the population parameter as the sample size grows” (Angrist and 
Kruger 2001, p. 71). Although the use of robust standard errors can result in 
asymptotically valid estimates of standard errors, they should still be interpreted 
with caution, given that they are only estimates of the true standard errors (Ibid.). 
Findings from the IV regression approach are difficult to interpret when the 
instrument is only slightly correlated with the treatment variable. A low correlation 
between the instrument and the treatment variable can result in weak-instrument 
bias. Weak-instrument bias usually results in estimates that are biased towards the 
findings from the OLS regression approach (Bound and Jaeger 1996). 
The local average treatment effect
Despite the potential problems, instrumental variables have the potential to increase 
greatly our understanding of important economic relationships (Angrist and Krueger 
2001). The applied economics literature has come up with a number of empirical 
examples that show the enormous potential of the IV approach for causal inference, 
also in development economics (e.g. Yang and Choi 2007; Olken 2009; Bhattacharyya, 
Bedi, and Chhachhi forthcoming). However, the interpretation of IV impact estimates 
becomes complicated in the presence of heterogeneous impacts, i.e. when the 
monotonicity assumption does not hold. In this case the IV impact estimate 
identifies the so-called local average treatment effect (LATE). The LATE is identical 
to the ATE if there are no heterogeneous impacts. However, if there is heterogeneity 
in the impacts, it remains unclear for which population the LATE actually holds.
 Angrist (2004) defines the LATE as the impact estimate for those who are 
“compliers”, motivated by the literature on randomised experiments in which 
compliers are those who comply with an experimenter’s intended treatment status. 
Hence the LATE could be very informative when there is no perfect compliance with 
a randomised intervention at the community level. Under this condition and when 
externalities are not expected, it might be most informative to estimate the impact 
on those who comply with the randomised program by estimating the LATE of the 
randomised intervention with the initial treatment intent as an instrument for the 
compliance with the program.42 
 Deaton (2010a) argues that most studies that base their impact estimates on 
instrumental variable methods account insufficiently for heterogeneity in the impact 
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estimates, making the resulting LATE difficult to interpret.43 Furthermore, McKenzie 
and Seynabou Sakho (2010) illustrate empirically that there could be large differences 
between the LATE and the ATE. They identify the impact of registering for taxes on 
firm profits in Bolivia. Although their IV impact estimates identify a positive LATE of 
tax registration on profits, they also find negative heterogeneous impacts of tax 
registration on profits for relatively small as well as relatively large firms using PSM. 
The positive impact is only found for mid-size firms that register for taxes (McKenzie 
and Seynabou Sakho 2010). Hence the estimation of the LATE only provides limited 
information on the distribution of treatment effects. One solution in large datasets 
would be to estimate the LATE separately for several sub-samples. 
 However, in the case studies we discuss the IV regression approach will only be 
the preferred choice in analysing those research questions for which we do not 
hypothesise heterogeneous impacts and for which suitable instruments are present 
in the data available to us. This is the case in Chapter Five of this thesis, which looks 
into the impact of self-help group membership on women’s autonomy in India. For 
those studies for which we explicitly hypothesise heterogeneous impacts, our sample 
sizes are too small to use instrumental variables for the estimation of heterogeneous 
impacts. If we were to aim for the estimation of heterogeneous impacts with 
instrumental variables, our estimates would suffer from weak-instrument bias. 
Moreover, potential instrumental variables are only correlated with the treatment 
assignment for sub-samples in the case studies we discuss. Hence the LATE only 
provides limited information in the cases where we expect heterogeneous impacts. 
Although we report the LATE of SHG membership on subjective well-being in Chapter 
Five, we only pay limited attention to this finding, because of the hypothesized 
heterogeneous impacts.         
 To illustrate the internal validity of the IV regression approach, McKenzie et al. 
(2010) also compared experimental estimates of the impact of migration on earnings 
in Tonga with quasi-experimental estimates as derived from the IV regression 
approach. They show that the validity of the IV regression approach can go both 
ways. Although a good instrumental variable (pre-migration distance from the 
office in Tonga where a lottery was organised for eligibility for migration) only 
results in an upward bias of 9 percent in comparison with the experimental 
estimates, a relatively weak instrument (the size of the migrant network) results in 
an upward bias of 82 percent. Hence, when a good instrument is available, the IV 
regression approach is among the best-performing quasi-experimental methods in 
deriving causal effects. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any study that judges the 
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validity of the IV regression approach in determining heterogeneous impacts. The 
earlier discussion suggests that IV impact estimates would not perform very well in 
such a comparison, particularly in small samples.   
2.4.4. Introducing welfare dynamics through panel data
Until now we have mainly focused on the use of cross-sectional quasi-experimental 
methods. In contrast with cross-section data, panel data permit to look into the 
dynamics of welfare outcomes. Carter and Barrett (1996) argue that the use of 
longitudinal data opens the way to a deeper analysis of the nature and extend of poverty. 
Using such data makes it possible to distinguish between persistent and transitory 
poverty. Moreover, the use of panel data could be particularly useful for NGOs, since 
they mainly aim for social change (Elbers 2011 ), which can be made visible by using panel 
data. This does not only hold for economic outcomes. As demonstrated by Munshi and 
Myaux (2006) the use of panel data could also be very useful for explaining changes in 
social norms. Additionally, social norms could explain changes in welfare. An example of 
such a mechanism is illustrated in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
 When panel data are available, one can account for both observed and 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics using the so-called fixed effect or differ-
ence-in-difference regression approach. When only two surveys are conducted over 
time the outcomes from these approaches are by definition the same. Because we 
only use panel data with two time periods in the empirical applications in this thesis, 
we will not pay attention to the fixed-effect approach in this chapter. 
 A difference-in-difference approach requires the assumption that there are no 
diverging trends for the treatment and the control group. Otherwise, differences 
between the treatment and control group could be related to trends in the outcome 
variables. In this case it will not be possible to distinguish between the trend and the 
treatment variable. To illustrate the potential bias in the difference-in-difference 
regression approach, we derive a model from Angrist and Pischke (2008). In their 
terminology the difference-in-difference regression approach can be summarised 
as in Equation 2.12, where itY  is the outcome variable for individual i at time t,  is 
the year effect, itD  is a dummy variable for individual i at time t that is 1 for the 
treatment group and 0 for the control group, itX  is a vector of time-invariant control 
variables for individual i at time t and  is the residual value.     
 (2.12)
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When there are diverging trends for the treatment and the control group,  and 
 are correlated. This results in a biased estimate of the treatment effect, which is 
estimated by . Under this condition, it is necessary to estimate the impact in a 
different manner, to arrive at unbiased impact estimates. As an alternative to the 
difference-in-difference approach, it is also possible to use an approach with lagged 
explanatory variables when using panel data. Since we are not able to guarantee 
non-diverging trends across treatment and control villages in Chapter Four, we apply 
an approach with lagged explanatory variables. This model requires the assumption 
that there is no omitted-variable bias. 
 To reduce omitted-variable bias it might be advisable to include the lagged 
dependent variable. However, when lagged dependent variables are included as 
explanatory variables, the impact estimates from panel data models tend to 
underestimate the impact, because the lagged dependent variable is usually 
correlated with the error term at time t-1, which is related to the error term at time t 
(Angrist and Pischke 2008). To demonstrate the relationship, we illustrate the lagged 
dependent variable approach in Equation 2.13, which we derive from Angrist and 
Pischke (2008) and where a is the constant, 1itY −  is the lagged dependent variable, 
 is the time effect, itD is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the treatment group, 
itX  is a matrix of control variables and  is the error term. When 1itY −  is correlated 
with ,  can be considered the conservatively estimated causal impact of the 
treatment on itY .
 (2.13)
In the application of our model with lagged explanatory variables in Chapter Four, 
we present a model with and without lagged dependent variables to derive the 
robustness of our estimates to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In this 
way we should be able to derive conservative impact estimates. Furthermore, we 
also estimate heterogeneous impacts by interacting the treatment variable with 
baseline household and community characteristics. Baseline household and 
community characteristics that are associated with heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects are usually not affected by the treatment variable. Hence approaches with 
lagged explanatory variables can be considered a useful device for the estimation of 
heterogeneous impacts, especially in comparison with cross-sectional methods 
such as propensity-adjusted regression and propensity score matching. Using the 
latter methods, unfortunately it cannot be guaranteed that the household and 
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community characteristics that we interact with the treatment variables are 
exogenously determined.44  
 Smith and Todd (2005) demonstrate that the difference-in-difference approach 
performs well in the estimation of the average causal impact of a job training 
program when combined with PSM. Furthermore, McKenzie et al. (2010) also 
compared experimental estimates of the impact of migration on earnings in Tonga 
with estimates as derived from the difference-in-difference regression approach. 
They demonstrate that the difference-in-difference regression approach overstates 
the gains of migration by 20 percent. The difference-in-difference approach 
compares poorly in comparison with an approach that makes use of a ‘good’ 
instrumental variable and favourably in comparison with an approach that makes 
use of a ‘weak’ instrumental variable. Additionally, the impact estimates are 
comparable with impact estimates from PSM. Unfortunately, McKenzie et al. (2010) 
do not present comparisons between experimental estimates of the effect of 
migration with estimates of the effect of migration as derived from a lagged de-
pendent-variable approach. 
2.4.5. The use of a triangulation of research methods
Complementary to the estimation methods discussed above we also apply a 
triangulation of research methods by validating our quantitative findings using 
existing qualitative evidence from the areas of intervention and by using a framed 
field experiment. The use of a triangulation of research methods could help in the 
interpretation of the impact estimates from experimental and quasi-experimental 
evaluations.
 For example, both White (2010) and Woolcock (2009) argue for the integration 
of qualitative research methods in impact evaluation designs. Qualitative research 
methods can uncover the underlying processes of causal relationships, i.e., they 
provide insight into how an intervention works (Bamberger, Rao, and Woolcock 
2010). By complementing quantitative with qualitative methods, one can thus 
provide insight into why an intervention works next to the question of whether an 
intervention works.      
 Similarly, Barrett and Carter (2010) argue for the greater use of artefactual and 
framed field experiments (or, in their terminology, “behavioural economic 
experiments”) to learn about development mechanisms. They argue that artefactual 
and framed field experiments can identify typically unobserved preferences and 
characteristics that are usually left in the error term, such as trust, trustworthiness, 
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ambition, time and risk preferences. Controlling for these factors could eliminate 
much confounding in empirical studies (Barrett and Carter 2010).     
2.5. Final overview of impact evaluation methods
We conclude this chapter by presenting a table on the advantages and disadvantages 
of the quasi-experimental methods we apply in this thesis. In table 2.1 we compare 
PSM, propensity-adjusted regression, the IV regression approach and the lagged 
dependent variable regression approach. For each technique we indicate the chapter 
in which we use the technique, the potential practical problems involved, and the 
major strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, we include a column in which we 
describe the ability of the different methods to estimate heterogeneous impacts. 
 The table demonstrates that the lagged dependent variable regression approach 
is best able to identify heterogeneous impacts. However, a major limitation of this 
method is that it requires panel data. Therefore we only apply the lagged dependent 
variable regression approach in Chapter Four – the only case for which we have 
panel data available. Additional problems of the lagged dependent variable 
regression approach are that the method does not allow for controlling for 
unobserved characteristics and that the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
tends to underestimate the impact of a development program.  
 Since propensity-adjusted regression does not require panel data but has a 
medium ability to estimate heterogeneous impacts, we apply this method in 
Chapters Three and Five. PSM only has a limited ability to estimate heterogeneous 
impacts, but we are able to apply this method in Chapter Five. An additional 
weakness of PSM and propensity-adjusted regression is that both methods are not 
able to control for unobservable characteristics.  
 Finally, the IV regression approach has a relatively low ability (at least in small 
samples and when only one instrument is available) to estimate heterogeneous 
impacts. Hence we only pay major attention to the IV impact estimates when we do 
not expect major heterogeneous impacts, as in the impact estimate of SHG 
membership on women’s autonomy in Chapter Five. In this case we are able to 
exploit the major strength of the instrumental variable regression approach: the 
ability to control for unobserved characteristics in the estimation of the LATE. 
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 Summarising this chapter, we argue that the quasi-experimental methods we 
apply in this thesis are able to estimate heterogeneous impacts meaningfully. 
Although the results might not be as quantitatively accurate as in structural 
approaches to impact evaluation, the methods should be able to give a qualitatively 
accurate picture of context-specific development mechanisms. Moreover, the 
methods require fewer restrictive assumptions than most structural approaches to 
impact evaluation. Hence we argue that the quasi-experimental methods we apply 
in Chapters Three, Four and Five can contribute substantially to the learning process 
about the internal as well as the external validity of findings from impact evaluations. 
Although randomised control trials are methodologically superior in terms of 
internal validity, currently most of the studies that apply randomised control trials 
lack attention to external validity and contextual characteristics. Impact evaluations 
Table 2.1	 Quasi-experimental	methods
Quasi-
Experimental 
Technique
Used in 
Chapter
Practical 
Problems
Major Strength Major  Weakness Ability to 
Estimate 
Heterogeneous 
Impacts
Propensity 
Score 
Matching.
5 - No need for 
assumptions 
about functional 
forms.
Not able to control 
for unobservable 
characteristics.
Limited ability.
Propensity-
Adjusted 
Regression.
3, 5 - Able to combine 
high statistical 
power with the 
estimation of 
heterogeneous 
impacts.
Not able to control 
for unobservable 
characteristics.
Medium ability.
Instrumental 
Variable 
Regression 
Approach.
5 Difficult to 
find a valid 
instrumental 
variable.
Able to control 
for observable 
and unobservable 
characteristics.
Interpretation 
becomes difficult 
when there are 
heterogeneous 
impacts.
Low Ability.
Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
Regression 
Approach.
4 Panel data  
are necessary.
Able to control 
for observable 
baseline 
characteristics. 
Requires the 
assumption that 
time-invariant 
unobservable 
characteristics do 
not influence the 
dependent variable. 
High Ability.
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that apply quasi-experimental methods suffer from similar shortcomings. As 
discussed in this chapter, the estimation of heterogeneous impacts and their relation 
with contextual characteristics could contribute considerably to the learning process 
about the internal as well as the external validity of findings from impact evaluations, 
both for randomised control trials and for quasi-experimental methods. By applying 
this framework, researchers should be able to provide complementary knowledge to 
knowledge derived from an incremental research paradigm, in which replication 
studies in different contexts can prove or disprove the external validity of findings 
from rigorous impact evaluations.
 Studies that apply randomised control trials or quasi-experimental evaluations 
could both benefit considerably in terms of quality by establishing links between 
contextual characteristics and the impact of development programs. Whether 
randomised control trials or quasi-experimental methods result in findings with a 
higher external validity is likely to be untestable. Ultimately, research designs should 
start with a research question and not with a method to learn about development 
mechanisms effectively.

3
Trust in Health Providers as a Catalyst 
for Malaria Prevention 
Heterogeneous Impacts of Health Education in Rural Ghana 1
1 This chapter is written based on the paper De Hoop, Thomas, and Luuk van Kempen. 2010.  
“Trust in Health Providers as a Catalyst for Malaria Prevention: Heterogeneous Impacts of Health 
Education in Rural Ghana.” The Developing Economies 48, no. 3: 376-404.   
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3.1. Introduction
The use of Insecticide Treated Bednets (ITNs) to prevent malaria has proven to be 
effective in a number of studies. Estimates of reductions in child mortality as a 
result of ITN use range from 20% to 60% (e.g., Alonso et al. 1991; D’Alessandro et al. 
1995; Neville et al. 1996; Binka et al. 1996; Phillips-Howard et al. 2003). Additionally, 
a high level of ITN coverage within a community reduces the overall infective 
mosquito population (e.g., Howard et al. 2000; Gimnig et al. 2003). Anecdotal and 
entomological evidence suggests that untreated nets in a relatively good condition 
can also protect against malaria (Guyatt and Snow 2002). 
 Although knowledge about the effectiveness of ITNs is widespread, their use 
among high-risk groups in malaria zones remains limited in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Dupas 2005), despite the enormous disease burden it places on the region. With 
public health education meetings about malaria prevention, hospitals and health 
centres try to prevent an overload of malaria patients. 
 We test and validate the hypothesis that health education is more effective for 
groups that display relatively high trust in health providers. We provide empirical 
evidence for this claim by comparing the ITN and bednet use of health education 
participants, in meetings of Catholic hospitals and health centres focused on ITN 
and bednet use, with non-participants in villages in the Brong-Ahafo (BAR) and 
Upper East Region (UER) in Ghana. We show that individuals with household 
members who participated in health education only use more ITNs and bednets if 
trust in health providers is relatively high. There are some indications of non-linear 
effects. The mean marginal effect of health education only becomes significant 
after a certain trust threshold has been passed. 
 Our empirical results indicate that specific forms of trust in the form of trust in 
health providers can be more important predictors of behaviour than generalised 
trust. The relative importance of specific trust is consistent with research that 
suggests that personal trust between group members was more important than 
generalised trust in predicting group loan repayment in Armenia and South Africa 
(Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick 2007). The results are also compatible with the positive 
role of advice from persons viewed as authority figures, such as extension agents, in 
explaining the adoption of new agricultural techniques in Madagascar (Moser and 
Barrett 2006) and the key role of trust and social cohesion in explaining the success 
of this relationship in Mali (Reid and Salmen 2000). Our main contribution to the 
literature consists of explicitly measuring trust in health providers, linking it to the 
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impact of health education and distinguishing the effect of trust in health providers 
from the effect of generalised trust levels.
  Research in Mali showed that complementary malaria education alongside ITN 
donations led to more bednet impregnation at the household level (Rhee et al. 
2005). Malaria education also led to increased knowledge of chloroquine use in 
Ecuador and Colombia, but failed to deliver results in Nicaragua (Kroeger et al. 1996). 
Health education focused on preventing worms was found not to be effective in 
Kenya (Kremer and Miguel 2007). A difference in trust in health providers among 
health education participants is a possible explanation for the observed differences 
in the effectiveness of health education. 
 Other studies suggest the need to revise health education programs to make 
them more sensitive to people holding indigenous beliefs about malaria (e.g., De La 
Cruz et al. 2006; Shirayama, Phompida, and Kuroiwa 2006; Beiersmann et al. 2007; 
Sanders Thompson et al. 2008). Indigenous beliefs make trust in health providers 
less self-evident and play an important role in one of the areas under study, i.e., the 
UER. A key local informant describes malaria knowledge among locals in the Kasse-
na-Nankani and Bulsa districts as follows:
“We know what we know and accept what you tell us. When you people come 
to us we have to let you know that we have accepted what you have been saying 
to us about malaria. These days, when our children are sent to the hospital, the 
mothers return to tell us they say it is malaria. If you ask about malaria, everyone 
in the village will tell you it is the mosquito that causes it. We must tell you what 
you want to hear my son” (Adongo et al. 2005, p. 369).  
 
 Local beliefs about malaria can therefore dominate over formal health sector 
beliefs. More serious stages of malaria, often characterised by convulsions or 
anaemia, are generally not related to malaria, but are considered specific illnesses 
with different causes among the Kassena-Nankana (Adongo et al. 2005).45 New 
information about malaria can coexist, interact and merge with local ideas about 
malaria (Hausman Muela et al. 2002). The dominance of formal health sector beliefs 
and resulting changes in preventive health behaviour can be achieved through 
health education from perceived trustworthy health providers. Trust in health 
providers can therefore act as a catalyst for malaria prevention. 
 In an interesting study related to ours Das and Das (2003) claim that demand for 
vaccination in Northern India is low and hinges crucially on the perception that 
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providers can be trusted and tell the truth about this link. The paper does not, 
however, define or measure trust, so the validity of the argument remains to be 
formally tested empirically. A different mechanism regarding ITN use was revealed 
in Tanzania. The author claims that social learning within the community about ITN 
use only results in higher ITN use at the household level, while a higher number of 
neighbours using ITNs discourages ITN adoption. Under the assumption that trust in 
household members is larger than trust in neighbours, high trust is again seen as a 
condition for social learning without formally measuring it (Anselmi 2007). 
 Although trust and preventive health care have been linked in the literature, 
trust has mainly been used as an explanatory instead of a conditional variable. Trust 
was found to be both essential for affordable health care in Sri Lanka (Russell 2005) 
and enrolment in micro-insurance in Rwanda (Schneider and Hanson 2006). 
Russians, moreover, also seemed to have less knowledge of HIV/AIDS when they had 
less trust in the government telling the truth about HIV/AIDS (Benotsch et al. 2004). 
 The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, we briefly describe 
our analytical framework. Second, we describe the collection of survey data and our 
most important variables. Third, we describe our procedure for estimating the 
heterogeneous impacts of health education. Fourth, we present descriptive 
statistics separately for the BAR and UER. Fifth, we demonstrate logistic models to 
identify the propensity score for health education participation. Sixth, we lay out 
our estimation results on the heterogeneous impacts of health education. Finally, 
we present our conclusions.  
3.2. Analytical framework
The analytical framework as laid out in the introduction is briefly summarised in 
Figure 3.1. It shows that health education is provided to individuals with local 
indigenous beliefs about malaria that dominate over formal health sector beliefs. 
These health education beneficiaries can be subdivided in two groups: the first 
group consists of beneficiaries with high trust towards health providers, while the 
second group consists of beneficiaries with low trust towards health providers. 
 In our model high-trust individuals are convinced of the high returns of ITN use 
after having visited a health education meeting, which results in a higher chance of 
adopting ITNs and, ceteris paribus, in a lower probability of contracting malaria. Low 
trusting individuals are not, however, convinced of the returns to ITN use after 
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having received health education. As a result, they do not change their behaviour. It 
is not, however, generalised trust but specific trust in health providers that 
determines the effectiveness of health education.  
 The model is based on the idea that trust in health providers can be considered 
a catalyst for the effectiveness of health education. This idea is consistent with the 
view that the diffusion of information about new technologies goes faster in 
communities with high-trust individuals (Van den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). 
More generally, the model builds on the idea that traditional and modern biomedical 
practices matter for the effectiveness of development programs (Adato et al. 2011).  
Figure 3.1   Analytical	framework
Individuals that stick 
to their local 
indigenous beliefs, 
because of low trust 
in health providers 
 
No behavioural 
change
Lower chance of 
malaria for household 
members
 
Higher chance of ITN 
use for household
 
Individuals that 
abandon their local 
indigenous beliefs, 
because of high trust 
in health providers
 
Individuals with local  
indigenous beliefs 
about malaria
 
Health Education
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 Trust in health providers can also be used as a continuous instead of a 
dichotomous variable. In this specification, the chance of using an ITN after health 
education increases with the level of trust in health providers. This can occur in a 
linear or in a non-linear way. Empirically, trust has been found to have a positive 
impact on self-reported health in a non-linear way in rural China (Wang et al. 2009). 
We could speculatively hypothesise that only after the trust level in health providers 
has reached a certain threshold is the trust level in health care providers high enough 
to abandon local indigenous beliefs about malaria, because of the important role of 
local indigenous beliefs, especially in our research area (Adongo et al. 2005). 
            This idea about threshold effects of social capital is related to the micro-economic 
literature on poverty traps. Amongst others, capital market failures can result in 
locally increasing returns at certain asset levels, resulting in strong non-linear 
threshold effects of physical capital on income levels (Carter and Barrett 2006). The 
persistence of information asymmetries, after health education at excessively low 
trust levels, can result in similar detrimental effects on malaria incidence. It is not, 
however, clear a priori whether the effect of trust in health providers on returns to 
health education is linear or non-linear. 
 More formally, a general model with effects of trust on returns to health 
education can be defined as follows: the probability of using an ITN, Pr(ITN), is 
dependent upon a vector X of individual, household and community characteristics 
and increases with the entrance of the health care provider H in the community. The 
probability increases faster with higher levels of trust T in the health care provider H, 
as shown in the probability function ( , , )F X H T . 
Pr( ) ( , , )ITN F X H T=  (3.1)
Pr( ) 0ITN
H
∂
>
∂
 (3.2)
2 Pr( ) 0ITN
H T
∂
>
∂ ∂
 (3.3)
 
Under conditions of threshold effects, Equation 3.3 transforms into Equation 3.3a 
and 3.3b (under the restriction that the impact of health education on the use of 
ITNs is not smaller than 0), in which a is a threshold value for trust above which 
marginal impacts of health education become more positive. Both models will be 
tested in our data analyses. 
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3.3. Data collection
Households were interviewed around three Catholic health centres in the UER and 
one Catholic hospital in Hwidiem in the BAR. High demand for services from 
faith-based hospitals and health centres in Africa (Leonard 2002) has resulted in an 
overload of patients and long waiting lists. The Catholic hospitals and health centres 
are thus an excellent example of organisations that have focused more on health 
education in the last couple of years, partly forced by excess demand.   
 The BAR counted 398 surveyed households, while the UER counted 402 surveyed 
households. Data collection efforts took place from October-November in 2007 and 
took about 20 days in each region. To guarantee comparability, we will only use 
survey data from the villages in which health education of the Catholic diocese is 
offered for our impact estimate of health education. This reduces our sample to 521 
households counting 3450 individuals; 200 households in the BAR and 321 households 
in the UER. 
3.3.1. The sampling procedure
In the BAR 8 villages (Apenamuadi, Woremamuso, Obengkrom, Amanfrom, 
Ata-Ne-Ata, Mmampehia, Nkrankrom and Nkaseim) were chosen through the 
selection of villages in a circle around the hospital in Hwidiem. Households in 
Hwidiem itself were not surveyed, because of the different urban nature. The 
number of surveyed households per village was chosen proportionally to the number 
of inhabitants and ranges from 4-94 surveyed households. After selection of the 
number of households per village, households were selected randomly through a 
system of counting houses in the village.
 In the UER 5 villages (Zoko, Logre, Aka Yonga, Piitanga and Nakolo) were selected 
that benefited from health education of the health staff of the Catholic health 
centres. Again, households were selected randomly through a system of counting 
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houses in the village, after selection of the number of households per village. The 
number of households was planned to be equal in the 5 villages. In practice, there 
was a slight oversampling of households in villages that suffered less from the 
floods that plagued the region just before the survey. 
3.3.2. The survey
Questionnaires in both areas were written in English and conducted by surveyors 
who knew the local languages applicable to the areas. On average a survey with a 
single household took about 2.5 hours. The survey was made up of 10 sections; a 
household roster, employment and income, migration, transfers, consumption and 
production, credit, housing, education, health and attitudes. 
 Some sections also contained questions at the individual level: employment and 
income, migration, education, health and attitudes. The section on attitudes was 
answered by the head of the household and his/her spouse or if not available 
another woman/man of 15 years and older. For the same persons questions were 
answered in three other sections: employment and income, education and health. 
Additionally, questions about two children between 0 and 14 years old were 
answered in two sections: education and health.   
3.3.3. The health education variable
Health education is provided in the villages at irregular intervals. It is either provided 
by health staff living in the villages, or by health staff reaching out from the hospital 
or health centre. The education is heavily focused on preventing malaria through the 
ownership and use of bednets. The health education participants in our study stated 
that they received a private educational visit from health staff or participated in a 
public health education meeting from a staff member of the Catholic hospital or 
health centre in the past four weeks. Our treatment variable for participation in 
health education is thus a lower-bound estimate for true participation. People 
treated as non-participants in our estimation strategy might have been beneficiaries 
of health education in the not-so-recent past. Our variable considers only recently 
organised health education efforts, but talks with staff of the Catholic hospitals and 
health centres revealed that groups of health education participants are relatively 
fixed over time. 
 This implies that comparing bednet use of participants and non-participants in 
health education meetings is bound to result in an underestimation of the effect of 
education programs on ITN use. Non-participants could also have benefited from 
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health education if they have had health education in the past. Therefore, we focus 
on differences in treatment effects between groups of high-trust and low-trust 
participants rather than the absolute size of the Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated (ATT) of health education. 
3.3.4. Measuring generalised and health provider trust
To distinguish between generalised trust and trust in health providers, we collected 
data on generalised trust, trust in public doctors, trust in private doctors and trust in 
doctors of the specific Catholic hospital or health centre. Both generalised trust and 
trust in health providers are measured using a question that can be considered a 
modified version of the well-known General Social Survey trust measure, in which 
respondents state their agreement (yes or no) with “Generally speaking would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people”. We ask for the level of agreement with the statements “Most people can be 
trusted” (for generalised trust) and “The doctors of the Catholic hospitals and health 
centres can be trusted” (for trust in health providers) on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Arguably, more information about the level of trust can be gathered using a 5-point 
Likert scale than by using a dichotomous variable. Although we are aware of the 
limitations of this measure, we believe it gives us a good proxy for both generalised 
trust and trust in health providers.46  
3.4. Estimation strategy
Before presenting our descriptive statistics, we first present our estimation strategy. 
Participation in health education meetings is led by supply and demand considerations. 
Firstly, the hospital supplies health education more frequently in villages that are 
close. Secondly, within villages it is likely that participants in health education 
meetings differ systematically from non-participants in observable and unobservable 
characteristics.
 A randomisation strategy to estimate the impact of the discussed health 
education program is thus not possible. We have to rely on cross-sectional quasi-
experimental methods to estimate the impact of the program, because baseline 
data were not available. We could, for example, apply the instrumental variable 
regression approach. However, the validity of instrumental variables depends 
crucially on the validity of the exclusion restriction (Ravallion 2001) and it is not clear 
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whether a valid instrument is available in our dataset. Alternatively, we use methods 
related to the so-called propensity score to estimate the impact of health education. 
This implies an assumption of independence of the outcome in the untreated state 
and the treatment assignment (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
 By estimating a probit model with health education in the household as the 
dependent variable and a number of exogenous independent variables for the UER 
and BAR separately, we are able to estimate the so-called propensity score for 
participation in health education programs, which can be seen as the relevant 
summary statistic to be balanced between participants and non-participants in 
health education (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The region of the probabilities for 
which a valid comparison group can be formed is termed the region of common 
support, and only observations in this region are used to estimate the impact of 
health education. Unobservables cannot, however, be accounted for by controlling 
for or matching on the propensity score. 
 We estimate the probit model for health education participation of one 
household member at the individual level to account for a number of important 
indicators that were measured at the individual level and to be able to estimate the 
possible heterogeneous impacts of health education within the household later in 
our estimation. Intra-household allocation of ITNs or bednets can be affected by 
both the exact individual visiting the health education meeting and by knowledge 
and behavioural transmissions within the household. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will label the exact individual visiting the health education meeting as a 
direct beneficiary and his/her household members as indirect beneficiaries of health 
education. Since the health education program is focused on preventing malaria, we 
will use malaria prevention measures as our main indicators in our estimation 
procedure. We will, moreover, estimate the impact of the program on self-reported 
fever in the week before the survey, as a proxy for malaria. 
 In specifying our probit model we account for individual and household charac-
teristics in the form of the number of household members in different categories, 
gender, age, the maximum years of schooling of a female household member and 
the relation to the household head. Secondly, we control for presumably exogenous 
socio-economic characteristics as land wealth, livestock wealth and housing 
wealth.47 Thirdly, we control for exogenous access to hospital services through 
controlling for distance, costs and usual transport devices to the Catholic hospital or 
health centre and for dummy variables for when a household lives closer to another 
public or private hospital, to distinguish health education from exogenous access to 
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other health services. Fourthly, we control for the percentage of other individuals 
participating in health education in the village, to control for supply of health 
education and for aggregate demand for health education within the village. Finally, 
we control for other individual and household characteristics and we include 
variables that are related to floods having occurred shortly before our survey for the 
UER.48 Including variables that are not immediately related to the final indicators in 
the probit model for propensity score matching can reduce possible bias (Rubin and 
Thomas 1996).49
 To derive heterogeneous impact estimates of health education we estimate 
different separate models for the two regions, in which we use the estimated 
propensities as explanatory variables. A Chow Test for pooling the two regions was 
rejected at the 5% level and was robust to the form of the specification of the model. 
We chose to use propensity-adjusted regression rather than propensity score 
matching to estimate heterogeneous impacts of health education because 
propensity score matching would not enable us to include interactions between 
health education and trust.50 Instead, it would have been necessary to estimate 
models for two different sub-samples of high-trust and low-trust individuals with 
less statistical power and without the ability to include other interactions.     
 We experimented with different interactions of health education with trust, to 
test whether the effectiveness of health education varies with levels of trust in 
health providers. We also include other interactions, which will be discussed in our 
estimation results.
3.5. Descriptive statistics
Before we describe the results of our estimation procedure, we first present 
descriptive statistics for health education beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 
separately for both regions. Our main indicators are whether individuals slept under 
a bednet in the night before the interview (Bednet use), whether individuals slept 
under a bednet which was originally treated with insecticides (ITN use) and whether 
individuals suffered from fever in the last week (Fever Incidence). 
3.5.1. Differences in malaria prevention and fever
Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for beneficiaries and non- 
beneficiaries in the first three rows. In our sample, 252 individuals (7.5%) had a member 
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of the household who participated in health education in the last four weeks. Both 
bednet and ITN use are underestimated for both groups, because we set these values 
to 0 for all individuals for which the household had no bednet. We cannot, however, 
set them to 1 for all individuals for which the household did at least have 1 bednet, 
because it is not clear whether ownership of bednets resulted in bednet use.51
 The tables give a first indication about the effectiveness of health education. 
We use the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test for which results are reported in 
column 4, to estimate differences between the two groups. In the BAR both bednet 
and ITN use are higher for beneficiaries at the 10% significance level. There is no 
significant difference in fever incidence, but fever incidence is lower for beneficiaries. 
In the UER both bednet and ITN use are significantly higher for beneficiaries at the 
1% level. Additionally, fever incidence is lower at the 10% significance level. 
 A closer look reveals that bednet and ITN use are only significantly higher for 
beneficiaries in the BAR when trust in health providers is sufficiently high, which 
gives a first indication of trust in health providers as a catalyst of malaria prevention. 
We illustrate the results by reporting Mann-Whitney Z statistics separately for two 
categories in Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.1. In column 5 we report the differences between 
participants and non-participants for the subsample of households where both the 
male and the female respondent strongly agree with the statement “The doctors of 
the Catholic hospital can be trusted” (group with high trust), while column 6 
presents the differences for the subsample where either the male and/or the female 
respondent reports a trust level from 1-4 (“Strongly Disagree”-“Agree”) i.e., the group 
with low trust. ITN use and bednet use are significantly higher at the 1% level for 
beneficiaries who belong to the group with high trust compared to non-beneficiar-
ies from the same group. Interestingly, ITN and bednet use are even lower for 
beneficiaries in the group with low trust at the 10% significance level in the BAR.  
 In the UER both bednet and ITN use are higher at the 1% significance level and 
self-reported fever incidence is significantly lower at the 10% significance level for 
beneficiaries for whom both the man and the woman respondent strongly agree 
with the statement on trust in doctors of the Catholic health centres. For beneficiaries 
for whom the man and/or the woman respondent report a less than maximum (1-4) 
trust level in these doctors, ITN use is higher for beneficiaries at the 5% significance 
level, and bednet use is also higher at the 10% significance level. The differences are, 
however, less strong than for beneficiaries for whom the male and the female 
respondent strongly agree with “The doctors of the Catholic hospital can be trusted”. 
We illustrate these results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.1. 
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3.5.2. Differences in explanatory variables
We also present descriptive statistics on a number of explanatory variables for 
health education beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in both areas. We focus on 
household characteristics, socio-economic characteristics, access to health care and 
trust. Again, we estimate differences with help of the Mann-Whitney test. The 
results are presented in Table 3.5 from row 4 in Appendix 3.1.  
 In the BAR, household size among beneficiaries is slightly lower but the number 
of children – especially girls – under five is higher at the 1% significance level. 
Beneficiaries have a lower maximum number of years of schooling for female 
household members at the 1% significance level. The Mann-Whitney test in row 10 
shows that the rank of livestock wealth for beneficiaries is higher at the 1% 
significance level. Generalised trust levels for beneficiaries are significantly lower at 
the 1% level for both men and women. Finally, among beneficiaries, women show a 
significantly lower trust in doctors (for all categories) than non-beneficiaries at the 
1% level, while for men only generalised trust is significantly lower at the 1% level for 
beneficiaries. Differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries differ 
between the category for whom both the man and the woman strongly agree with 
“The doctors of the Catholic hospital can be trusted” and the category for whom the 
women and/or the man respondent report a  trust level from 1-4 in doctors of the 
Catholic hospital for some explanatory variables. 
 In the UER there are fewer women household members among health education 
beneficiaries, but more girls under 5 years old, although the differences are not 
significant. Additionally, health education beneficiaries seem to be more 
agriculturally oriented, given their higher livestock wealth and lower housing wealth 
at the 1% significance level. Beneficiaries also need less time to travel to the hospital 
at the 1% significance level, although this effect might occur as a result of the lower 
percentage of individuals who walk to the health centre. Generalised trust among 
men and women for beneficiaries is lower at the 1% significance level. The results 
are similar for trust in doctors. Trust in public doctors and doctors of the Catholic 
health centre is significantly lower for male and female beneficiaries at the 1% level, 
while trust in private doctors is also significantly lower at the 1% level for female 
beneficiaries. Again, differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries differ 
between the category for whom both the man and the woman respondent strongly 
agree with “The doctors of the Catholic health centre can be trusted” and the 
category for which the man and/or the woman respondent report a trust level of 1-4 
in doctors of the Catholic health centre for some explanatory variables. In our 
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estimation procedure we will account for differences in a more systematic way with 
propensity-adjusted regression, as will be discussed in the next two sections.  
3.6. Estimating propensities
We estimate the probit models to estimate the propensity separately for the BAR 
and the UER, because a Chow test for pooling the two regions was rejected, as 
discussed in our estimation procedure. In our probit model, the dummy variable for 
health education participation is 1 for both direct and indirect beneficiaries. 
3.6.1. Probit estimations
In addition to the variables from the four categories mentioned earlier in our 
estimation procedure, we also include variables to account for durable ownership, 
housing conditions, sanitary conditions, income losses related to crop loss, a dummy 
variable for household members who died and a dummy variable for national health 
insurance participation in the probit model for health education in the BAR.52 To 
prevent the loss of too many variables as a result of missing values and the potentially 
endogenous nature, we did not use variables related to trust in our probit 
specification to derive the propensity score. We will control for trust later in this 
chapter. The second column of Table 3.1 presents the results of the probit model. 
 We can derive several conclusions from the probit model for the BAR. First, 
participation in health education increases strongly with the percentage of other 
community members who participate in health education. Second, both individual 
age and the number of household members of 65 years and older leads to decreased 
participation in health education, while a higher number of household members 
below 5 years old has a positive significant effect on participation in health 
education. Additionally, the spouse of the household head has the highest chance to 
participate within the household. Third, a higher number of years of education for 
the most educated female household member leads to a decreased chance of 
participation in health education. Fourth, participants seem to be poorer, when 
defined as having lower wealth in land and housing (although ownership of durables 
has different impacts on participation in health education, depending on the 
durable). Fifth, participants in health education live significantly closer to the 
Catholic and public hospital, while they often live further away from other private 
hospitals. Sixth, participation increases with the death of household members in 
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the last 5 years. Finally, participation in the national health insurance scheme is 
positively related with participation in health education in the BAR.    
 We also estimate a probit model for participation in health education in the 
UER. We use the same estimation procedure as for the BAR.53 For all health education 
beneficiaries, the health centres of the Catholic Diocese are the nearest health 
centre. We do not, however, exclude households for whom another public or private 
hospital is closer, because this would lead to the loss of 438 observations.54
 In addition to the variables from the four categories mentioned earlier, we also 
include variables to account for religion, language spoken in daily life, ethnicity, 
ownership of durables, housing conditions, income losses related to property loss in 
the last 5 years, crop loss during the floods and a dummy variable for national health 
insurance participation. Column 4 of Table 3.1 presents the results of the probit 
model. 
 First, just as in the BAR, participation in health education increases strongly with 
the percentage of other community members who participate in health education 
in the UER. Second, the chance to participate in health education increases with the 
number of male household members and the number of household members below 
15 years old, but decreases with general household size. Third, contrary to the BAR, a 
higher number of years of education for the most educated female household 
member leads to an increased chance of participation in health education. Fourth, 
wealth is more concentrated in livestock among participants than in housing, 
resulting in higher wealth in livestock and lower wealth in housing for health 
education participants. Additionally, participants in health education are less likely 
to live in a semi-detached dwelling than in a compound house or houses with several 
buildings connected. Fifth, Muslims participate more in health education and the 
chance to participate in health education decreases with speaking Gurune or a local 
language other than Gurune, Nabdam or Frafra. Sixth, participants in health 
education have lost significantly less property in the last 5 years but more crops in 
the last 2 months. Finally, participants in health education are less likely to participate 
in the national health insurance scheme in the UER.   
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Table 3.1	 Probit	model	for	health	education	participation
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) (2) Health Education (3) (4) Health Education
Community individual 
health education share
93.36*** 
(5.21)
Community 
individual health 
education share
45.07*** 
(7.09)
Household size -0.02 
(-0.47)
Household size -0.27** 
(-2.52)
Head of household 0.50 
(1.32)
Head of household 0.10 
(0.39)
Spouse of head of 
household
0.74** 
(2.05)
Age 0.00
 (0.44)
Age -0.02** 
(-2.28)
Dummy for man -0.23 
(-1.29)
Dummy for man 0.38  
(1.42)
Number of male 
household members
0.74*** 
(7.06)
Number of household 
members below 5 years old
0.78***  
(3.62)
Number of household 
members below 15 
years old
0.45*** 
(5.01)
Number of female 
household member 
between 6 and 15 years old
0.24*  
(1.72)
Maximum number 
of years of schooling 
of female household 
members
0.08*** 
(3.88)
Number of household 
members of 65 years and 
older
-1.39*** 
(-4.47)
Land Wealth -0.00
 (-1.48)
Maximum number of years 
of schooling of female 
household members
-0.21*** 
(-4.44)
Livestock Wealth 0.00***
 (5.70)
Land Wealth -0.00*** 
(-2.69)
Housing Wealth -0.00***
 (-3.78)
Livestock Wealth 0.00 
(0.83)
Time distance from 
catholic health centre
-0.01
 (-1.56)
Housing Wealth -0.00***
(-3.48)
Travel to catholic 
health centre with 
tro tro
0.56* 
(1.71)
Time distance from catholic 
hospital
0.02**  
(2.28)
Married -0.25 
(-1.41)
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Table 3.1	 Continued
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) (2) Health Education (3) (4) Health Education
Travel to catholic hospital 
with tro tro
0.01
 (0.02)
Number of Muslim 
household members
0.30*** 
(6.44)
Travel to catholic hospital 
with taxi
1.00**
(2.42)
Number of household 
members that do 
speak a different 
local language than 
Gurune, Nabdam or 
Frafra
-0.22*** 
(-3.30)
Dummy for closer public 
hospital
1.11*** 
(4.10)
Number of household 
members that do 
speak Gurune
-0.53***  
(-6.73)
Dummy for closer private 
hospital
-1.24*** 
(-4.27)
Ownership of watch -0.24 
(-1.54)
Ownership of Refrigerator 1.51*** 
(4.38)
Brick material of the 
external wall
0.29  
(1.95)
Ownership of Fan -1.77*** 
(-4.50)
Semi-detached 
dwelling
-2.15*** 
(-5.27)
Adobe Wall 1.73*** 
(6.35)
Property loss in the 
last 5 years
-1.37*** 
(-3.15)
Borehole source for water -0.42 
(-1.57)
Crop loss during 
floods in last 2 
months
0.01*** 
(4.50)
Income loss due to crop loss 
in the last 5 years
-0.00*
 (-1.71)
National Health 
Insurance
-2.03*** 
(-5.60)
Household member died in 
last 5 years
1.18***
 (4.40)
Constant -1.20***  
(-3.21)
National Health Insurance 2.23*** 
(6.65)
Constant -4.54*** 
(-5.95)
Observations 1150 Observations 1884
Pseudo R2 0.563 Pseudo R2 0.506
AIC 312.3 AIC 510.2
t statistics in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.6.2. Propensity-adjusted regression results
Overall, we find mixed evidence of a positive ATT of health education in the two 
regions. In the BAR, we find no significant ATT after propensity-adjusted regression. 
We find no evidence of significant impacts of health education on bednet or ITN use 
or self-reported fever. Additionally, some coefficients point in the wrong direction. 
Out of the 83 health education beneficiaries, 79 fall in the common support. The 
propensity-adjusted regression results with clustered standard errors are presented 
in columns 2-4 of Table 3.2. The results are more positive for the UER. We find a 
significant impact of health education on ITN use at the 10% significance level but 
not on fever incidence. Propensity-adjusted regression results with clustered 
standard errors are presented in columns 5-7 of Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2	 Propensity-adjusted	regression 
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) 
Dependent 
Variable
(2)  
Number of 
observations  
on common 
support
(3)  
Average 
Treatment 
Effect 
On The 
Treated
(4) 
Clustered 
Standard 
Errors
(5)  
Number of 
observations  
on common 
support
(6)  
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
the Treated
(7) 
Clustered 
Standard 
Errors
Bednet Use 779 0.47 0.83 1379 0.93 0.57
ITN Use 743 1.01 0.85 1357 1.05* 0.57
Fever  
Incidence
613 -0.40 0.53 934 -0.16 0.53
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard Errors Clustered at the Household Level. 
It is by no means clear that health education has a positive ATT, although there is 
weak evidence of a positive ATT in the UER. Since the treatment effects are likely to 
be underestimated as a result of our treatment variable, we should not, however, 
conclude too much from these results. Instead, we will focus on heterogeneous 
impact estimates in our following analysis.  
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3.7. Estimating heterogeneous impacts
3.7.1. Heterogeneous linear impacts
By estimating propensity-adjusted regression models with interactions, we are able 
to observe the heterogeneous impact of health education. We estimate the empirical 
model with two main specifications. In our first specification we test whether trust 
in health providers has a linear effect on returns to health education as in Equation 
3.1-3.3 of our analytical framework. In our second specification we account for 
non-linear threshold effects of trust in health providers on returns to health 
education, by substituting Equation 3.3 with Equation 3.3a and 3.3b of our analytical 
framework. In both models we add interactions between generalised trust and 
health education and trust in health providers and health education. The regression 
models are summarised in Equation 3.4, in which Th is trust, while THPh stands for 
trust in health providers (either linear or non-linear, depending on the model), Hhi 
for health education for direct beneficiaries, Hh for health education for indirect 
beneficiaries, Xhi for possible other explanatory variables (that can also be interacted 
with health education), Phi for the estimated propensity and ∈hi  for the residual 
value:
  
(3.4)
In our first main specification for the BAR we only include interactions between 
health education and trust in doctors of the Catholic hospital, and health education 
with generalised trust. The questions on trust were answered by the head of the 
household and his/her spouse or, if not available, another woman/man of 15 years or 
older. Both trust in doctors of the Catholic hospital and generalised trust are defined 
as the mean trust level for the two respondents. When there was only one 
respondent, we replaced the value for both trust levels with the value for this 
respondent.55 Through controlling for generalised trust, we make sure we actually 
estimate the impact of trust in health providers and not of generalised trust. 
 We also include the second part of the interaction in both models. The exclusion 
of constitutive terms can result in omitted-variable bias (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
2006). Additionally, we also include a dummy variable that is 1 if the individual 
participated in health education, to distinguish direct and indirect beneficiaries. 
There are, however, too few observations on individual participation to distinguish 
heterogeneous impacts for individual participants. Finally, we account for the 
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propensity to account for selection effects in health education participation. The 
results are shown in columns 1-3 of Table 3.3. 
 Coefficients and standard errors of interactions cannot be directly interpreted 
in logistic models with interactions. The magnitude of interaction effects in 
non-linear models can even be of opposite sign of the marginal effect of the 
interaction and is conditional on the independent variables (Ai and Norton 2003). 
Only when the interaction of health education with trust in doctors of the Catholic 
hospital has a mean positive marginal significant effect can Equation 3.3 in our 
analytical framework be considered confirmed.   
 For this reason we estimate the magnitude of the interaction between health 
education and trust in doctors of Catholic hospitals over different predicted values 
of owning or using a bednet, depending on the dependent variable.56 Columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.3 show the mean, minimum and maximum z value of the marginal effects on 
ITN use in rows 11, 12 and 13, respectively. The marginal effects are very heterogene-
ously distributed and although the mean of the marginal impact of the interaction 
is positive over the whole distribution, it is not significant. There are significant 
impacts over parts of the distribution, but evidence of positive linearly determined 
mean marginal effects of the interaction as in Equation 3.3 of our analytical 
framework is only weak. We also do not find a direct benefit of health education at 
the individual level. These results are robust to the exclusion of the propensity score, 
which is not significant, from the model.57 
 We estimate a similar model for the UER, in which we add one extra interaction 
between the health education of a household member and the Kassena Nankana 
ethnic group. As discussed earlier, the anthropological literature has shown that the 
Kassena-Nankana have rather distinct views on malaria. Additionally, it is unclear 
whether modern medicine is trusted within this group (Adongo et al. 2005). The 
second point is reflected by a significant lower trust in private doctors for the Kasse-
na-Nankana among both men and women. Additionally, Kassena-Nankana women 
display a significantly lower trust in public doctors and the doctors of the Catholic 
health centres. Alternatively, the low trust level of the Kassena-Nankana might be 
explained by a strong identification with a subset of society – the Kassena-Nankana. 
A strong identification with only a subset of society has been shown to have a 
negative effect on generalised trust levels under certain conditions (Zerfu, Zikhali, 
and Kabenga 2009) and might have an even stronger negative effect on trust levels 
in relative outsiders such as health providers. The distinct views of the Kassena-Nan-
kana can result in different impacts of health education for this group. 
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 We find unconditional significant direct benefits of health education at the 
individual level in the UER. The magnitude of the interaction effect of health 
education of a household member with trust in health providers on ITN and bednet 
use is, however, only significant at the 5%  significance level for a number of 
observations, despite the significant coefficient in the regression tables explaining 
bednet and ITN use. Columns 4-6 of Table 3.3 show the mean, minimum and 
maximum z value of the marginal effects in rows 11, 12 and 13, respectively. Just as for 
the BAR, there is only weak evidence of marginal linear positive effects of the 
interaction. Equation 3.3 from our analytical framework is not confirmed. 
 The magnitude of the interaction effect of health education of a household 
member with the Kassena-Nankana ethnic group on ITN and bednet use is, however, 
significant at the 5% level. Fever incidence is also significantly lower at the 10% 
significance level for this group. The heterogeneous distribution of marginal effects 
on ITN and bednet use is positive for the complete survey population for this 
variable. Again, the results are robust to the exclusion of the propensity score from 
our model. 
 There are a number of possible explanations for the higher impact for the 
 Kassena-Nankana. First, health education might be more suited to the indigenous 
beliefs about malaria of the Kassena-Nankana. Second, health education might be 
more effective, because of decreasing returns. Although the Kassena-Nankana are 
not less educated than other ethnic groups, convulsion and anaemia are generally 
not related to the less serious stages of malaria (Adongo et al. 2005). The Kassena-
Nankana might thus have a lower knowledge level of the serious stages of malaria. 
Beliefs about returns to bednet use could, therefore, change more for this group as 
a result of health education. We are not, however, able to test the possible 
explanations for higher health education impacts among the Kassena-Nankana 
with our data. We can only control for the effect and speculate about possible 
explanations. 
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Table 3.3			Linear	heterogeneous	impacts
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1)  
Bednet Use
(2) 
ITN Use
(3) 
Fever 
Incidence
(4)  
Bednet Use
(5) 
ITN Use 
(6) 
Fever 
Incidence
(1)  
Individual 
Health 
Education
0.66
(1.20)
0.96(1.04) 1.21
(1.14)
2.24***
(2.98)
3.95***
(3.63)
-1.15
(-1.57)
(2)  
Health 
Education of 
a household 
member
-6.59
(-1.38)
-10.09**
(-2.27)
5.13*
(1.73)
-9.13**
(-1.98)
-9.04**
(-1.96)
-2.84
(-0.56)
(3)  
Health 
Education 
* Trust in 
Health 
Providers
1.47
(1.58)
2.14**
(2.42)
-1.36*
(-1.92)
2.12**
(2.20)
2.11**
(2.19)
0.12
(0.10)
(4)  
Health 
education * 
Generalised 
Trust
0.28
(0.35)
0.59
(0.86)
-0.07
(-0.21)
-0.24
(-0.39)
-0.23
(-0.38)
0.92*
(1.66)
(5) 
Generalised 
trust
0.05
(0.37)
0.12
(0.81)
-0.02
(-0.20)
-0.15
(-1.44)
-0.16
(-1.54)
0.11
(1.17)
(6)  
Trust in 
Health 
Providers
-0.13
(-0.56)
-0.13
(-0.63)
0.22
(0.98)
0.08
(0.51)
0.09
(0.56)
0.61***
(2.78)
(7)  
Health 
Education 
* Kassena-
Nankana
- - - 3.79***
(3.49)
3.95***
(3.63)
-0.40
(-0.26)
(8)  
Kassena-
Nankana
- - - -0.17
(-0.55)
-0.32
(-1.02)
0.69***
(2.67)
(9) 
Propensity
1.15
(0.97)
0.95
(0.83)
-0.71
(-0.59)
-0.09
(-0.10)
-0.11
(-0.12)
0.10(0.11)
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Table 3.3			Continued
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1)  
Bednet Use
(2) 
ITN Use
(3) 
Fever 
Incidence
(4)  
Bednet Use
(5) 
ITN Use 
(6) 
Fever 
Incidence
(10)  
Constant
-0.63
(-0.62)
-1.31
(-1.33)
-2.13**
(-2.19)
-0.42
(-0.60)
-0.49
(-0.70)
-3.68***
(-3.99)
(11) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
trust in 
health 
providers 
mean z-value
1.08 0.93 -1.42 1.05 1.08 -0.89
(12) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
trust in 
health 
providers 
minimum 
z-value
0.55 0.51 -3.02*** -0.54 -0.63 -3.67***
(13) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
trust in 
health 
providers 
maximum 
z-value
2.14* 2.68*** -0.91 3.54*** 3.51*** 0.64
(14) 
Observations
779 743 613 1360 1345 919
(15)  
Log pseudo- 
likeli hood
-450.05 -351.40 -317.93 -871.47 -840.90 -575.49
(16)  
Pseudo R2
0.021 0.042 0.012 0.029 0.034 0.056
t statistics in parentheses in regression. Standard errors clustered at household level. 
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.7.2. Non-linear effects of trust?
Health education might become more effective proportionally with trust, but 
alternatively might also only become effective after a certain trust threshold. This 
last option implies non-linear effects of trust on returns to health education, as 
discussed in our analytical framework. Instead of an interaction between trust in 
doctors of the Catholic hospital and health education for a household member, we 
add an interaction of health education for a household member and a dummy 
variable that is 1 when both the male and the female respondent in the household 
strongly agree with “The doctors of the Catholic hospital or health centre can be 
trusted” in our second main specification, to test for the presence of non-linear 
effects, as in Equations 3.3a and 3.3b of our analytical framework.
 Other than that, we add the same variables as in our first linear specification. 
We hypothesise that health education participants abandon their local indigenous 
beliefs after a meeting only after a certain threshold in provider trust has been 
exceeded. Whenever the mean marginal impact of the interaction of health 
education with the dummy threshold for trust in health providers is significantly 
positive and the mean marginal impact of unconditional health education cannot 
be distinguished from 0, Equations 3.3a and 3.3b from our analytical framework can 
be considered confirmed.  
Non-linear heterogeneous impacts in the Brong-Ahafo Region
Trust does seem to have a positive non-linear impact on returns to health education 
in the BAR. We find a significant mean marginal effect of the interaction between 
health education for a household member and the dummy for the trust threshold in 
health providers on ITN and bednet use. The mean, minimum and maximum 
marginal impact of the interaction are reported in rows 11, 12 and 13 in columns 1-3 of 
Table 3.4, respectively. Marginal effects are very heterogeneous over the population. 
Z values run from 0.99 to 5.23. The mean marginal impact of the interaction is 
significantly positive. Both Equations 3.3a and 3.3b seem to be confirmed in our 
non-linear model. The impact of health education for a household member cannot 
be empirically distinguished from 0 without interaction with trust in health 
providers.   
 Even though the interaction between health education for a household member 
and a dummy for the trust threshold in health providers has a positive impact on a 
large part of the survey population, the effects are not significant for everybody. The 
sign is, however, consistently positive for the complete survey population. Selection 
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bias from other observable characteristics does not seem to be strong, given that 
the results are robust to the exclusion of the propensity score.  
Non-linear heterogeneous impacts in the Upper East Region
We also estimate a second main specification with an interaction of health education 
and a dummy for the trust threshold in health providers for the UER. The results are 
shown in column 4-6 of Table 3.4. Mean marginal effects show that trust has a 
non-linear impact on returns to health education in the UER too. The mean marginal 
effect on ITN and bednet use is significant at the 5% level and the interaction also 
has a mean negative significant impact on fever incidence in the last week. The 
mean, minimum and maximum marginal impact of the interaction are reported in 
rows 11, 12 and 13 in columns 4-6 of Table 3.4, respectively. Again, marginal effects 
are unevenly distributed over the survey population. Z values run from 0.76 to 2.75. 
In the mean, Equations 3.3a and 3.3b of our analytical framework, however, seem to 
be confirmed in the UER as well. Just as in the BAR, the coefficient for health 
education for a household member cannot be empirically distinguished from 0 
without interaction with trust in health providers. The propensity score is not 
significant and excluding it from the model has no implications for the results.    
3.8. Conclusion
In this chapter we presented evidence of trust in health providers as a catalyst for 
effectiveness of health education in the BAR and the UER in rural Ghana. Earlier 
research showed mixed evidence regarding the impact of health education 
programs. Differences in perceived trustworthiness of health providers are a 
plausible explanation for the divergence in impact estimates in previous studies. We 
presented empirical evidence of heterogeneous impacts of health education. 
Effectiveness of health education increases with the level of trust in health providers. 
Specific trust in health providers is a more important predictor of returns to health 
education than generalised trust. This result provides support for the importance of 
specific trust in explaining success of development projects. 
 The effectiveness of health education does not, however, seem to increase 
proportionally with the level of trust in health providers. Health education only has 
a significant impact on ITN and bednet use after a certain trust threshold has 
passed. The impact of trust in health providers on returns to health education seems 
 Trust in Health Providers as a Catalyst for Malaria Prevention | 105
3
Table 3.4			Non-Linear	heterogeneous	impacts
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) 
Bednet Use 
(2)
ITN Use
(3)
Fever 
Incidence
(4)
Bednet Use
(5)
ITN Use
(6)
Fever 
Incidence
(1)  
Individual 
Health 
Education
1.08
(1.10)
1.55
(1.17)
0.77
(0.85)
2.44***
(3.18)
2.44***
(3.18)
-1.10
(-1.55)
(2)  
Health 
Education of 
a household 
member
-0.70
(-0.21)
-1.97
(-1.03)
0.28
(0.26)
-0.21
(-0.10)
-0.17
(-0.08)
-2.15
(-1.03)
(3)  
Health 
Education 
*Dummy for 
High Trust 
in Health 
Providers
4.28**
(1.96)
4.47***
(3.27)
-0.89
(-0.98)
2.79*
(2.04)
2.62*
(1.92)
-1.02
(-0.92)
(4)  
Health 
education * 
Generalised 
Trust
1.08
(1.10)
0.18
(0.24)
-0.24
(-0.69)
-0.50
(-0.73)
-0.46
(-0.68)
1.05*
(1.61)
(5)  
Generalised 
trust
0.04
(0.32)
0.12
(0.79)
-0.01
(-0.08)
-0.09
(-0.84)
-0.12
(-1.17)
0.02
(0.16)
(6)  
Dummy for 
High Trust 
in Health 
Providers
-0.37
(-1.17)
-0.59*
(-1.73)
0.27
(1.04)
-0.29
(-1.17)
-0.12
(-0.48)
1.33***
(5.52)
(7)  
Health 
Education 
* Kassena-
Nankana
- - - 3.36***
(3.66)
3.51***
(3.81)
-0.71
(-0.46)
(8)  
Kassena-
Nankana
- - - -0.21
(-0.70)
-0.36
(-1.16)
0.56**
(2.11)
(9)  
Propensity
1.12
(0.97)
0.76
(0.63)
-0.49
(-0.47)
-0.11
(-0.11)
-0.09
(-0.09)
0.29
(0.30)
(10)  
Constant
-1.00**
(-2.24)
-1.63***
(-3.10)
-1.33***
(-4.21)
-0.09
(-0.27)
-0.15
(-0.42)
-1.37***
(-4.87)
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Table 3.4			Continued
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) 
Bednet Use 
(2)
ITN Use
(3)
Fever 
Incidence
(4)
Bednet Use
(5)
ITN Use
(6)
Fever 
Incidence
(11) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
dummy for 
high trust 
in health 
providers 
mean z-value
4.13*** 2.04** -0.94 2.29** 2.33** -3.46***
(12) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
dummy for 
high trust 
in health 
providers 
minimum 
z-value
1.23 0.98 -1.05 0.67 0.76 -4.05***
(13) 
Interaction 
health 
education* 
dummy for 
high trust 
in health 
providers 
maximum 
z-value
5.53*** 5.23*** -0.71 2.90*** 2.75*** 0.16
(14) 
Observations
779 743 613 1360 1345 919
(15)  
Log pseudo- 
likeli hood
-443.96 -345.62 -319.21 -870.20 -841.99 -557.32
(16) 
Pseudo R2
0.035 0.058 0.008 0.030 0.033 0.086
t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at household level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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to be non-linear. We only found weak evidence of linear impacts of the interaction 
between trust in health providers and health education for a household member. 
Although non-linear impacts have a significant mean value, the impact of trust on 
health providers is not significant for the complete survey population. The sign of 
the interaction is, however, positive for the complete survey population.  
 In the BAR we found significantly higher ITN and bednet use for individuals with 
health education participants in the household and a trust level in health providers 
above the threshold. We find similar results for the UER. Apart from the impact on 
ITN and bednet use, fever incidence is also significantly lower for individuals with 
health education participants in the household and a household trust level in health 
providers above the threshold. In addition to the “trust as catalyst for malaria 
prevention effect”, we also find significant benefits of health education for 
individuals who participated in health education themselves and the Kassena- 
Nankana ethnic group in the UER, in the form of higher ITN and bednet use. Our data 
are not, however, sufficient to explain the latter finding. 
 Returns to health education have been shown to be dependent on trust in 
health providers. Future research can focus on establishing the link between social 
capital and returns to different kinds of development projects. It is unclear whether 
the Catholic hospitals and health centres should change their targeting mechanism 
for health education as a result of these heterogeneous impacts. First, it is difficult 
to identify households that trust health providers. Trust is usually not an observable 
determinant for targeting practices. This objection might not apply when observable 
factors that are highly correlated with trust in health providers can be identified. 
Secondly, trust in health providers could also be formulated in the process of health 
education. Hence, efforts could be directed at building community trust in health 
educators to improve the impact of health education before starting health 
education programs, but also during their implementation. 
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Appendix 3.1
Table 3.5   Descriptive	statistics
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)   
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower 
trust
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower trust
(1)   Bednet Use (n=908) 0.38 0.27 1.72* 5.46*** -1.88* (1) Bednet Use (n=1924) 0.56 0.36 3.93*** 3.75*** 1.78*
(2)   ITN Use(n=869) 0.30 0.19 1.95* 6.16*** -1.86* (2) ITN Use (n=1901) 0.56 0.33 4.50*** 3.86*** 2.43**
(3)   Fever Incidence (n=720) 0.13 0.21 -1.46 -1.50 -0.58 (3) Fever Incidence (n=1302) 0.29 0.39 -1.73* -2.10** 0.132
(4)   Number of household 
members (n=1332)
7.69 8.24 -0.37 -4.78*** 3.72*** (4) Number of household 
members (n=2118)
7.88 7.54 0.54 -1.28 1.63
(5)   Number of female 
household members 
(n=1332)
3.74 4.01 -0.07
-1.53 1.24 (5) Number of female 
household members (n=2118) 3.29 3.63 -1.62
-2.28** 0.27
(6)   Number of children under 
5 (n=1332) 1.05 0.87 3.07***
3.01*** 1.89* (6) Number of children under 
5 (n=2118) 0.80 0.81 0.12
4.32*** -2.42**
(7)   Number of girls under 5  
(n=1332) 0.58 0.33 4.16***
3.94*** 2.65*** (7) Number of girls under 5 
(n=2118) 0.50 0.41 1.50
5.82*** -2.04**
(8)   Maximum number of 
years of schooling of a 
female household member 
(n=1332)
3.85
5.46 -3.45***
-3.86*** -1.12 (8) Maximum number of 
years of schooling of a female 
household member (n=2118)
3.68
3.91
-0.29
-3.24*** 2.14**
(9)   Land Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
257.89
854.38 1.34
3.16*** -0.74 (9) Land Wealth per household 
member (n=2118) 207.73 248.09 2.81***
4.44*** -0.56
(10)  Livestock Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
13.10
13.09 4.61***
2.79*** 3.34*** (10) Livestock Wealth per 
household member (n=2118) 154.26 94.67 2.58***
2.44** 1.26
(11)  Housing Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
524.65
918.13 0.79
0.74 0.95 (11) Housing Wealth per 
household member (n=2118) 257.04 581.39 - 3.06***
-0.60 -4.08***
(12)  Time to reach the catholic 
hospital (n=1277)
25.67
24.88 0.74
1.19 0.77 (12) Time to reach the catholic 
hospital (n=2067) 19.04
 
30.86
-2.99***
-4.48*** 1.26
(13)  Costs to reach the catholic 
hospital  (n=1256)
1.62
2.37 3.67***
2.87*** 2.86*** (13) Costs to reach the catholic 
hospital  (n=2108)
0.05
0.06 1.35
-1.98** 3.13***
(14)  Generalised trust [M]   
(n=1034)
2.40
3.12 -4.90***
-0.26 -5.84*** (14) Generalised trust [M] 
(n=1887) 2.94 3.27 -3.05**
-4.00*** 1.79*
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Appendix 3.1
Table 3.5   Descriptive	statistics
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)   
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower 
trust
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower trust
(1)   Bednet Use (n=908) 0.38 0.27 1.72* 5.46*** -1.88* (1) Bednet Use (n=1924) 0.56 0.36 3.93*** 3.75*** 1.78*
(2)   ITN Use(n=869) 0.30 0.19 1.95* 6.16*** -1.86* (2) ITN Use (n=1901) 0.56 0.33 4.50*** 3.86*** 2.43**
(3)   Fever Incidence (n=720) 0.13 0.21 -1.46 -1.50 -0.58 (3) Fever Incidence (n=1302) 0.29 0.39 -1.73* -2.10** 0.132
(4)   Number of household 
members (n=1332)
7.69 8.24 -0.37 -4.78*** 3.72*** (4) Number of household 
members (n=2118)
7.88 7.54 0.54 -1.28 1.63
(5)   Number of female 
household members 
(n=1332)
3.74 4.01 -0.07
-1.53 1.24 (5) Number of female 
household members (n=2118) 3.29 3.63 -1.62
-2.28** 0.27
(6)   Number of children under 
5 (n=1332) 1.05 0.87 3.07***
3.01*** 1.89* (6) Number of children under 
5 (n=2118) 0.80 0.81 0.12
4.32*** -2.42**
(7)   Number of girls under 5  
(n=1332) 0.58 0.33 4.16***
3.94*** 2.65*** (7) Number of girls under 5 
(n=2118) 0.50 0.41 1.50
5.82*** -2.04**
(8)   Maximum number of 
years of schooling of a 
female household member 
(n=1332)
3.85
5.46 -3.45***
-3.86*** -1.12 (8) Maximum number of 
years of schooling of a female 
household member (n=2118)
3.68
3.91
-0.29
-3.24*** 2.14**
(9)   Land Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
257.89
854.38 1.34
3.16*** -0.74 (9) Land Wealth per household 
member (n=2118) 207.73 248.09 2.81***
4.44*** -0.56
(10)  Livestock Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
13.10
13.09 4.61***
2.79*** 3.34*** (10) Livestock Wealth per 
household member (n=2118) 154.26 94.67 2.58***
2.44** 1.26
(11)  Housing Wealth per 
household member 
(n=1332)
524.65
918.13 0.79
0.74 0.95 (11) Housing Wealth per 
household member (n=2118) 257.04 581.39 - 3.06***
-0.60 -4.08***
(12)  Time to reach the catholic 
hospital (n=1277)
25.67
24.88 0.74
1.19 0.77 (12) Time to reach the catholic 
hospital (n=2067) 19.04
 
30.86
-2.99***
-4.48*** 1.26
(13)  Costs to reach the catholic 
hospital  (n=1256)
1.62
2.37 3.67***
2.87*** 2.86*** (13) Costs to reach the catholic 
hospital  (n=2108)
0.05
0.06 1.35
-1.98** 3.13***
(14)  Generalised trust [M]   
(n=1034)
2.40
3.12 -4.90***
-0.26 -5.84*** (14) Generalised trust [M] 
(n=1887) 2.94 3.27 -3.05**
-4.00*** 1.79*
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Table 3.5   Descriptive	statistics
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)   
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower 
trust
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower trust
(15)  Generalised trust [F]  
(=1206)
2.36
2.89 -3.29***
-1.71* -3.05*** (15) Generalised trust [F]  
(=2017) 2.63 3.35 -6.64***
-4.98*** -3.56***
(16)  Trust in private doctors 
[M] (n=1028)
3.94
4.03 -0.47
-2.00** 0.75 (16) Trust in private doctors 
[M] (n=1893)
3.99
4.09 -1.55
1.39 -0.35
(17)  Trust in private doctors [F] 
(n=1190)
3.51
4.29 -6.14***
-6.97*** -3.25*** (17) Trust in private doctors [F} 
(n=2021)
4.09
4.26 -3.65***
0.97 -2.35**
(18)  Trust in public doctors [M] 
(n=1034)
4.00 4.23 0.07 2.65*** -0.76 (18) Trust in public doctors [M] 
(n=1893)
3.76 4.11 -4.42*** 1.15 -4.44***
(19)  Trust in public doctors [F] 
(n=1196)
3.74 4.41 -3.16 -1.17 -3.84*** (19) Trust in public doctors [F] 
(n=2021)
4.06 4.29 -3.72*** -0.08 -0.59
(20)  Trust in doctors of the 
catholic hospital [M] 
(n=1034)
4.42 4.42 -0.91 n.a. 0.73 (20) Trust in doctors of the 
catholic health centre [M] 
(n=1893)
4.19 4.28 -3.43*** n.a. 0.62
(21)  Trust in doctors of the 
catholic hospital [F} 
(n=1196)
3.72 4.50 -4.40 n.a. -6.51*** (21) Trust in doctors of the 
catholic health centre [F] 
(n=2021)
4.26 4.45 -4.82*** n.a. -1.54
Note: [M] and [F] refer to answers by male and female respondents, respectively. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 3.5   Descriptive	statistics
Brong-Ahafo Region Upper East Region
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)   
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower 
trust
(1) Variable (2)  
Mean health 
education 
participants
(3)  
Mean non-
participants
(4)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test
(5)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
highest 
trust
(6)  
Mann-
Whitney 
test for 
lower trust
(15)  Generalised trust [F]  
(=1206)
2.36
2.89 -3.29***
-1.71* -3.05*** (15) Generalised trust [F]  
(=2017) 2.63 3.35 -6.64***
-4.98*** -3.56***
(16)  Trust in private doctors 
[M] (n=1028)
3.94
4.03 -0.47
-2.00** 0.75 (16) Trust in private doctors 
[M] (n=1893)
3.99
4.09 -1.55
1.39 -0.35
(17)  Trust in private doctors [F] 
(n=1190)
3.51
4.29 -6.14***
-6.97*** -3.25*** (17) Trust in private doctors [F} 
(n=2021)
4.09
4.26 -3.65***
0.97 -2.35**
(18)  Trust in public doctors [M] 
(n=1034)
4.00 4.23 0.07 2.65*** -0.76 (18) Trust in public doctors [M] 
(n=1893)
3.76 4.11 -4.42*** 1.15 -4.44***
(19)  Trust in public doctors [F] 
(n=1196)
3.74 4.41 -3.16 -1.17 -3.84*** (19) Trust in public doctors [F] 
(n=2021)
4.06 4.29 -3.72*** -0.08 -0.59
(20)  Trust in doctors of the 
catholic hospital [M] 
(n=1034)
4.42 4.42 -0.91 n.a. 0.73 (20) Trust in doctors of the 
catholic health centre [M] 
(n=1893)
4.19 4.28 -3.43*** n.a. 0.62
(21)  Trust in doctors of the 
catholic hospital [F} 
(n=1196)
3.72 4.50 -4.40 n.a. -6.51*** (21) Trust in doctors of the 
catholic health centre [F] 
(n=2021)
4.26 4.45 -4.82*** n.a. -1.54
Note: [M] and [F] refer to answers by male and female respondents, respectively. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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How does Trust Matter for Cash Crop Adoption?
Evidence from the Indian Himalaya 1
1 This chapter is written based on the paper De Hoop, Thomas, and Luuk van Kempen. 2011. “ 
How does Trust Matter for Cash Crop Adoption? Evidence from The Indian Himalaya.”, which is currently 
submitted to a journal for possible publication.    
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4.1. Introduction
The adoption of new crops and technologies by smallholder farmers in remote areas 
of the developing world is seriously hindered by a lack of market access, technical 
information and resources. In the discussion of these problems, previous studies 
have directed major attention to technical and economic aspects related to adoption 
(Jakoby 2000; Folz 2004; Boucher, Barham, and Carter 2005). Nowadays it is 
increasingly recognised that, apart from technical and economic considerations, 
social networks play an important role in the farm household decision-making 
process regarding the adoption of new crops and/or technologies. The literature 
concerned with the relationship between social networks and adoption has 
benefited considerably from high-quality panel data, which represent a natural 
solution to some of the problems associated with the identification of the impact of 
prior adoption by social network members on the adoption decision of individual 
farmers (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 2004; Conley and Udry 2010; Van 
den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). 
 There is still considerable controversy in the literature with respect to whether 
and to what extent behavioural mechanisms, i.e. time preferences, risk and 
ambiguity aversion, self control, reciprocity and trust, exacerbate the role of 
information asymmetries in agricultural innovation in developing countries. 
Although risk and ambiguity aversion as well as time preferences have been linked 
to agricultural innovation (e.g., Engle-Warnick, Escobal, and Laszlo 2007; Duflo et al. 
2011; Huang and Liu 2009; Liu, 2011), Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) argue that there 
is still a lack of understanding regarding the influence of trust on agricultural 
innovation. Although trust has been linked to several economic outcomes, such as 
access to credit, income and economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997; Narayan 
and Pritchett 1999; Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009; Algan and Cahuc 2010), until 
now only few studies have linked trust to the dissemination of knowledge and 
information about new crops and technologies in social networks. Van den Broeck 
and Dercon (forthcoming) and Dupas (2010) are notable exceptions. None of these 
studies has actually measured trust before linking it to crop or technology adoption, 
however.
 This chapter aims to further explore the importance of trust in agricultural 
innovation by determining the link between measures of trust, social networks and 
crop adoption in the Devrana Valley of Uttarakhand State, which is situated in the 
Indian Himalaya. In the setting we discuss, a federation was set up by a Non-Govern-
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mental Organisation (NGO) that disseminates information about cash crops and 
organic production techniques to some of the members of the federation, which 
consists of local community residents whose perceived trustworthiness could 
determine whether cash crops are adopted by other community residents.58 
Additionally, the federation is engaged in an agricultural supply chain that involves 
the delivery of crops to a large retailer that markets the crops (mainly tomatoes) in 
Delhi, about 400 kilometres to the south of the Devrana Valley. 
 We hypothesise that trust is positively related to the adoption of new crops 
when information asymmetries about new crops are addressed by social networks. 
The main mechanism underlying this hypothesis is that the dissemination of 
information in social networks is more effective in villages where social network 
members are perceived as trustworthy. This should allow for faster social learning 
about the prospects of new crops (Golub and Jackson 2010; Van den Broeck and 
Dercon forthcoming), which decreases the transaction costs of switching to a new 
crop (Renkow, Hallstrom, and Karanja 2004). This would be consistent with the idea 
that villagers use more information from community residents with whom they are 
connected by relatively strong ties (e.g. Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Van den Broeck 
and Dercon forthcoming). By establishing a link between trust, social networks and 
crop adoption the current chapter contributes to the discussion on the role of 
behavioural mechanisms in agricultural innovation. Additionally, we build on the 
debate about the determinants of crop adoption in developing countries (Feder, 
Just, and Zilberman 1985).   
 To test the hypothesis regarding the relationship between trust, social networks 
and crop adoption we take advantage of household-level panel data from 17 villages in 
the Devrana Valley. The data consist of detailed household information concerning 
consumption and agricultural production, as well as detailed individual information 
regarding trust, among other attitudes. The data allow for a distinction to be made 
between the effects of generalised trust and trust in other community members 
(hereafter defined as in-group trust). In our analyses we focus specifically on the 
differential adoption patterns of two relatively new crops in the setting under study: 
tomatoes and French beans. Tomatoes had already been adopted by several farmers 
before the baseline survey in 2008, most likely because of the marketing activities of 
the federation, which strongly endorsed the production of tomatoes before the 
baseline. In 2008 French beans had a less established position. Although some 
farmers adopted French beans as early as 2004, these farmers can be considered 
early adopters. After the baseline the NGO disseminated more information about 
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French beans to some of the members of the federation. This dissemination may 
have resulted in the increased adoption of French beans between 2008 and 2010.   
 The cross-village variation in the adoption of French beans and tomatoes during 
the baseline survey allows for the estimation of peer effects. We demonstrate that 
the prior adoption of tomatoes and French beans by local community residents is 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of an individual farmer producing these 
crops in 2010. This relationship appears to be stronger for tomatoes than for French 
beans, and appears to be driven by the formation of social networks by the 
federation. Furthermore, we find evidence that supports our main hypothesis that 
trust improves the effectiveness of the dissemination of information about new 
crops in social networks, but only for the case of French beans. Both household-level 
in-group and village-level generalised trust strengthen the relationship between the 
presence of the federation and the decision to adopt French beans. Although we do 
not find a significant magnitude of interaction effects between trust and social 
networks over the whole of the distribution, the relationship appears broadly 
consistent with the idea that trust is a catalyst for the effective dissemination of 
information in social networks. In most of the specifications we present, we find a 
mean significant marginal effect of the interactions between the federations and 
household-level in-group as well as village-level generalised trust. 
 We find no relationship between trust and the adoption of tomatoes. This 
finding presents a puzzle as to why farmers would consider the trustworthiness of 
their fellow community residents in their decision to adopt French beans but not in 
their decision to adopt tomatoes. To explain the differential relationships between 
trust, social networks and crop adoption, we put forward two possible explanations. 
The first explanation is related to the relative novelty of French beans. We conjecture 
that its more recent introduction creates ambiguities for the prospects of French 
bean adoption relative to tomato adoption. Ambiguity aversion might strengthen 
the relationship between trust, social networks and the adoption of French beans 
and mitigate the relationship between trust, social networks and the adoption of 
tomatoes. This is inspired by the idea that ambiguity aversion reduces the propensity 
to adopt new technologies (Engle-Warnick and Laszlo 2006; Engle-Warnick et al. 
2007). The second explanation relates to the differential market structures for 
tomatoes and French beans. Tomatoes are produced for two different outlets by the 
members of the federation: 1) wholesale markets, and 2) the local market. The 
prospects for selling French beans on the local market are less positive. Hence there 
appear to be less demand risks in tomato production than in French bean production. 
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Taking into account the widely documented negative relationship between risk 
aversion and crop or technology adoption (e.g., Feder et al. 1985; Knight, Weir, and 
Woldehanna 2003), we argue that the stronger relationship between trust, social 
networks, and the adoption of French beans might also be related to risk aversion.59 
The relationships we present are merely indicative of a causal heterogeneous 
relationship between trust, social networks and the adoption of French beans, since 
they might be biased due to endogeneity. Nevertheless, it is difficult to explain the 
heterogeneous relationship with mechanisms other than the ones discussed in this 
chapter. Moreover, the relationship is robust to the inclusion of several control 
variables that have been associated with crop adoption in previous studies and the 
inclusion of village fixed effects. 
4.2. Trust and crop adoption
The analytical framework as laid out in the introduction relies on a combination of 
three types of models: 1) models related to social learning in social networks, 2) 
models related to the formation of beliefs, and 3) models related to risk and 
ambiguity aversion. This section serves to introduce these models and relates them 
to the potential connection between trust, social networks and crop adoption in the 
Devrana Valley. 
4.2.1. Social learning
Regarding social learning, there is an extensive body of literature that discusses how 
to distinguish empirically between common unobservables, mimicking behaviour 
and social learning (e.g., Besley and Case 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Munshi 
2004; Conley and Udry 2010; Dupas 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Van den 
Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). Each of these processes can account for 
within-village correlation of adoption decisions. Learning takes place when new 
information affects behaviour and results in outcomes for an individual that are 
closer to the (private) optimum (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010). Although 
within-village correlation of adoption decisions might reflect learning externalities, 
it could also relate to common unobservables within villages that make the returns 
to the new technology higher for the individual farmer and his fellow community 
residents or to peer effects that are solely based on copying behaviour.
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 To test whether within-village correlation of adoption decisions is based on 
social learning in social networks, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) took advantage of 
high-quality panel data concerned with the adoption and productivity of high 
yielding variety (HYV) seeds before and after the Green Revolution in India. Using 
these data they estimated not only the relationship between the farmers’ individual 
propensity to adopt HYV seeds and the prior adoption of their neighbours, but also 
the one between the farmers’ individual productivity and the prior productivity of 
their fellow community residents. This methodology allows a distinction to be made 
between common time-invariant unobservables, copying behaviour and social 
learning. By applying this methodology, Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) found strong 
evidence of social learning concerned with agricultural productivity.60 Moreover, 
they also show that farmers learn from their own previous experience concerned 
with the use of new technologies. However, Duflo et al. (2011) fail to find evidence of 
social learning in their study concerned with the adoption of fertiliser and hybrid 
seeds in Kenya. Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) suggest that the lack of social learning 
in Kenya could be related to the relatively established status of fertiliser and hybrid 
seeds in the Kenyan context. They argue that social learning only takes place in 
environments where new information becomes available and that this was not the 
case with regard to fertiliser and hybrid seeds during the study by Duflo et al. (2011). 
 The use of panel data does not prevent all problems associated with the 
identification of social learning in social networks. For example, Van den Broeck and 
Dercon (forthcoming) and Conley and Udry (2010) argue that there are important 
empirical problems concerned with the identification of the social network of 
individual farmers. When using fellow community residents as a proxy for the social 
network, the key assumptions are that the optimal management of the new 
technology does not vary much within the village, that information flows within the 
village are not strongly constrained by networks based on kin or social status, and 
that individual farmers have a good sense of the structure of the technology (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2010). Using detailed data from Ghana, Conley and Udry (2010) 
demonstrate that farmers only learn from neighbours with whom they share 
information. Similarly, in Tanzania, Van den Broeck and Dercon (forthcoming) find 
that new agricultural techniques only result in agricultural diffusion within 
presumably high-trust kinship-related groups and not in presumably low-trust 
distance-based groups (Van den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming).     
120 | Chapter 4
4.2.2. The formation of beliefs
In their analytical framework regarding social networks and the adoption of new 
technologies, Van den Broeck and Dercon (forthcoming) suggest that beliefs about 
agricultural productivity only change after an encounter with a perceivably 
trustworthy social network member. Similarly, Golub and Jackson (2010) demonstrate 
theoretically that the influence of agents increases with their level of perceived 
trustworthiness. Empirically, these predictions are consistent with the finding that 
only presumably high-trust kinship-related groups result in learning externalities 
(Van den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). These insights bring us to the second 
type of model that is of interest for our research question: models related to the 
formation of beliefs.
 Trust could reduce the transaction costs of obtaining information in social 
networks and might thus be an important predictor of beliefs about the profitability 
of new crops or technologies (Lyon 2000). Hence we would expect a positive 
relationship between the perceived trustworthiness of farmers who disseminate 
information about new crops and the adoption of new crops by farmers who receive 
the information. However, when information about new crops is not available or not 
transmitted in social networks, it remains questionable whether (in-group) trust is 
positively correlated with the adoption of new crops. Hence we only expect a 
positive relationship between trust and crop adoption in villages where information 
asymmetries about the prospects of new crops are addressed by information in 
social networks. In the setting we discuss, the creation of social networks is likely to 
be stimulated by federations.           
 Conceptually, one could relate the mechanism discussed above to switching 
costs, an important component of transaction costs (Klemperer 1995). Producers 
who previously produced a crop with a specific technology have (or perceive) costs 
of switching to a different crop or technology. In the non-separable household 
model switching costs can explain why farmers stay in autarkic production, even 
when there are profitable possibilities to enter crop markets (Renkow et al. 2004). An 
autarkic household is perfectly price inelastic, unless the price change is sufficient to 
move this household into the market (Key, Sadoulet, and De Janvry 2000). Similarly, 
a combination of low trust and lack of information could result in switching costs 
that produce perfectly inelastic responses of households to new information about 
crops that were previously not produced by the household. 
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4.2.3. Risk and ambiguity aversion
Models concerned with risk and ambiguity aversion are complementary to the 
models discussed above regarding social learning in networks and the formation of 
beliefs. It is widely documented that farmers’ risk preferences are related to the 
adoption of new crops and technologies (e.g., Feder et al. 1985; Knight et al. 2003). A 
typical poor farmer might not adopt new technologies because of risk aversion. 
Therefore risk-averse farmers would benefit from stable demand for cash crops. 
Theoretical results demonstrate that a reduction in demand uncertainty could 
significantly increase the scale of production of relatively risky crops (e.g., Fafchamps 
1992; Barrett 1996; Kurosaki and Fafchamps 2002). 
 Instead of, or in addition to, risk aversion, ambiguity or uncertainty aversion 
could also be related to the adoption of new crops or technologies. While risk can be 
considered as imperfect knowledge where the probabilities of the possible outcomes 
are known, uncertainty refers to the case where probabilities are unknown 
(Engle-Warnick et al. 2007). By applying an artefactual field experiment in rural Peru, 
Engle-Warnick et al. (2007) demonstrate evidence in support of the idea that 
ambiguity aversion is a better predictor of the adoption of new cash crops than risk 
aversion. Moreover, Munshi (2004) demonstrates that social learning in India was 
more important for the adoption of HYV seeds for wheat production than for rice 
production, presumably because the returns on the adoption of HYV seeds for rice 
production were highly ambiguous in comparison with the returns to the adoption 
of HYV seeds for wheat production. 
 The type of risk aversion might also influence the adoption of new cash crops. As 
discussed in the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there are important 
differences between risk aversion and loss aversion. Most individuals are only 
risk-averse over losses, while they are risk-seeking over gains. Liu (2011) demonstrates 
that this distinction may be relevant in the identification of the determinants of 
technology adoption. She shows that more risk-averse farmers use more pesticides, 
while more loss-averse farmers use fewer pesticides, allegedly because farmers 
place more weight on the importance of their health over the importance of money 
in the loss domain.    
4.2.4. Trust and information dissemination
The three types of models discussed above could be related to a slow process of 
learning about productivity. If µi is the profit from a new crop but unknown to a 
risk-averse and/or ambiguity-averse farmer who must decide whether to adopt the 
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new crop, the farmer will only decide to adopt the new crop when his expectation is 
that µi is substantially (because of risk and/or ambiguity aversion) larger than his 
current profit from the old crop. Learning about the potential profit from the new crop 
from the members of his social network might help in making his decision (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2010). However, it is unlikely that the conservative priors of a risk- and/or 
ambiguity-averse farmer about µi will change after a conversation with another 
farmer whom he perceives as untrustworthy. The challenge of overcoming uncertainty 
by learning might thus be more difficult in villages with relatively low (in-group) trust. 
However, when risk and/or uncertainty are not (or hardly) an issue, trust might play a 
less important role in the adoption of new crops. Hence, we interpret trust as an 
attitude that decreases the uncertainty and improves the signal with which farmers 
receive information about the prospects of new cash crops from their fellow 
community residents. This interpretation of trust is related to the model of Conley and 
Udry (2001) regarding limited communication in social networks.             
 Although the models discussed in this section predict a positive relationship 
between (in-group) trust and the adoption of new cash crops, until now the 
relationship between (in-group trust) and crop adoption has not yet been empirically 
tested. So far, studies have only presumed levels of trust from the types of relations 
that exist in social networks, without actually measuring them. To the best of our 
knowledge, this chapter is the first to focus its attention on the direct relationship 
between trust measures and crop adoption using panel data. Until now, rigorous 
quantitative studies mainly focused on different constraints for crop and technology 
adoption, such as information asymmetries (Boucher et al. 2005; Ashraf et al. 2009), 
risk and ambiguity aversion (Fafchamps 1992; Knight et al. 2003; Engle-Warnick et al. 
2007; Liu 2011), credit constraints (Folz 2004; Boucher et al. 2005), lack of human 
capital (Bingen, Serrano, and Howard 2003), time-inconsistent preferences (Duflo et 
al. 2011) and infrastructure problems (Jakoby 2000; Dercon et al. 2009). 
 The main hypothesis we test in this chapter refers to the likelihood that high 
(in-group) trust results in a stronger relationship between the dissemination of 
information in federation networks and the adoption of new crops. In testing this 
hypothesis we accurately account for both household-level and contextual charac-
teristics. Hence we treat trust as a concept, applying at both the household and the 
village level, by including both household and village-level characteristics in the 
empirical model. Additionally, we argue that the relationship between trust, social 
networks and crop adoption might differ, depending on the risks and ambiguities 
that are related to the adoption of specific crops.         
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4.3. Context of the study
4.3.1. The Devrana Valley
Our empirical analysis draws on survey data from 17 villages in the Devrana Valley. 
On average the villages are small, with an average number of 278 inhabitants made 
up of 42 households. Census data about the villages from 2000 indicate that 26 
percent of the population is part of the scheduled caste group. The data further 
suggest that 44 percent of the population was literate in 2000. Finally, virtually all 
households practice Hinduism.      
 The Devrana Valley is situated in the Uttarkashi district, which lies high in the 
Himalaya range. The area provides an interesting case study because markets played 
little role in the activities of the farmers before the introduction of the agricultural 
supply chain in 2000.61 Before that time a large majority of the farmers almost 
exclusively produced traditional crops to meet their own consumption. The supply 
chain was introduced by the most prominent NGO in the region, the Himalayan 
Action Research Centre (HARC). First, HARC mainly stimulated the production of 
tomatoes to increase sales on the local market in the Devrana Valley. However, the 
stimulation of the production of tomatoes quickly resulted in an oversupply of 
tomatoes, making HARC decide to stimulate the sale of crops to wholesale markets 
through a supply chain (Alam and Verma 2007). 
 All farmers in the area are eligible to join the supply chain and although 
opposition had to be overturned, many farmers joined the supply chain when the 
initial benefits became apparent. Through the supply chain the retailer obtains 
increased opportunities to source vegetables from hill areas during the summer 
season, while farmers obtain higher crop prices and a stable demand for tomatoes. 
Although HARC and the retailer supported the federations in its formative years, 
after 2005 responsibilities for the dissemination of market information were shifted 
to the federation itself (Alam and Verma 2007). 
 Although the supply chain is not without problems, it is generally perceived as a 
success (Alam and Verma 2007). However, a decrease in the price of tomatoes induced 
HARC to disseminate information about different cash crops, such as French beans, 
through local community members in the federation. Herewith HARC aims for a 
reduction of the risk of future crop-specific price declines through crop diversification. 
Since tomatoes can be considered a more established crop than French beans in the 
valley, the prospects for French bean adoption are likely to be more ambiguous than 
those for tomato adoption from the perspective of the farmers in the Devrana Valley. 
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Moreover, the production of French beans can be considered more complex than the 
production of tomatoes, which might increase the ambiguities in the prospects of 
French bean adoption.  Hence, when ambiguity aversion strengthens the relationship 
between trust, social networks and crop adoption, we expect a stronger relationship 
between trust and the effectiveness of the dissemination of information in social 
networks for French beans than for tomatoes. Moreover, since the information about 
the prospects of French beans is more recent than for tomatoes, we might also expect 
a larger influence of social learning in social networks on the adoption of French beans 
(Foster and Rosenzweig 2010).
  With regard to risk, non-traditional cash crops are generally perceived as riskier 
(albeit also more profitable) than traditional crops (Engle-Warnick et al. 2007). 
However, the members of the federation benefit from a relatively secure market for 
tomatoes because of the link with the supply chain. There is relatively little volatility 
in the demand from the large retailer that markets the crops in Delhi. Additionally, 
farmers who participate in the federation continue to produce tomatoes for two 
different outlets: 1) wholesale markets and 2) the local market (Alam and Verma 
2007). Hence there still exists the opportunity to sell tomatoes on the local market, 
even when the demand of the large retailer drops. The prospects for selling French 
beans on the local market appear to be less positive. The decision to adopt tomatoes 
might thus be less risky than the decision to adopt French beans. However, the 
reduction in tomato prices suggests that there are important price risks involved in 
the adoption of tomatoes. Hence it remains ambiguous whether it is more risky to 
adopt tomatoes than French beans. When risk aversion strengthens the relationship 
between trust, social networks and crop adoption and demand risks are a more 
important constraint for crop adoption decisions than price risks, we expect a 
stronger relationship between trust and the effectiveness of the dissemination of 
information in social networks for French beans. By contrast, when price risks are 
more important, the relationship between trust and the effectiveness of the 
dissemination of information in social networks might be stronger for tomatoes.     
4.3.2. Data collection
Baseline and follow-up data from the 17 villages in the Devrana Valley were collected 
in the period March-April 2008 and in October-November 2010, respectively. For this 
purpose, we applied a multistage sampling technique. In five of the six villages with 
a federation we interviewed 13 households with federation members. In one village 
(Kalogi) we interviewed 17 households with federation members, because only one 
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household in the village was not a member. The number of interviewed non-members 
in villages with federations was determined by the population size in the village 
according to census data from 2000. To obtain more interviews with non-members 
in villages with a relatively high population size we applied proportionate random 
sampling for the sub-group of non-members in villages with federations. Originally, 
the idea was to interview the total household population according to the Indian 
census from 2000 in each of the villages without a federation. However, due to 
extreme weather conditions it was not considered safe to conduct interviews in two 
of the originally sampled villages. Instead, and because it turned out that the census 
underestimated  the total population size due to population growth, we decided to 
interview more households than was originally deemed possible in some of the 
villages without a federation. We complemented the survey with seven extra 
interviews in another community (Mapa), to arrive at the originally scheduled 402 
household interviews. In our data analyses we will use survey weights to account for 
the sampling strategy. The survey weights are based on the probability of being 
selected for an interview according to the Indian census from 2000.62 Attrition in the 
follow-up survey in 2010 was negligible. Only 9 of the 402 interviewed households 
from 2008 were not traced in 2010, which is not surprising, given that no migration 
was reported during our baseline survey.      
 First, the idea was to estimate the impact of the federation using a so-called 
difference-in-difference regression approach. We selected villages with the idea in 
mind that federations would be set up in some of the villages where federations had 
not yet been established at the time of the baseline survey. Therefore, we only 
selected six villages with access to a federation. HARC was under the impression 
that some of the other villages would initiate federations between 2008 and 2010. 
Unfortunately, however, it was not possible for HARC to support the initiation of 
federations in other villages in the Devrana Valley, due to internal constraints. For 
this reason it was not possible to estimate the causal impact of the federation using 
a difference-in-difference regression approach.63 
 Surveys were written in English and translated to Hindi by translators who knew 
the local context and language (as did the surveyors) in the Devrana Valley. The 
survey was made up of 10 sections; a household roster, employment and income, 
migration, transfers, consumption and production, credit, housing, education, 
health and attitudes. The survey also contained questions at the individual level. 
During the baseline survey, the section on attitudes was answered by the head of 
the household and his/her spouse or, if not available, another adult woman/man 
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(> 15 years). For the follow-up survey the surveyors were instructed to let the section 
on attitudes be answered by the same persons who answered the questions during 
the baseline survey.     
4.4. Descriptive statistics
4.4.1. Measuring generalised and in-group trust
Both generalised and in-group trust were measured using a question that can be 
considered a modified version of the well-known General Social Survey trust 
measure, in which  respondents state their agreement (yes or no) with “Generally 
speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?”. We ask for the level of agreement with the 
statements “Most people can be trusted” (for generalised trust) and “The people in 
my community can be trusted” (for in-group trust) on a 5-point Likert scale. We 
argue that more information about the level of trust can be gathered using a 5-point 
Likert scale than by using a dichotomous variable. Although we are aware of the 
limitations of this measure, we believe it gives us a good proxy for both generalised 
and in-group trust.64 
 Due to logistical constraints it was not possible to interview the male adult in 
the household in many cases (n=233).65 Therefore, to determine the mean level of 
(in-group) trust at the village level, we first estimate the mean level of (in-group) 
trust at the household level, which is equal to the value for one person when only 
one individual in the household answered the questions related to (in-group) trust. 
From there, we estimate the mean value of generalised and in-group trust at the 
village level, by calculating the mean household-level value of generalised and 
in-group trust in a village.66 
4.4.2. Village-level statistics
Table 4.1 provides an overview of village-level characteristics during the baseline 
survey in 2008. Village-level in-group trust varies from 3.06 to 4.75 across villages 
and has a median level of 3.38, while village-level generalised trust runs from 1.08 to 
3.57 across villages and has a median level of 2.45. We argue that the relatively strong 
cross-village variation in generalised and in-group trust should provide enough 
statistical power to detect significant differences between high-trust and low-trust 
villages. Perhaps surprisingly, we find a negative bivariate correlation between 
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in-group and generalised trust at the village level (β=-0.21). This negative relation 
might be related to a trade-off between bonding and bridging social capital. 
Possibly, some villages pursue strong ties without focusing on inter-community ties 
and vice versa (Woolcock and Narayan 2000). 
Table 4.1	 Village-level	baseline	characteristics	2008
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village Observations Federation Generalised 
Trust
In-Group 
Trust
Tomato 
Adoption
French  Bean 
Adoption
Bajladi 20 Yes 2.93
(1.38)
3.55
(0.86)
0.75
(0.44)
0.40
(0.50)
Bhaunti 20 No 1.08
(0.24)
4.75
(0.38)
0.70
(0.47)
0.00
(0.00)
Bijori 15 No 2.77
(1.02)
3.53
(0.81)
0.07
(0.26)
0.00
(0.00)
Chhudi 12 No 2.75
(0.89)
3.38
(0.98)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Chopda 56 No 2.57
(1.55)
3.78
(0.50)
0.25
(0.44)
0.23
(0.43)
Gair 23 Yes 2.24
(1.44)
3.15
(1.27)
0.70
(0.47)
0.17
(0.39)
Garh 28 No 3.39
(1.21)
3.38
(0.63)
0.25
(0.44)
0.00
(0.00)
Himrol 26 Yes 1.79
(1.28)
3.31
(1.09)
0.81
(0.40)
0.27
(0.45)
Jarda 39 No 2.13
(1.12)
3.35
(1.27)
0.33
(0.48)
0.77
(0.43)
Kafnaul 22 Yes 2.43
(1.61)
3.30
(0.95)
0.73
(0.46)
0.67
(0.48)
Kalogi 18 Yes 1.50
(1.02)
3.06
(1.20)
0.89
(0.32)
0.61
(0.50)
Kaslana 42 No 2.45
(1.39)
3.58
(0.58)
0.17
(0.38)
0.12
(0.33)
Kuwa 23 No 2.57
(1.45)
3.76
(1.02)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
Mapa 7 No 3.57
(1.21)
3.36
(0.63)
0.14
(0.38)
0.00
(0.00)
Nudi 16 No 3.30
(1.22)
3.50
(0.55)
0.13
(0.34)
0.06
(0.25)
Paluka 22 Yes 2.95
(1.53)
3.69
(0.89)
0.91
(0.29)
0.29
(0.46)
Teda 20 No 1.64
(0.82)
3.22
(0.48)
0.45
(0.51)
0.95
(0.22)
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Furthermore, we find strong regional variation in the adoption rates of tomatoes 
and French beans. During the baseline survey, the adoption rate of tomatoes was 
much higher than the adoption rate of French beans, which is not surprising, given 
the initial focus of the federation on the production of tomatoes in the Devrana 
Valley. The recall data we collected also suggest that the adoption of tomatoes in 
2004, 2005 and 2006 was much higher than the adoption of French beans. 
 Nevertheless, there are villages in which the adoption rate of tomatoes was nil 
during the baseline survey. Although information about the prospects of tomato 
production also diffused into villages without access to federations, this finding 
demonstrates that knowledge about the prospects of tomato production had not 
yet diffused to all villages before the baseline survey. The adoption rate of tomatoes 
runs from 0 to 0.91 across villages, with a median adoption rate of 0.29, while for 
French beans the adoption rate runs from 0 to 0.95 across villages, with a median 
adoption rate of 0.17. The cross-village variation in crop adoption in 2008 should 
provide enough statistical power to relate the individual adoption of cash crops in 
2010 to the prior adoption of cash crops by local community residents in 2008. 
4.4.3. Household-level statistics
Table 4.2 describes the baseline data concerned with the size of the land used for, 
and the production of, tomatoes, French beans, peas, capsicum, potato, wheat, 
paddy, chaulai, rajma and tordal in villages with and without access to federations. 
Originally, we did not collect data on the year of adoption of these crops. Hence we 
only knew whether crops were produced in 2008 and 2010. However, by collecting 
recall data after the follow-up survey we were also able to proxy for the time that 
the crops were adopted. The recall data suggest that only French beans and 
tomatoes were newly and intensively adopted by households between the baseline 
and the follow-up survey.67 Hence we focus exclusively on the adoption of French 
beans and tomatoes in our data analysis.68 Furthermore, we present data concerned 
with the use of fertiliser and pesticides during the baseline survey and baseline data 
concerned with variables that have been related to crop adoption in previous 
studies: personal characteristics, consumption, livestock, durable ownership, credit 
and education. Additionally, we also report data regarding the self-reported 
communication about agriculture with other community members. Finally, we also 
describe data regarding the attitudes of households concerned with generalised 
trust, trust in family members, friends, and other community members.69  
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 The descriptive statistics indicate that there are several observable differences 
between individuals and households in villages with access to federations (hereafter 
defined as the treatment group) and individuals and households in villages without 
access to federations (hereafter defined as the comparison group). Although these 
differences are not necessarily causally related to the federation, the findings 
suggest that the federation has had at least some influence on outcomes in the 
treatment group. For example, the significant differences between the treatment 
and the comparison group in tomato production and land use are not surprising, 
given the activities of the federation. Nevertheless, the differences are remarkably 
large. For French beans the difference between the treatment and the comparison 
group is much smaller, most likely because of the limited attention of the federation 
for French beans before the baseline survey. We only find a small but significant 
difference in the land that was used for the production of French beans. For the 
production of French beans we do not find significant differences between the 
treatment and comparison group. 
 We also find several differences in the size of land used for and the production 
of different crops that we will not discuss in detail in this thesis. These differences 
are probably at least partly related to substitution effects as a result of crop adoption 
after the start of the federation, since we find no significant differences in the 
total area of land used for crop production. However, the differences might also be 
related to pre-existing observable and/or unobservable individual-, household- and 
village-level characteristics. In this chapter we will not focus on the significant 
differences between the treatment and the comparison group for capsicum, potato, 
wheat, paddy, rajma and tordal. Since none of these crops were intensively adopted 
between the baseline and the follow-up survey, and since the focus of this chapter 
lies in crop adoption, the explanation of the significant differences between the 
treatment and the comparison group falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
 With regard to fertilisers and pesticides, the data suggest that households in 
the treatment group use fewer chemical fertilisers and pesticides. This is not 
surprising, given the promotion activities of the federation for organic production 
techniques. However, the data provide no conclusive evidence of a substitution 
from chemical to organic production techniques. Rather, we find a negative 
relationship between the federation and the use of organic pesticides, although the 
difference is much smaller than for chemical pesticides. Again, we should be careful 
in explaining these results, given the likely pre-existing observable and unobservable 
differences between the treatment and the comparison group.  
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 With regard to personal characteristics, the network effect of the federation is 
illustrated by the significantly higher percentage of households that discuss farming 
with other community members in the treatment group. We find no significant 
differences in age and household size between the treatment and the comparison 
group, but there appear to be fewer scheduled caste members in the treatment 
group. Furthermore, on average, there is no significant difference in absolute 
consumption between the treatment and the comparison group. However, 
households in the treatment group appear to spend less on food and more on other 
consumption items than households in the comparison group. 
 Given that the federation offers assistance for access to credit to its members, 
it is perhaps surprising that during the baseline survey the use of formal credit is 
slightly but significantly lower for households in the treatment group. This difference 
is most likely related to pre-existing differences between the treatment and the 
comparison group. Furthermore, we find significant differences in education. In 
general, the households in the treatment group appear somewhat more educated. 
When we examine the maximum education level in the household, there appear to 
be more households with only illiterate women in the comparison group. 
 Interestingly, we also find significant differences in trust in family, friends and 
other community members. In general, the households in the comparison group are 
more trusting than the households in the treatment group. The differences might 
be related to free-rider behaviour in the federation. Federation members are 
responsible for the grading of tomatoes themselves. After the grading the retailer 
checks the quality of the tomatoes by taking a five percent sample of the tomatoes 
in Delhi. A high rejection rate of tomatoes is the most common cause of resentment 
among farmers. Alam and Verma (2007) report dishonest or careless self-grading of 
the tomatoes by the farmers. This free-rider behaviour might cause a decrease in 
trust. Nevertheless, we should be careful with the interpretation of the differences 
in trust, since they might also be related to pre-existing differences between the 
treatment and the comparison groups.
4.4.4. Descriptive statistics on trust and crop adoption
To analyse descriptively the relationship between in-group trust, social networks 
and crop adoption, we divide our sample into four groups: (1) households in villages 
with federations and a level of in-group trust of 4 and higher (n=73), 2) households 
in villages with federations and a level of in-group trust of 3.5 and lower (n=55), 3) 
households in villages without federations and a level of in-group trust of 4 and 
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Table 4.2   Household-level	baseline	characteristics	2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Observations Mean in 
Villages with 
Federations
Mean in 
Villages 
without 
Federations
T-Test/χ2 test
Agricultural Production 
Total Land a 395 33.94
(1.31)
34.46
(0.77)
t=-0.34
Total Value of Sale c 397 9.19
(0.22)
8.94
(0.15)
t=0.96
Land for Tomatoes a 400 3.59
(0.23)
1.19
(0.15)
t=8.85***
Production Tomatoes b 400 16.21
(1.49)
3.25
(0.50)
t=8.24***
Land for French Beans a 395 1.37
(0.23)
0.79
(0.08)
t=2.42**
Production French Beans b 398 1.61
(0.32)
1.54
(0.34)
t=0.14
Land for Capsicum a 398 0.22
(0.11)
0.01
(0.01)
t=1.97**
Production Capsicum b 397 0.14
(0.07)
0.01
(0.01)
t=1.67*
Land for Potato a 400 2.83
(0.31)
6.46
(0.21)
t=-9.75***
Production Potato b 399 4.81
(0.52)
10.51
(0.41)
t=-8.59***
Land for Wheat a 400 7.35
(0.38)
8.12
(0.23)
t=-1.71*
Production Wheat b 399 4.23
(0.28)
3.08
(0.12)
t=3.77***
Land for Paddy a 400 7.14
(0.43)
8.60
(0.24)
t=-2.96***
Production Paddy b 400 7.52
(0.43)
8.43
(0.25)
t=-1.83*
Land for Chaulai a 400 1.80
(0.27)
1.92
(0.16)
t=-0.39
Production Chaulai b 400 0.84
(0.14)
0.62
(0.05)
t=1.55
Land for Rajma a 400 3.14
(0.39)
1.37
(0.12)
t=4.32***
Production Rajma b 400 0.98
(0.09)
0.48
(0.04)
t=4.98***
Land for Tordal a 400 3.26
(0.38)
1.91
(0.13)
t=3.36***
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Table 4.2   Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Observations Mean in 
Villages with 
Federations
Mean in 
Villages 
without 
Federations
T-Test/χ2 test
Production Tordal b 400 1.03
(0.12)
0.61
(0.05)
t=3.32***
Agricultural Inputs
Expenditures Chemical 
Fertiliser c 
401 15.25
(7.54)
393.95
(28.24)
t=-12.95***
Expenditures Organic  
Fertiliser c
401 107.27
(75.70)
13.94
(13.94)
t=1.21
Expenditures Chemical 
Pesticides c
401 11.25
(2.92)
234.65
(18.49)
t=-11.93***
Expenditures Organic 
Pesticides c
401 117.50
(21.63)
224.71
(31.66)
t=-2.80***
Household Characteristics
Discusses Farming with 
Other Community Members
402 0.70
(0.04)
0.33
(0.03)
χ2=44.29***
Average Age 402 28.68
(0.97)
30.07
(0.66)
t=-1.19
Scheduled Caste d 402 0.18
(0.03)
0.28
(0.03)
χ2=4.74**
Number of Men 388 3.02
(0.17)
3.21
(0.11)
t=-0.94
Number of Women 388 3.93
(0.18)
3.73
(0.11)
t=1.00
Food Consumption c 402 10.83
(0.03)
10.99
(0.02)
t=-3.93***
Other Consumption c 402 10.24
(0.05)
10.08
(0.03)
t=2.81***
Value of Livestock c 402 9.54
(0.26)
9.95
(0.14)
t=1.38
Value of Durables c 402 8.57
(0.08)
8.38
(0.05)
t=2.24**
Use of Formal Credit d 401 0.15
(0.03)
0.23
(0.02)
χ2=3.37*
Use of Informal Credit d 401 0.31
(0.05)
0.32
(0.03)
χ2=0.10
Maximum Education Male  
Illiterate d
401 0.02
(0.01)
0.06
(0.02)
χ2=2.11
Maximum Education Female 
Illiterate d 
401 0.06
(0.02)
0.14
(0.02)
χ2=4.58**
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higher (n=154), and 4) households in villages without federations and a level of 
in-group trust of 3.5 and lower (n=100). Hereafter we compare levels of crop 
adoption in 2010 between the treatment and the comparison group separately for 
households with a relatively high level and households with a relatively low level of 
in-group trust.      
 For households with a relatively high level of in-group trust we find that the 
adoption of French beans in 2010 is significantly higher in the treatment group 
(χ2=9.96, P=0.00), while we find no difference in the adoption of French beans 
between the treatment and the comparison group for households with a relatively 
low of in-group trust (χ2=0.30, P=0.51). For tomatoes we find that the adoption in 
2010 is higher in the treatment group for households with a relatively high level of 
in-group trust (χ2=36.22, P=0.00) and for households with a relatively low level of 
in-group trust (χ2=16.18, P=0.00). Hence the results indicate that there might be a 
relationship between trust, social networks and crop adoption, but only for French 
beans. However, we have not yet accounted for other confounding factors. 
Table 4.2   Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Observations Mean in 
Villages with 
Federations
Mean in 
Villages 
without 
Federations
T-Test/χ2 test
Maximum Education Male 
No Primary Schooling d
401 0.15
(0.03)
0.11
(0.03)
χ2=0.23
Maximum Education Female 
No Primary Schooling d
401 0.09
(0.02)
0.13
(0.02)
χ2=0.22
Attitudinal Statements
Generalised Trust 382 2.45
(0.14)
2.57
(0.09)
t=-0.74
Trust in Family Members 398 3.74
(0.10)
4.15
(0.05)
t=-3.65***
Trust in Friends 397 3.44
(0.09)
3.81
(0.05)
t=-3.75***
In-Group Trust 384 3.42
(0.10)
3.60
(0.04)
t=-1.67*
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Size in acres. b) Production in quintiles in last 
year. c) Logarithm of value in rupees in last 12 months. d) Dummy variable. Note: t indicates a relationship 
derived from a t-test and χ2 indicates a relationship derived from a χ2 test.
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4.4.5. Adoption decisions between 2008 and 2010
Before we describe the econometric specification and results we first briefly present 
some descriptive statistics concerned with the (differences in the) adoption of 
French beans and tomatoes in 2008 and in 2010. For this purpose we present Table 
4.3, which reports on the adoption of tomatoes and French beans in 2008 as well as 
the adoption and disadoption of tomatoes and French beans following the baseline 
survey in 2008. 
 The table demonstrates that almost half of the farmers in our sample had 
adopted tomatoes, while close to one-third of the farmers had produced French 
beans in 2008. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that farmers are still 
experimenting with the cash crops we discuss in this chapter, which indicates that 
the crops are still relatively new in the context we discuss (Foster and Rosenzweig 
2010). More than one-third of the farmers who adopted tomatoes and French beans 
in 2008 disadopted those crops between 2008 and 2010. Similarly, of those farmers 
who did not adopt tomatoes or French beans in 2008, more than one-third adopted 
those crops between 2008 and 2010.    
 In the remainder of this chapter we will mainly discuss the decision to produce 
tomatoes or French beans in 2010. Nevertheless, we also present a robustness check 
using a logit model that takes into account the difference between the decisions 
before 2008 and the decisions between 2008 and 2010 in Appendix 4.1, such that we 
can test whether the influence of trust on crop adoption is not merely static but also 
dynamic. In this robustness check we will present findings for the sub-sample of 
farmers who did not yet adopt tomatoes or French beans in 2008. By applying this 
robustness check, it should be possible to analyse adoption decisions between 2008 
and 2010.70  
Table 4.3   Adoption	and	disadoption	decisions
Variable Observations 
in 2008
Adoption 
rate 
in 2008
Observations 
in 2010
Adoption 
rate 
between 
2008 and 
2010
Disadoption 
rate 
between 
2008 and 
2010  
Adoption 
rate 
in 2010
French Bean 
Adoption 
398 0.30 394 0.29 0.15 0.44
Tomato 
Adoption 
400 0.48 394 0.21 0.16 0.48
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4.5. Econometric specification and results
4.5.1. Econometric specification
In the econometric specification we first use a logistic model with clustered standard 
errors at the village level to determine the relationship between the crop adoption 
of individual farmers in 2010 and prior crop adoption of local community residents 
in 2008. Subsequently, we extend the model with variables that indicate access to 
the federation, trust at the household and at the village level, and interactions 
between the federation and trust at the household as well as the village level. To 
estimate heterogeneous relationships between the federation and crop adoption 
that are associated with trust we estimate a model as specified in Equation 4.1, 
where Yit is the adoption at time t for household i, Fi is a dummy variable that is 1 for 
the households in villages with a federation, Yv t-1 is the rate of crop adoption of 
other local community residents at time t-1, Tit-1 is a vector with attitudinal charac-
teristics related to trust at time t-1, Fi * Tit-1 is an interaction between the federation 
and the vector with attitudinal characteristics related to trust at  time t-1, Xit-1 is a 
vector with supposedly exogenous baseline control variables at time t-1,  and ∈it is 
the error term. 
 (4.1)
We focus specifically on the value of β2 relative to the values of β0 and β3. Our main 
hypothesis is that β2 is significantly larger than both β0 and β3. This hypothesis 
comes from the theoretical idea that the dissemination of information about the 
productivity of new cash crops is more effective when trust is relatively high. We 
discuss the findings from Equation 4.1 in Section 4.5.2. 
 We also estimate a model in which we control for village-level fixed effects 
rather than observable village characteristics. The model for this estimation can be 
specified as in Equation 4.2, in which  is the village fixed effect. The fixed effects 
model precludes an estimation of the separate relationship between access to the 
federation and the adoption of crops, because access to the federation is included in 
the village fixed effects. Nor is it possible to estimate the separate relationship 
between crop adoption and the interaction between access to the federation and 
indicators of village-level trust.   
 (4.2)
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However, we can test whether γ0 is significantly different from the village fixed 
effects. In this way, we control for both observable and unobservable village charac-
teristics. We derive a conservative test for the role of trust in determining the 
adoption of tomatoes and French beans, in which we are able to control for village 
fixed effects, in case unobservable village characteristics influence the adoption 
decision. The findings related to the approach with village fixed effects are presented 
in Appendix 4.1.       
4.5.2. Analysing crop adoption status in 2010
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present the logit models for the decision to adopt tomatoes and 
French beans in 2010, respectively. The model in the first column tests for the 
presence of peer effects in crop adoption. It investigates whether the decision to 
adopt new crops in 2010 is dependent on the prior adoption of other community 
residents in 2008 by relating the individual adoption decision in 2010 to the decision 
to adopt French beans and tomatoes of other community residents in 2008. We 
control for several variables that have been associated with crop and technology 
adoption in previous studies. First, we control for personal characteristics like 
household size and a dummy variable for scheduled caste members. Second, we 
control for baseline socio-economic characteristics like food consumption, 
expenditures on other consumption items, land size, the total value of sales from 
cash crops, and the value of livestock and durables. Finally, educational achievements 
are controlled for. We include the maximum education level in the household during 
the baseline survey by including a set of dummy variables for households with only 
illiterate men, only illiterate women, a maximum education level of no primary 
schooling for the men in the household, a maximum education level of no primary 
schooling for the women in the household, a maximum education level of primary 
schooling for the men in the household, and a maximum education level of primary 
schooling for the women in the household. Each of these variables can be considered 
exogenous, since we focus exclusively on the value of these variables during the 
baseline survey.    
 The findings suggest that both the decisions to adopt tomatoes and French 
beans are partly driven by the adoption decisions of other community members in 
2008. Hence the results indicate that peer effects are important for explaining 
adoption decisions. This is consistent with some of the findings in other studies 
concerned with adoption decisions (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Dupas 2010; 
Conley and Udry 2010). Additionally, the results also suggest that peer effects are 
How does Trust Matter for Cash Crop Adoption | 137
4
more important for the decision to adopt tomatoes than for the adoption to adopt 
French beans. The coefficient for peer effects is 3.5 times as large for tomatoes. This 
is surprising, given that tomatoes are the more established crop in the context we 
discuss. Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) argue that peer effects are more likely for 
relatively new crops. However, the strength of the peer effects might also be driven 
by other factors than the degree of novelty of the crops, such as the influence of the 
federation. 
 We control for this influence by including a dummy variable for the treatment 
group in column 2. The dummy is 1 for members of the federation as well as for 
farmers that are not members of the federation but live in villages with a federation. 
We make no distinction between these groups because the non-members could 
also benefit from the federation as a result of the network externalities we present 
in this chapter.71 Herewith we follow the approach of Ashraf et al. (2009) in their 
study on the impact of cooperatives in Kenya. The findings suggest that a sizeable 
share of the peer effects for tomatoes occurred under the influence of the federation. 
We find a significant influence of the federation on the adoption of tomatoes at the 
5 percent level. The peer effects are no longer significant for this crop after 
controlling for the influence of the federation. Arguably, the peer effects for tomato 
adoption are endogenous and driven by the presence of the federation. This is not 
surprising, given the marketing activities of the federation for tomatoes. Additionally, 
the results might also be related to the significantly higher rate of communication 
concerning farming activities in the treatment group. Either way, the federation 
appears to result in the stimulation of the dissemination of information about the 
prospects of new crops in social networks. For French beans the effect of the 
federation is not significant. Nevertheless, the finding indicates that the influence of 
the federation on French bean adoption tends towards the positive. Additionally, the 
effect of prior adoption by community residents is smaller and only marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level after controlling for the influence of the federation. 
 As discussed in Section 4.1, our main hypothesis relates to the idea that trust is 
positively related to the adoption of new crops when information asymmetries 
about new crops are addressed by social networks. Hence we would expect a 
stronger relationship between trust and crop adoption in the treatment as in the 
comparison group. Before discussing these differential relationships in the complete 
sample by including interactions between the federation and trust, we first discuss 
two separate models for villages with and without federations. After controlling for 
the same observable characteristics as in the previous models and including house-
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hold-level in-group trust as an explanatory variable, the results of Table 4.6 provide 
some indication for the idea that household-level in-group trust only influences crop 
adoption when information asymmetries are addressed by the federation and only 
for French beans. As shown in column 1-2, we find no relationship between house-
hold-level in-group trust and crop adoption in villages without federations. 
Additionally, column 3 demonstrates that there is no relationship between house-
hold-level in-group trust and tomato adoption in villages with federations. Column 
4, nonetheless, demonstrates some evidence for the idea that there is a relationship 
between household-level in-group trust and the adoption of French beans in villages 
with federations. The relationship is significant at the 10% level. Taking into account 
the low sample size, this relationship appears to be consistent with the idea that 
household-level in-group trust improves the effectiveness of the dissemination of 
information when information asymmetries are addressed in social networks. 
Arguably, however, trust cannot be considered a catalyst for the effectiveness of the 
federation based on this information alone. To present a stricter test for the 
hypothesis, we include interactions between different forms of trust and the 
federation in the full sample of villages with and without federations.          
 The first part of this model is presented in column 3 of table 4.4 and 4.5, in which 
we include household-level in-group trust and its interaction with the federation 
next to the control variables that we included in the previous models. By controlling 
for household-level in-group trust and its interaction with the federation we test 
the idea that the size of the peer effects that occurred through the influence of the 
federation is related to the trust of households in the community residents with 
whom they have a direct link, such as community residents with whom they discuss 
their farming activities. For tomatoes we do not find a significant relationship 
between crop adoption and the interaction between household-level in-group trust 
and the federation. By contrast, we find this relationship to be strongly positive and 
significant for French beans. We should nonetheless be careful in interpreting this 
relationship, since coefficients and standard errors of interaction terms cannot be 
interpreted directly in logistic models (Ai and Norton 2003). The marginal effect of 
interactions in logit models is dependent on the likelihood of the dependent variable. 
Only when the interaction of access to the federation with in-group trust has a 
mean positive marginal significant effect can our hypothesis on the relationship 
between in-group trust and crop adoption be confirmed. For this reason we estimate 
the magnitude of the interaction between access to the federation and in-group 
trust over different likelihoods of French bean adoption.72 As illustrated in rows 
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23-25, we find a significant marginal effect over the whole of the distribution. Hence 
we find strong evidence of a heterogeneous relationship between household-level 
in-group trust and crop adoption, but only for the adoption decision concerned with 
French beans. 
 Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the heterogeneous relationship 
between the federation and the adoption of French beans can truly be considered to 
be caused by household-level in-group trust, unless we control for generalised trust 
and its interaction with access to the federation. By controlling for these variables 
we should be able to distinguish between the effects of household-level in-group 
and generalised trust. After controlling for these variables, the mean magnitude of 
the interaction between access to the federation and in-group trust remains 
significant at the 10 percent level (z=1.88). The relationship may have become weaker 
because of the inclusion of a second interaction term. Hence, although the effect is 
only marginally significant, the finding can still be interpreted as evidence in support 
of the idea that household-level in-group trust is a catalyst for the effective 
dissemination of information in the case of French beans. Additionally, we do not 
find evidence of an independent effect of the interaction between the federation 
and household-level generalised trust (not reported). Hence we conclude that it is 
household-level in-group and not generalised trust that drives the influence of trust 
on the relationship between the federation and the adoption of French beans. 
 Similarly, we can also test the robustness of the significance and magnitude of 
the interaction between the federation and household-level in-group trust to the 
inclusion of village-level characteristics concerned with trust. Both household-level 
and village-level trust may influence crop adoption patterns. For example, when 
farmer i discusses the adoption of French beans with farmer j who is a member of 
the federation and receives information about French beans from the agricultural 
extension agents of HARC, the message he receives from farmer j about the 
prospects of French bean adoption also depends on the trust of farmer j in the 
agricultural extension agents of HARC. Ideally, we should thus control for the 
village-level trust in HARC. However, several of the respondents in the comparison 
group are not aware of the existence of HARC and we were thus not able to obtain 
reliable answers from them concerning their level of trust in HARC. Rather, we 
control for village-level generalised trust and its interaction with access to the 
federation. We argue that this variable could proxy for the trust of community 
residents in the agricultural extension agents of HARC. The results are shown in 
column 4. 
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 As illustrated in rows 26-28, the mean magnitude of the interaction between 
access to the federation and village generalised trust is positive and significant at 
the 10 percent level for French bean adoption, while we find no effect of the 
interaction between access to the federation and village-level generalised trust on 
the adoption of tomatoes (see row 23-25). Most likely due to multicollinearity, the 
significance of the mean magnitude of the interaction between access to the 
federation and household-level in-group trust disappears in the model to explain 
the adoption of French beans, but the mean effect of this interaction still tends 
towards the positive. In addition, the marginal effect of the interaction between 
access to the federation and household-level in-group trust remains significant over 
parts of the distribution of the likelihood to produce French beans. Moreover, the 
size of the interaction remains positive over the whole of the distribution. 
 Finally, in column 5 we control for the lagged dependent variable: the adoption 
of French beans and tomatoes in 2008. According to Angrist and Pischke (2008), 
controlling for the lagged dependent variable could substantially reduce the 
potential omitted-variable bias in models with lagged explanatory variables. 
However, we fail to detect a significant relationship between crop adoption in 2008 
and 2010, for both tomato adoption and French bean adoption.73 We also do not 
encounter any significant differences between the findings of columns 4 and 5. The 
mean marginal effect of the interaction between village-level generalised trust and 
the federation remains significant at the 10 percent level and the mean marginal 
effect of the interaction between household-level in-group trust and the federation 
continues to lean towards the positive. The latter effect also remains strongly 
significant over parts of the distribution of the likelihood of French bean adoption.    
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Table 4.4   Tomato	adoption	in	2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1)  Percentage of other 
Community Members 
Producing Tomato in 2008
3.08***
(0.43)
0.88
(0.83)
0.95
(0.87)
-0.14
(0.20)
1.22
(1.22)
(2) Federation - 1.70***
(0.53)
1.09
(1.21)
-0.64
(1.58)
-0.54
(1.59)
(3)  Federation * Household In-
Group Trust
- - 0.15
(0.30)
0.05
(0.30)
0.00
(0.30)
(4) Household In-Group Trust - - -0.15
(0.19)
-0.14
(0.20)
-0.12
(0.20)
(5)  Federation * Village 
Generalised Trust
- - - -0.64
(1.58)
0.78
(0.52)
(6) Village Generalised Trust - - - 0.22
(0.34)
0.26
(0.35)
(7) Total Land Size 0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.01)
(8) Total Value of Sales -0.01
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.08)
-0.01
(0.08)
-0.02
(0.08)
-0.04
(0.08)
(9) Household Size 0.02
(0.05)
0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.02
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
(10) Scheduled Caste -0.01
(0.31)
-0.05
(0.31)
-0.18
(0.32)
-0.21
(0.33)
-0.19
(0.33)
(11) Food Consumption 0.48
(0.40)
0.47
(0.39)
0.43
(0.40)
0.48
(0.40)
0.52
(0.41)
(12) Other Consumption -0.35
(0.26)
-0.21
(0.27)
-0.35
(0.28)
-0.37
(0.28)
-0.38
(0.29)
(13) Value of Livestock -0.06
(0.06)
-0.04
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.07)
(14) Value of Durables -0.03
(0.15)
-0.05
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.17)
-0.09
(0.17)
-0.09
(0.18)
(15)  Maximum Education  
Male Illiterate
-0.55
(0.61)
-0.57
(0.62)
-0.40
(0.66)
-0.44 
(0.68)
-0.46
(0.69)
(16)  Maximum Education 
Female Illiterate 
0.15
(0.40)
0.22
(0.39)
0.23
(0.40)
0.24
(0.41)
0.27
(0.41)
(17)  Maximum Education Male 
No Primary Schooling
-0.24
(0.39)
-0.25
(0.39)
-0.19
(0.40)
-0.22
(0.41)
-0.27
(0.40)
(18)  Maximum Education 
Female No Primary 
Schooling
0.34
(0.45)
0.28
(0.47)
0.34
(0.51)
0.36
(0.51)
0.40
(0.51)
(19)  Maximum Education Male 
Primary Schooling
-0.60
(0.43)
-0.57
(0.45)
-0.63
(0.45)
-0.66
(0.46)
-0.65
(0.47)
(20)  Maximum Education 
Female Primary Schooling
0.26
(0.35)
0.27
(0.35)
0.43
(0.37)
0.47
(0.38)
0.41
(0.39)
(21) Tomato Adoption in 2008 - - - - 0.41
(0.35)
(22) Constant -2.48
(4.42)
-3.24
(4.36)
-0.93
(4.51)
-1.87
(4.67)
-2.13
(4.65)
(23) Number of Observations 390 390 373 373 373
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the village level. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4.5   French	bean	adoption	in	2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1)  Percentage of other 
Community Members 
Producing French Beans in 
2008
0.88**
(0.44)
0.78*
(0.45)
0.70
(0.48)
0.47
(0.57)
0.06
(0.36)
(2) Federation - 0.39
(0.26)
-2.04**
(1.04)
-5.09***
(1.67)
-5.08***
(1.67)
(3)  Federation * Household In-
Group Trust
- - 0.69**
(0.29)
0.65**
(0.30)
0.65**
(0.30)
(4) Household In-Group Trust - - -0.23
(0.19)
-0.25
(0.20)
-0.25
(0.20)
(5)  Federation * Village 
Generalised Trust
- - - 1.32***
(0.50)
1.31***
(0.51)
(6) Village Generalised Trust - - - -0.23
(0.30)
-0.23
(0.30)
(7) Total Land Size -0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
(8) Total Value of Sales 0.07
(0.06)
0.06
(0.06)
0.06
(0.06)
0.05
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
(9) Household Size 0.06
(0.05)
0.06
(0.05)
0.07
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
0.08
(0.06)
(10) Scheduled Caste -0.93***
(0.30)
-0.92***
(0.30)
-0.85***
(0.32)
-0.90***
(0.32)
-0.90**
(0.32)
(11) Food Consumption -0.50
(0.35)
-0.40
(0.36)
-0.50
(0.36)
-0.51
(0.37)
-0.50
(0.37)
(12) Other Consumption -0.61***
(0.23)
-0.65***
(0.23)
-0.58**
(0.26)
-0.79**
(0.39)
-0.61**
(0.26)
(13) Value of Livestock 0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.07)
0.02
(0.07)
0.02
(0.07)
(14) Value of Durables -0.05
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.16)
-0.10
(0.17)
-0.07
(0.17)
-0.06
(0.17)
(15)  Maximum Education  
Male Illiterate
-0.51
(0.70)
-0.49
(0.70)
-0.71
(0.85)
-0.70
(0.86)
-0.71
(0.87)
(16)  Maximum Education  
Female Illiterate 
-0.64
(0.41)
-0.58
(0.41)
-0.53
(0.42)
-0.55
(0.43)
-0.54
(0.43)
(17)  Maximum Education  
Male No Primary Schooling
-0.70*
(0.37)
-0.69*
(0.37)
-0.76*
(0.39)
-0.79**
(0.39)
-0.80**
(0.39)
(18)  Maximum Education Female 
No Primary Schooling
-0.27
(0.43)
-0.27
(0.43)
-0.39
(0.45)
-0.38
(0.46)
-0.38
(0.46)
(19)  Maximum Education Male 
Primary Schooling
-0.15
(0.36)
-0.13
(0.36)
-0.02
(0.37)
-0.03
(0.38)
-0.04
(0.37)
(20)  Maximum Education 
Female Primary Schooling
0.09
(0.34)
0.13
(0.34)
0.09
(0.35)
0.06
(0.36)
0.06
(0.36)
(21)  French Bean Adoption  
in 2008
- - - - 0.06
(0.36)
(22) Constant 11.15**
(4.04)
10.53**
(4.08)
11.90***
(4.22)
12.77***
(4.33)
12.80***
(4.32)
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Table 4.5   Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Magnitude of Interactions 
Social Networks * Household 
In-Group Trust 
(23)  Federation * Household In-
Group Trust Mean z-value
- - 2.32** 1.63 1.62
(24)  Federation * Household 
In-Group Trust Minimum 
z-value 
- - 1.06 0.83 0.83
(25)  Federation * Household 
In-Group Trust Maximum 
z-value
- - 3.19*** 2.80*** 2.78***
Magnitude of Interactions 
Social Networks * Village 
Generalised Trust
(26)  Federation * Village 
Generalised Trust Mean 
z-value
- - - 1.78* 1.75*
(27)  Federation * Village 
Generalised Trust Minimum 
z-value 
- - - 0.74 0.74
(28)  Federation * Village 
Generalised Trust Maximum 
z-value
- - - 3.36*** 3.33***
(29) Number of Observations 389 389 372 372 372
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the village level. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4.6   Tomato	and	French	bean	adoption	in	sub-samples
(1)  
Tomato 
Adoption 
in Villages 
without 
Federations
(2)  
French Bean 
Adoption 
in Villages 
without 
Federations
(3)  
Tomato 
Adoption 
in Villages 
without 
Federations 
(4)  
French Bean 
Adoption 
in Villages 
without 
Federations
(1)  Percentage of other 
Community Members 
Producing Tomatoes in 2008
0.41
(0.91)
- 8.80**
(3.74)
-
(2)  Percentage of other 
Community Members 
Producing French Beans in 
2008
- 0.65
(0.55)
- -0.20
(1.43)
(3) Household In-Group Trust -0.14
(0.19)
-0.24
(0.20)
-0.18
(0.32)
0.42*
(0.23)
(4) Total Land Size 0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
0.03**
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
(5) Total Value of Sales -0.01
(0.08)
0.01
(0.08)
0.16
(0.14)
0.22**
(0.09)
(6) Household Size 0.04
(0.07)
0.05
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.14)
0.03
(0.10)
(7) Scheduled Caste -0.20
(0.37)
-1.14***
(0.39)
0.77
(0.58)
0.60
(0.59)
(8) Food Consumption 0.42
(0.44)
-0.50
(0.45)
-0.18
(0.85)
0.37
(0.76)
(9) Other Consumption -0.23
(0.33)
-0.60*
(0.33)
-1.08**
(0.52)
-0.69
(0.44)
(10) Value of Livestock -0.01
(0.09)
0.08
(0.09)
-0.08
(0.13)
-0.11
(0.14)
(11) Value of Durables -0.19
(0.21)
-0.12
(0.20)
0.41
(0.32)
-0.05
(0.32)
(12)  Maximum Education Male 
Illiterate
-0.16
(0.66)
-0.55
(0.90)
-3.51**
(1.36)
-
(13)  Maximum Education Female 
Illiterate 
0.27
(0.43)
-0.43
(0.46)
-0.28
(1.10)
-2.21*
(1.33)
(14)  Maximum Education Male No 
Primary Schooling
-0.11
(0.47)
-1.18**
(0.51)
-0.76
(0.85)
-0.39
(0.57)
(15)  Maximum Education Female 
No Primary Schooling
0.47
(0.56)
-0.65
(0.64)
0.29
(1.17)
0.55
(0.65)
(16)  Maximum Education Male 
Primary Schooling
-0.23
(0.45)
0.06
(0.41)
-3.17***
(0.80)
-1.64*
(0.99)
(17)  Maximum Education Female 
Primary Schooling
0.35
(0.41)
0.22
(0.41)
2.54*
(1.42)
0.07
(0.70)
(18) Constant -1.44
(4.90)
12.59**
(4.98)
3.30
(10.18)
0.53
(8.91)
(19) Number of Observations 247 247 126 125
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the village level. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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The findings above are broadly consistent with the idea that trust operates as an 
enabling factor for the effective dissemination of information in social networks, at 
both the household and the village levels. Although the interactions between trust 
and the federation are not statistically significant in each specification we present, the 
results all point to the existence of a positive relationship between the effectiveness of 
the dissemination of information in social networks and household-level in-group as 
well as village-level generalised trust, but only for French beans. 
4.6. Conclusion
Since the seminal studies by Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1986) and Binswanger 
and McIntire (1987), agricultural economists have been interested in the behavioural 
determinants of production relations in agriculture. However, until now the 
behavioural mechanisms concerned with crop and technology adoption have been 
poorly understood. Although recent evidence indicates that time preferences and 
risk as well as ambiguity aversion are related to crop and technology adoption (e.g., 
Engle-Warnick et al. 2007; Duflo et al. 2011; Huang and Liu 2009; Liu 2011), there have 
been few rigorous attempts to link trust to crop and technology adoption (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 2010). 
 The current chapter identifies a link between trust and crop adoption through 
the channel of network externalities. We present evidence that both household-
level in-group and village-level generalised trust can improve the effectiveness of 
the dissemination of information in social networks. Although the relationship is 
only significant over parts of the distribution of our sample, the findings provide 
support for the idea that both household-level in-group and village-level generalised 
trust are catalytic factors in the effective dissemination of information in social 
networks. The first finding is consistent with results from previous studies 
demonstrating that new agricultural techniques only result in agricultural diffusion 
within presumably high-trust kinship-related groups and not in presumably 
low-trust distance-based groups (Van den Broeck and Dercon forthcoming). That 
village-level generalised trust can also be considered a catalyst for the effective 
dissemination of information in social networks suggests that distance based 
groups may also be effective when generalised trust is sufficient.  
 Nevertheless, we only find a link between trust, networks and the adoption of 
French beans. Admittedly somewhat speculatively, we relate the observed differential 
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effects of trust on French bean and tomato adoption to ambiguity and risk aversion. 
Taking into account the novelty of French beans in the setting we discuss, the 
returns to French bean adoption might be relatively ambiguous from the point of 
view of the farmers in the Devrana Valley. Moreover, the possibility to sell tomatoes 
on wholesale and local markets might make the decision to adopt tomatoes less 
risky than the decision to adopt French beans. We argue that the relationship 
between trust, social networks and crop adoption is likely to be stronger when the 
prospects of crop adoption are relatively ambiguous or risky. The interpretation 
concerned with ambiguity aversion is borrowed from a previous study that 
demonstrates a negative relationship between ambiguity aversion and crop 
adoption (Engle-Warnick et al. 2007). The interpretation related to risk aversion is 
related to the widely documented negative relationship between risk aversion and 
crop adoption (e.g., Feder 1985; Knight et al. 2003).   
 Future studies could focus on establishing a more precise link between trust, 
social networks, ambiguity and/or risk aversion and crop and/or technology 
adoption. For this purpose, it could be particularly useful to combine field 
experiments with survey data. For example, Engle-Warnick et al. (2007) demonstrate 
that ambiguity and risk aversion can be measured rather accurately by applying 
artefactual field experiments in their Peruvian case.     
 Future research could also focus on the identification of causal relationships 
between trust, networks, and crop or technology adoption by randomised control 
trials or the identification of natural experiments. The relationships we present 
need further corroboration to demonstrate that the link between trust, social 
networks and the adoption of new crops is indeed causal. 
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Appendix 4.1.
This section serves to test the robustness of the results to the inclusion of dynamics 
and village fixed effects. First, we include dynamics to the model by focusing 
exclusively on the farmers who adopted tomatoes and French beans between 2008 
and 2010. For this purpose, we estimate Equation 4.1 for the sub-sample of farmers 
who did not yet adopt tomatoes or French beans during the baseline survey in 2008. 
Here we should be able to distinguish between crop adoption decisions that were 
made before 2008 and crop adoption decisions that were made between 2008 and 
2010. Second, we control for the inclusion of village fixed effects by estimating 
Equation 4.2. For this purpose, we apply a linear probability model.   
Appendix 4.1.1: An analysis of adoption decisions between 2008 and 2010
Until now we have treated households that adopted a crop before 2008 and 
continued producing the crop until 2010 as similar to households that adopted a 
crop between 2008 and 2010. To analyse adoption decisions between 2008 and 
2010 we estimate the influence of the interaction between trust and access to the 
federation exclusively for those households that had not yet adopted tomatoes or 
French beans during the baseline survey in 2008. This leaves us with 214 observations 
for tomatoes and 266 observations for French beans. The purpose of this analysis is 
to present a stricter test for the dynamic relationship between trust, networks and 
the adoption of French beans.74  
 When applying this test, we continue to find evidence of a significant relationship 
between trust, networks and the adoption of French beans. The results are presented 
in columns 1-2 of Table 4.7. As illustrated in rows 23-28, the estimates of the 
interaction between trust and access to federations are not significant over the 
whole of the distribution, but we find significant effects of the interaction over 
parts of the distribution for the interaction between village-level generalised trust 
and access to federations as well as for the interaction between household-level 
in-group trust and access to federations. Moreover, the effects also appear to be 
positive over the whole of the distribution. Taking into account the strictness of the 
test, the findings provide us with rather strong evidence in support of the idea that 
trust matters for the effectiveness of the dissemination of information about the 
prospects of French beans in social networks. As in the previous analyses, we find 
hardly any evidence of a significant magnitude of the interactions between trust 
and the federation for tomatoes. Although we find a significant marginal effect over 
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a very small part of the distribution, on average the effects are far from significant. 
Moreover, the marginal effect also appears negative over parts of the distribution of 
the likelihood of tomato adoption.          
Table 4.7   Crop	adoption	between	2008	and	2010
(1)  
Tomato 
Adoption
(2)  
French 
Bean 
Adoption
(1)  Percentage of other Community Members Producing 
Tomatoes in 2008
0.71
(1.44)
-
(2)  Percentage of other Community Members Producing  
French Beans in 2008
- -0.36
(0.93)
(3) Federation 0.40
(3.72)
-4.80**
(2.05)
(4) Federation * Household In-Group Trust -0.49
(0.57)
0.67*
(0.36)
(5) Household In-Group Trust -0.26
(0.21)
-0.22
(0.24)
(6) Federation * Village Generalised Trust 1.50
(1.52)
1.25*
(0.65)
(7) Village Generalised Trust 0.38
(0.45)
-0.27
(0.32)
(8) Total Land Size -0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.01)
(9) Total Value of Sales -0.07
(0.08)
0.02
(0.08)
(10) Household Size 0.02
(0.08)
0.09
(0.07)
(11) Scheduled Caste -0.39
(0.39)
-0.73**
(0.35)
(12) Food Consumption 0.80*
(0.48)
-0.63
(0.42)
(13) Other Consumption -0.22
(0.38)
-0.42
(0.34)
(14) Value of Livestock -0.07
(0.08)
0.01
(0.07)
(15) Value of Durables 0.06
(0.20)
-0.03
(0.19)
(16) Maximum Education Male Illiterate -0.27
(0.71)
-0.35
(0.92)
(17) Maximum Education Female Illiterate 0.79*
(0.47)
-0.56
(0.49)
(18) Maximum Education Male No Primary Schooling -0.59
(0.56)
-0.58
(0.43)
(19) Maximum Education Female No Primary Schooling 0.81
(0.58)
-0.24
(0.52)
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Appendix 4.1.2: A model with village fixed effects
Finally, we also discuss the relationship between trust, networks and crop adoption 
controlling for village fixed effects. This has the advantage that we control for both 
observable and unobservable village characteristics. However, in this specification 
we are not able to estimate the separate effects of characteristics that are only 
measurable at the village level, such as the access to federations and village-level 
generalised trust and its interaction. The specification nonetheless allows for a 
stricter test of the relationship between household-level in-group trust, social 
networks and crop adoption. We use a linear probability fixed-effect model rather 
than a fixed-effect logit model, because results from fixed-effect logit models are 
rather difficult to interpret, especially when interactions are included. Moreover, we 
avoid the elimination of observations that are constant across villages. For the 
specification we use standard errors determined by jack-knife replications to account 
for the clustering and the survey weights. 
Table 4.7   Continued
(1)  
Tomato 
Adoption
(2)  
French 
Bean 
Adoption
(20) Maximum Education Male Primary Schooling -0.49
(0.53)
-0.76
(0.51)
(21) Maximum Education Female Primary Schooling 0.62
(0.48)
-0.15
(0.45)
(22) Constant -6.99
(5.54)
12.32**
(5.24)
Magnitude of Interactions Social Networks  
* Household In-Group Trust 
(23) Federation * Household In-Group Trust Mean z-value -0.31 1.33
(24) Federation * Household In-Group Trust Minimum z-value -1.08 0.73
(25) Federation * Household In-Group Trust Maximum z-value 0.36 2.67**
Magnitude of Interactions Social Networks  
* Village Generalised Trust
(26) Federation * Village Generalised Trust Mean z-value 0.24 1.40
(27) Federation * Village Generalised Trust Minimum z-value -0.81 0.72
(28) Federation * Village Generalised Trust Maximum z-value 1.87* 2.38**
(29) Number of Observations 214 266
Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the village level. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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 The results are presented in columns 1-2 of Table 4.8. Just as in the previous 
specifications, we find no evidence in support of a significant relationship between 
the interaction between access to the federation and household-level in-group trust 
and the adoption of tomatoes. The results continue to provide evidence of a 
significant effect of the interaction between access to the federation and house-
hold-level in-group trust on the adoption of French beans. The interaction between 
access to the federation and household-level in-group trust is significant even after 
controlling for village fixed effects. Hence we argue that the estimates from the 
model with village fixed effects present strong evidence of a positive relationship 
between trust, social networks and the adoption of French beans.    
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Table 4.8   Crop	adoption	with	village	fixed	effects
(1)  
Tomato 
Adoption
(2)  
French 
Bean 
Adoption
(1) Federation * Household In-Group Trust 0.03
(0.07)
0.16**
(0.07)
(2) Household In-Group Trust -0.06
(0.05)
-0.06
(0.05)
(3) Total Land Size 0.00
(0.00)
-0.00
(0.00)
(4) Total Value of Sales -0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
(5) Household Size 0.00
(0.01)
0.02
(0.01)
(6) Scheduled Caste -0.04
(0.08)
-0.16**
(0.07)
(7) Food Consumption 0.12
(0.09)
-0.13
(0.09)
(8) Other Consumption -0.05
(0.06)
-0.10
(0.06)
(9) Value of Livestock 0.00
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.02)
(10) Value of Durables -0.03
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.04)
(11) Maximum Education Male Illiterate -0.11
(0.17)
-0.08
(0.18)
(12) Maximum Education Female Illiterate 0.05
(0.10)
-0.09
(0.10)
(13) Maximum Education Male No Primary Schooling -0.03
(0.09)
-0.17*
(0.09)
(14) Maximum Education Female No Primary Schooling 0.08
(0.12)
-0.11
(0.11)
(15) Maximum Education Male Primary Schooling -0.12
(0.09)
-0.01
(0.10)
(16) Maximum Education Female Primary Schooling 0.06
(0.09)
-0.00
(0.09)
(17) Tomato Adoption in 2008 0.08
(0.09)
-
(18) French Bean Adoption in 2008 - 0.02
(0.09)
(19) Constant 0.01
(1.00)
3.01***
(1.01)
(20) Number of Observations 373 372
Standard errors in parentheses and determined by jack-knife replications that account for clustering at the 
village level. Controlled for village fixed effects. p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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5.1. Introduction
Self-help groups (SHGs) nowadays are the most popular strategy for empowering 
women in India (Jakimow and Kilby 2006). SHGs are groups of 10 to 20 women75 
initiated by a development agency, which are usually involved in savings and credit 
programs and/or advancing group members’ claims or rights (Thorp, Stewart, and 
Heyer 2005). Previous studies suggest that SHG programs have had a positive 
impact on consumption and asset levels at the household and community level in 
India (Deininger and Liu 2009b; Bali Swain and Varghese 2009). Furthermore, Bali 
Swain and Wallentin (2009) and Deininger and Liu (2009a) find positive impacts of 
SHGs on a latent variable of women empowerment composed of female attitudes, 
and an index of women’s autonomy and political participation, respectively.76 
Additionally, Holvoet (2005) finds evidence of positive impacts of SHGs on 
investments in girls’ healthcare in southern India. Garikipati (2008), however, argues 
that a non-patriarchal hold on productive assets is a necessary but unfulfilled 
condition for positive impacts of SHGs on empowerment in India. 
 To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to turn its attention 
to the impact of SHGs on subjective well-being (SWB), using data from a survey we 
administered in 2008 in the districts of Bolangir and Puri in the Indian state of 
Orissa. Empowerment can be defined as the “expansion in people’s ability to make 
strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them” 
(Kabeer 1999, p. 437). Perceptions of freedom and control over choices are 
conceptually related to this definition of empowerment, and were found to predict 
SWB better than any other known factor, also in India (Verme 2009). SHGs could 
thus have a positive impact on SWB through the channel of empowerment, which 
consists of resources, agency and achievements dimensions. Agency can be defined 
as the individual ability to define goals and act upon them (Kabeer 1999). This 
chapter mainly focuses on the link between a key component of agency – namely, 
autonomy – and SWB.
 Although SHG membership could have a positive impact on SWB, empowerment 
often requires the transgression of gender norms. Conservative gender norms, 
reflected in the view of women as being shy, not assertive and subordinating their 
life to their husband (Agarwal 2007), are clearly visible in Orissa. Its violation, in the 
sense that individual abilities to act upon goals are not accepted in the wider 
community, could result in decreases in SWB through the loss of feelings of identity 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000). To comprehend this relationship, we have to take into 
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account gender relationships outside the household (Agarwal 1997). This was 
demonstrated earlier by Koenig et al. (2003) who show that household level 
sanctions are related to contextual characteristics. Using data from Bangladesh 
they demonstrate that women’s autonomy is related to risks of domestic violence, 
but only in relatively conservative areas. Starting from these notions and the 
well-known identity model of Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we formalise the 
argument that SHG membership could have heterogeneous impacts on SWB, which 
are more likely to be negative if gender norms at the village level are relatively 
conservative. 
 Applying propensity score matching, we fail to find significant average treatment 
effects on the treated (ATT) of SHG membership on SWB. However, the analysis 
provides strong evidence of negative impacts of SHG membership on SWB in villages 
with relatively conservative gender norms. Additionally we also find some evidence 
for positive impacts of SHG membership on SWB in villages with relatively liberal 
gender norms. However, these results are less convincingly demonstrated. The 
heterogeneous impacts on SWB are likely to be driven by members’ enhanced 
autonomy, which we show is strongly correlated with SHG membership. A 
triangulation of findings from propensity score matching, instrumental variable 
regression analysis and qualitative research provides mixed evidence that this 
relation is a causal one. Taking into account the very likely underestimation of the 
impact estimates regarding autonomy, we argue that the findings are indicative of 
a positive impact of SHG membership on autonomy.    
 The evidence is consistent with our identity-based interpretation of the link 
between SHG membership and SWB. This interpretation is further supported by 
in-depth interviews showing that transgressions of gender norms through 
autonomy are often accompanied by social sanctioning by other community 
members. Finally, the heterogeneous impact of SHG membership on SWB is robust 
to a wide range of specification tests and the inclusion of relatively large magnitudes 
of unobserved heterogeneity. 
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5.2. Context and analytical framework
5.2.1. Context
Our study took place in the state of Orissa, which is one of the least developed states 
in India featuring the highest income poverty rate in the country (Government of 
Orissa 2004). For our survey, we selected the two districts of Bolangir and Puri, to 
capture some of the intra-regional variation in Orissa. Although poverty is higher in 
Bolangir than in Puri, the male-female ratio, which is 109 in Puri and 103 in Bolangir, 
suggests that gender inequality is worse in Puri than in Bolangir.77 The share of 
non-adult married women is, however, four times as high in Bolangir (0.58) as in Puri 
(0.14), which casts some doubt on the stronger position of women in Bolangir (Ibid.). 
To gain a better understanding on the manifestations of empowerment in the 
context of Orissa, in-depth interviews with SHG members and non-members were 
undertaken alongside the survey in March 2007 (in 4 villages in Bolangir and 5 
villages in Puri)  and from January-March in 2008 (in 5 villages in Puri). The interviews 
were not undertaken in a representative sample of villages. Instead, the interviews 
should be seen as a way to uncover underlying processes, i.e., to provide insight into 
how an intervention works (Bamberger et al. 2010). The interviews indicate that 
gender norms restricting women’s autonomy clearly exist in both Puri and Bolangir. 
A woman going out in public is likely to meet disapproval, as illustrated by the 
following quote by a respondent: “They yell at me and say: ‘why are you going 
outside the house? Why are you going to meetings? You should stay in.’” 
 Violators of gender norms are not merely subject to ‘external’ social sanctions 
by other community members. Increases in emotional distress could also result 
from anxieties and tensions arising with newly adopted non-traditional roles 
(Ahmed, Chowdhury, and Bhuiya 2001) that are related to internalised psychological 
rules about sex-typed standards (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). This notion is 
demonstrated in a quote by a respondent: “Husbands are equal to god. So they 
should be in control. It is a Hindu tradition. Now people think that women should 
also be equal to god. If it was up to me, I would keep the traditions.” We will label the 
transgression of internalised psychological rules as ‘internal’ sanctioning in this 
chapter and argue that both internal and external social sanctioning could act as 
barriers to empowerment.  
 Through group lending schemes and the organisation of supplementary 
trainings, which may range from meetings imparting business skills to camps aimed 
at increasing awareness of women’s legal rights, both NGO-supported and govern-
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ment-supported SHGs stimulate the challenging of gender norms in Orissa. In-depth 
interviews among SHG members suggest that SHGs primarily focus on generating 
income for SHG members, although NGO-supported SHGs put a somewhat stronger 
emphasis on meetings about social issues than government supported SHGs. 
 Participation in SHGs could change attitudes towards gender roles, either 
because of increased income earning capabilities (Khandker 2005) or because of 
meetings of SHGs, in which women are exposed to new ideas and become more 
aware of their subordinate social position (Jakimow and Kilby 2006). The interviews 
suggest that SHG members have a greater autonomy in public space than in the 
past, as this quote by a respondent shows: “Before we were inside the house and 
had not seen anything, not a bank, not an office, a police station, a court and so on. 
We had no experiences. But the bird escaped from the cage and moved from one 
tree to another. With the group we have come to see new things and have seen new 
places and we have been lucky to see a police station, banks, courts, offices etc.” 
 Based on this information, we would expect a positive relationship between 
SHG membership and autonomy. SHG membership could also influence other 
components of agency, such as attitudes towards male control over women and 
domestic violence. The enhanced freedom that an improvement in agency brings 
should exert a positive effect on SWB for SHG members. However, it is unclear 
whether the possible increases in SWB would outweigh the decreases potentially 
resulting from sanctions after the violation of gender norms. In our subsequent 
analytical framework we will elaborate further on the relationship between SHG 
membership, agency and SWB. In our estimation strategy we will also pay attention 
to the difficulties associated with demonstrating causal relationships between SHG 
membership, agency and SWB in the presence of self-selection into SHGs. 
5.2.2. Analytical framework
We argue that the positive effect of empowerment on SWB will only dominate the 
negative effect of social sanctioning on SWB if the social costs of violating prevailing 
gender norms are relatively low. To illustrate this mechanism, we follow the 
economic model of identity as discussed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). 
( , , )j j j j jU U a a I−=  (5.1)
 (5.2)
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Equation 5.1 derives the utility U of person j, which depends on identity Ij, actions aj 
and others’ actions a-j. j’s actions also determine j’s consumption of goods and 
services, which guarantees that standard economic factors are incorporated in the 
model (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Equation 5.2 derives j’s identity I, which depends 
on, amongst others, j’s assigned social category c. The social status of this category 
is given by the function Ij (.) and a person assigned a social category with higher 
social status may enjoy an enhanced identity. The extent to which j’s own character-
istics match the ideal of the social category, as indicated by the prescription P, is 
captured by ej. Feelings of identity depend on the extent to which j’s own and others’ 
actions correspond to prescribed behaviour indicated by P. Gains or losses in identity 
are depicted by increases or decreases in utility that derive from Ij (.)  (Ibid.).                      
  Departures from the idealised gender norm through enhanced agency are 
represented by changes in actions aj, which have positive and negative effects on 
utility in an empowerment process without second-order effects. First, agency 
could result in utility gains through gains in freedom. These utility gains could be 
realised directly but also through actions such as the setting up of small businesses. 
Second, agency results in actions that do not correspond to prescribed behaviour 
according to the idealised gender norm, which could result in social costs through 
identity losses. These identity losses are, amongst others, caused by internal social 
sanctions. As a consequence, enhanced agency resulting from SHG membership can 
also result in decreases in utility. External sanctions by other community members, 
which are represented in others’ actions a-j and are positively related to SHG 
membership, can also result in identity losses, potentially resulting in negative 
effects of SHG membership on utility. Moreover, external social sanctions can also 
have a direct negative impact on the utility of person j. However, the direct effect of 
changes in others’ actions a-j on utility does not necessarily have to be negative. The 
in-depth interviews we conducted suggest that SHG members can also gain respect 
of other community members through their activities in SHGs, which could result in 
actions of others a-j that have a positive effect on the utility of person j. Hence, the 
direct effect of changes in others’ actions a-j on utility remains ambiguous. 
Nevertheless, external social sanctions by other community members could have a 
strong negative indirect effect on the utility of person j  which runs through the 
channel of identity losses.     
 In our analytical framework we interpret gender norms as exogenously 
determined context characteristics. We argue that SHGs can only transform gender 
norms in the long run, after a dynamic process, just like fertility programs in 
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Bangladesh were only able to transform fertility norms in the very long run (Munshi 
and Myaux 2006). Hence, we assume that cj, ej and P remain constant in the short 
run. This does not, however, prevent SHGs from stimulating individuals to challenge 
gender norms in the short run. For this reason, the exercising of agency by individuals 
is most likely to depend on the individuals’ belief about the likelihood and strength 
of sanctioning after empowerment. Beliefs about social sanctioning could be related 
to SHG membership if the SHG serves as a form of social legitimisation of behaviour 
that challenges the gender norm, as discussed in Ray (1998, p. 323), or if SHG 
members challenge the gender norm more often than non-members prior to joining 
the SHG. If this is the case, we would expect SHG members to have more optimistic 
beliefs about social sanctioning than non-members, in the sense that sanctions are 
believed to be few and mild, because of microfinance, meetings about social issues 
or self-selection. Individuals will only choose to depart from the idealised gender 
norm when they believe that the expected benefits of challenging gender norms 
outweigh the expected costs. If SHG members have more optimistic beliefs about 
sanctioning, in the sense that sanctions are believed to be few and/or mild, we 
would expect a positive correlation between SHG membership and agency, as 
hinted at in our earlier discussed qualitative data. Moreover, we would expect a 
causal impact of SHG membership on agency if SHG members become more 
optimistic after the legitimisation of behaviour that challenges the gender norm by 
the SHG.    
 Other modelling exercises related to the social sanctioning of the violation of 
gender norms have attempted to explain, amongst others, the fertility transition in 
Bangladesh (Munshi and Myaux 2006). A model was derived in which a woman who 
chooses modern reproductive behaviour is sanctioned if she meets a conformist 
woman, i.e., a woman with a conservative gender norm. The proportion of women 
with conservative  gender norms in the village is uncertain, such that the chance to 
be sanctioned is unknown ex ante for the women in the model. In our analytical 
framework, SHG members are more likely to be overoptimistic with regard to the 
trade-off between gains in agency and social sanctions in villages with relatively 
conservative gender norms if the likelihood and/or strength of social sanctioning 
are dependent on the conservativeness of the gender norm. Therefore, we would 
expect a more positive relationship between SHG membership and utility if the 
gender norm is sufficiently liberal, assuming that the social legitimisation of the 
exercising of agency by SHGs works similarly in villages with relatively conservative 
(liberal) gender norms. Our analytical framework thus predicts heterogeneous 
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impacts of SHG membership on utility, which depend on the conservativeness of 
the gender norm.  
 More formally, the change in utility after SHG membership depends on gains in 
agency represented in changes in actions aj, which are positively related to SHG 
membership and which have a positive effect on utility, changes in actions of others 
a-j, which are positively related to SHG membership and which have an ambiguous 
direct effect on utility, and losses in identity Ij, which have a negative effect on 
utility. By applying the chain rule the relationship between utility and SHG 
membership can be defined as in equation 5.3.   
j j j j j j j
j j j j j j j
dU U da U da U dI
dSHG a dSHG a dSHG I dSHG
−
−
∂ ∂ ∂
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂  
 (5.3)
It shows that there is an ambiguous relationship between SHG membership and 
utility since the first term is positive, while the second term is ambiguous and the 
third term is negative, as shown in the equations below: 
0, , 0j j j j j j
j j j j j j
U da U da U dI
a dSHG a dSHG I dSHG
−
−
∂ ∂ ∂
> −∞ < < ∞ <
∂ ∂ ∂
Identity losses, as represented in the third term, are likely to be stronger and/or 
more severe in villages with relatively conservative gender norms. This can be more 
precisely illustrated as in Equations 5.4-5.6.Equation 5.4 presents the negative 
change in identity Ij that results from SHG membership, which affects both actions 
aj and actions of others a-j (sanctions). It demonstrates that SHG membership could 
result in identity losses. 
 
j j j jj
j j j j j
I da I dadI
dSHG a dSHG a dSHG
−
−
∂ ∂
= +
∂ ∂  (5.4)
The identity losses run through the channels of internal and external social 
sanctions, represented by positive changes in actions aj and other’s actions a-j as 
shown in the equations below: 
0, 0j j j j
j j j j
I da I da
a dSHG a dSHG
−
−
∂ ∂
< <
∂ ∂
We extend the model by introducing the village level gender norm Sk, which 
represents a continuous measure of the conservativeness of the gender norm for 
village k. As stated above, the loss in identity Ij that results from changes in aj is 
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related to the conservativeness of the gender norm Sk, in the sense that identity 
losses are likely to be more negative in villages with relatively conservative gender 
norms, because internal sanctions are more likely and/or more severe in these 
specific contexts. This is formally shown in Equation 5.5, in which Sc is the gender 
norm in a relatively conservative village and Sl is the gender norm in a relatively 
liberal village and Sc > Sl 
( | ) ( | )j jk l k c
j j
I IS S S S
a a
∂ ∂
= > =
∂ ∂  (5.5)
Identity losses are strengthened even more by the stronger external social sanctions 
of autonomous women by other community members in villages with relatively 
conservative gender norms. The model we present predicts that external social 
sanctions that result from SHG membership and which are represented in actions of 
others a-j are stronger in villages with relatively conservative gender norms. This is 
formally shown in equation 5.6. 
( | ) ( | )j jk l k c
j j
a aS S S S
SHG SHG
− −∂ ∂
= < =
∂ ∂  (5.6)
The stronger internal and external social sanctions should result in a less positive (or 
more negative) relationship between SHG membership and utility in villages with 
relatively conservative gender norms. 
 Admittedly, we should exercise caution in drawing general conclusions from our 
model, because it describes a static picture without second-order effects. Individuals 
could shift their belief about social sanctioning back to their belief before the social 
legitimisation of the violation of gender norms, when they would be disappointed 
with the utility losses resulting from social sanctioning. There exists some 
experimental evidence in support of such a mechanism (Van Kempen 2009). Explicit 
use of sanctioning has, however, also been shown to result in stronger violations of 
social norms among the punished (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003; Fehr and List 2004). 
These violations are consistent with psychological game theory, as developed by 
behavioural economists (Rabin 1993), in which strongly reciprocal individuals respond 
kindly towards actions that are perceived to be kind and in a hostile manner to actions 
that are perceived to be hostile, such as sanctioning. Therefore, it remains unclear 
whether disappointment with utility losses for SHG members would result in a return 
to their level of agency before the legitimisation of the violation of the gender norm. 
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 SHG members could also legitimise the transgression of gender norms for 
non-members if social networks result in a dynamic diffusion of beliefs from SHG 
members to non-members, which could result in empowerment externalities. 
Under this condition, the cost of sanctioning for the sanctioners could in the long 
run become too high if too many women break the gender norm. In this case there 
would not be any long-term trade-off between agency and social sanctioning 
(Kuran 2004). 
 Deininger and Liu (2009a) and Janssens (2010) provide evidence of the presence 
of empowerment externalities from SHGs. A model accounting for such dynamic 
equilibria is beyond the scope of this thesis (Munshi and Myaux (2006) discuss such 
a model), because our cross-section data would not allow us to analyse the dynamic 
relationships between SHG membership, agency and SWB. It is nonetheless 
important to realise that the relationships between SHG membership, agency and 
SWB could also be interpreted taking into account these dynamic relationships. In 
our multivariate data analyses in Section 5.4, we will test whether SHG members 
experienced an improvement in autonomy, one of the components of agency. In 
addition, we will estimate the impact of SHG membership on SWB as a proxy for 
utility, taking into account the possible heterogeneous impacts in villages with 
relatively conservative (liberal) gender norms. However, we will not be able to 
demonstrate possible shifts to the dynamic low-empowerment equilibrium level, 
nor the potential stronger violation of gender norms after social sanctioning or 
empowerment spillovers to non-members. In the interpretation of the results, we 
will nevertheless take into account the possible dynamic relationships between SHG 
membership, agency and SWB.   
5.3. The survey data
5.3.1. Sampling design
For our survey we selected households from 19 villages, of which 9 are situated in 
Puri and 10 in Bolangir. In 18 of the villages 20 households were interviewed: 12 or 13 
households with SHG members and 7 or 8 households without SHG members. In 
one particularly large village we interviewed 40 households in 2 hamlets that were 
clearly separated from each other: 25 households with SHG members and 15 
households without SHG members. The survey consists of 9 sections that related to 
all household members: a household roster, employment and income, migration, 
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transfers, consumption and production, credit, housing, education and health. 
Additionally, in each household with SHG members the SHG member and his/her 
spouse were individually interviewed about issues related to social capital and 
empowerment, just like the household head and his/her spouse in each household 
without SHG members. Each village in our survey contains at least one government-
supported or NGO-supported SHG. Discussions with coordinating NGO and 
government officials and a number of field visits suggested that it would not be 
possible to select comparable villages where no SHGs were active. 
 Participation in government-supported SHGs is only possible for below-poverty-
line households. To assure comparability between government-supported SHG 
members, NGO-supported SHG members and non-members, only below-poverty-
line households were interviewed.78 Additionally, relatively poor households were 
selected by restricting the sample to those with monthly SHG saving rates of no 
more than 30 Rupees. The threshold of 30 Rupees was set to assure comparability 
between possibly excluded poor non-member households and households with 
SHG members. Apart from these criteria, both households with and without SHG 
members were randomly selected. In total 400 households were interviewed: 124 
households had at least 1 household member who participated in an NGO-supported 
SHG, 129 households had at least 1 household member who participated in a govern-
ment-supported SHG and 147 households had no SHG members. 
  In the remainder of this chapter, women in households without female SHG 
members will be used as a comparison group for female SHG members. Men, 
however, also participate in SHGs in certain villages of our sample. Of the 19 villages 
in our sample, 13 villages (9 in Bolangir and 4 in Puri) contain SHGs with male 
members. We will focus on the impact of female membership in SHGs. Whenever 
necessary, we will control for male membership in SHGs in our empirical 
specifications. 
5.3.2. Empowerment profile of the sample
In this section we focus on indicators of empowerment. This will give us 
approximations of the conservativeness of the gender norm of non-SHG members 
and the magnitude of the deviation from the gender norm by SHG members. Fehr 
and Gächter (2000a) define a social norm as “1) a behavioural regularity that is 2) 
based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave, which triggers 3) the 
enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions.” The mean 
level of empowerment of non-SHG members at the village level could be seen as the 
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traditionally shared belief among women in the village of how women ought to 
behave. Deviations of SHG members from this social norm could trigger social 
sanctions of non-SHG members. Therefore we would expect stronger utility losses 
for SHG members in villages with relatively conservative gender norms, but only if 
SHG members deviate from the gender norm of non-SHG members considerably, 
i.e., if there are significant differences in empowerment between SHG members and 
non-members. 
 Although we mainly focus on women’s agency, we also discuss a number of 
‘resources’ in our descriptive statistics. Additionally, we discuss indicators related to 
male tolerance of women’s agency, because male attitudes could be indirectly 
influenced by SHG membership of their wives. Table 5.1 clearly shows that households 
with SHG members have more economic resources.79 Savings and loans in SHGs are 
significantly higher for households with SHG members, as well as the level of loans 
from family and friends. The saving level in non-SHG saving groups is significantly 
lower for SHG members, which suggests that there has been substitution of savings 
away from saving groups to SHGs. Households with SHG members are also 
significantly more likely to own livestock. In addition, the estimated size of their land 
is significantly higher than the estimated size of the land of households without 
SHG members and women in households with SHG members are significantly more 
likely to own land. Hence, the pre-condition of economic resources for empowerment 
is fulfilled to a greater extent for SHG members. Nevertheless, economic resources 
are only one of the ways in which SHG members can achieve agency. Disentangling 
the impacts of increased income earning capabilities and meetings of SHGs is, 
however, beyond the scope of this thesis.      
 With regard to agency, we focus on autonomy, male control over women and 
domestic violence. Concrete autonomy indicators in our survey relate to the degree 
of freedom women have to leave the house without permission. Both men and 
women were asked for their agreement with statements related to the freedom of 
women to go to the market and visit a doctor without male permission. Men were 
also asked for their agreement with the statement “Women should be able to go to 
community meetings on their own”. Comparable empowerment indicators were 
used in a recent impact evaluation of an SHG program in Andhra Pradesh in India. In 
this study, economic empowerment of women was based on “whether a woman 
can set aside money for her own use, go to the market, to the clinic or the community 
centre, visit friends, or work on fields outside the village, without asking permission 
from her husband or other males from the family.” (Deininger and Liu 2009a). In 
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more abstract terms, respondents in our survey were also asked for their agreement 
with the statement “I have control over my own life” on a Likert scale from 1-5. The 
statement serves to see whether concrete conceptualisations of autonomy are 
actually related to perceptions about control. 
 The exact wording of the statements and descriptive statistics are reported in 
Table 5.2. The table shows several differences in autonomy between SHG members 
and non-members. SHG members show a significantly higher agreement with the 
statements “I have control over my own life and “I am able to go to the market 
without asking a man”. However, we find no significant differences in the women’s 
Table 5.1   Descriptive	statistics	on	resources
Variable (1)
Mean Members
(2)
Mean Non-
Members
(3)
t-test/ Chi2 test a
(1) SHG Savings 257.71
(193.11)
90.20
(137.35)
10.14*** b
(0.00)
(2) Savings in saving group 17.25
(88.88)
40.13
(153.19)
-1.73* b
(0.08)
(3) Other Formal Savings 379.88
(3063.67)
183.26
(1177.85)
0.89 b
(0.37)
(4) Informal Savings 165.87
(959.34)
69.53
(726.98)
1.14 b
(0.25)
(5) SHG and saving group loans 337.57
(559.62)
58.97
(186.61)
7.07*** b
(0.00)
(6) Informal loans 346.73
(776.54)
226.46
(655.39)
1.67 b
(0.09)*
(7) Money lender loans 11.78
(112.54)
24.87
(183.48)
-0.82 b
(0.41)
(8) Bank loans 99.00
(927.74)
85.30
(645.57)
0.17 b
(0.86)
(9) Other formal loans 232.25
(746.99)
285.49
(850.34)
-0.65 b
(0.86)
(10) Any Livestock 0.71
(0.45)
0.61
(0.49)
4.56** c
(0.03)
(11) Land Size in Acres 2.01
(7.08)
0.96
(1.84)
2.16** b
(0.03)
(12) Female Land Ownership 0.06
(0.24)
0.02
(0.15)
4.01** c
(0.05)
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) T-values or Chi 2-values are reported in these columns, depending on 
the applicable test.  b) t-value reported c) Pearson Chi 2 reported. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
in columns 1-2. P-values in parentheses in column 3. 
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autonomy to visit a doctor. We also encounter some significant differences in male 
attitudes towards women’s autonomy. Spouses of SHG members show a significantly 
higher agreement with the statements “Women should be able to go to community 
meetings on their own” and “Women should be able to go to the market without 
male permission”. We find no significant differences in male tolerance of women 
seeing a doctor without requesting permission. The differences are not necessarily 
related to impacts of SHG membership. Spouses of SHG members also show a 
significantly higher agreement with the statement “I have control over my own life”, 
which indicates that characteristics of spouses could play an important role in 
self-selection into SHGs. However, even if the significant differences in autonomy 
are not related to SHG membership, our results still show that SHG members deviate 
considerably from the gender norms of non-members. Our data on autonomy also 
indicate that there are considerable differences in gender norms across villages (the 
mean percentage of non-SHG members that have the freedom to go to the market 
runs from 0 to 62% across villages). This gives us the statistical power to estimate 
the heterogeneous impacts of SHG membership on SWB in villages with relatively 
conservative (liberal) gender norms.
 Data about attitudes towards male control over women and domestic violence 
were collected by asking both men and women for their level of agreement with the 
statements “Men are entitled to command their women” and “Men are entitled to 
beat their women on certain occasions” on a 5-point Likert scale. A comparable 
indicator related to domestic violence was used in a different study on India, relating 
the introduction of cable TV to attitudes towards domestic violence. In this study, 
women were asked whether it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife (Jensen 
and Oster 2009). Descriptive statistics about statements related to male control 
over women and domestic violence are reported in Table 5.2. There are only slight 
differences between attitudes of SHG members and non-members. Spouses of SHG 
members, however, show a lower degree of agreement with the statement “Men 
are entitled to beat their women”. The relatively small differences suggest that SHG 
members do not deviate considerably from the gender norms of non-members in 
the area of male control over and domestic violence against women. Because it is 
unclear whether SHG members violate gender norms in these areas and because 
domestic violence is intrinsically linked to sanctioning at the household and not at 
the village level, we will focus on autonomy in the remainder of this chapter.        
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5.3.3. Subjective well-being and gender norms
Survey questions related to happiness or SWB have become fairly standardised in 
the economics literature and have been increasingly used as a proxy for experienced 
utility (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006). Admittedly, SWB does not measure “true 
utility”. However, SWB has been shown to correlate strongly with other variables 
that we can plausibly claim to be associated with “true utility”, such as unemployment, 
but also with left frontal brain activity and Duchenne smiles, a type of smiling that 
involves a muscle near the eye (Ibid.). In addition, research in developing countries 
has shown that correlates of happiness are remarkably consistent around the world 
(Graham 2009). Based on these findings, we argue that SWB is valid for use in 
empirical applications in developing countries. The way we measure SWB is in 
accordance with the economics literature (for an extensive review, see Frey and 
Stutzer 2002). Both the household head and his/her spouse were asked to answer 
the question “How happy are you with your life in general?” on a scale from 1 to 5 to 
quantify SWB. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 5.2. On average, there are 
no significant differences in levels of SWB between SHG members and non-members. 
Our theoretical model, however, discusses the possibility that differences in SWB 
between SHG members and non-members could be positive (negative) in villages 
with relatively liberal (conservative) gender norms. 
 To analyse these possible heterogeneous effects, we construct a proxy for the 
conservativeness of the gender norm. This proxy was constructed by using the 
mean of the indicated level of autonomy to go to the market and the doctor of 
female non-SHG members at the village level (Mean=0.35, S.E.=0.16). We focus in 
particular on levels of autonomy, because the violation of this specific gender norm 
was frequently related to social sanctioning in in-depth interviews with SHG 
members and because our descriptive statistics showed a clear significant difference 
between SHG members and non-members for these variables. We find evidence 
indicative of heterogeneous impacts of SHG membership on SWB. SHG members in 
villages with a relatively conservative gender norm have a significantly lower SWB 
than non-members (t=-2.07, P=0.02), while the difference in SWB between SHG 
members and non-members is positive and marginally significant in villages with 
relatively liberal gender norms (t=1.68, P=0.09). However, we should be careful in 
interpreting these results, since we have not yet accounted for other factors. 
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5.4. Econometric specification and results
In this section we test the theoretical predictions of our model. First, we will use 
propensity score matching (PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) regression analysis 
to derive the impact of SHG membership on autonomy. Second, we will estimate the 
impact of SHG membership on SWB, to elaborate further on Equations 5.3-5.6 of our 
theoretical model. To estimate the impact on SWB, we mainly focus on PSM, 
although we will also pay some attention to the IV impact estimate of SHG 
membership on SWB in Appendix 5.1.    
5.4.1. Estimation strategy
To estimate the causal impact of SHG membership on autonomy, we present PSM 
and IV regression analysis. Both PSM and IV regression analysis suffer from 
methodological shortcomings and using both methods will minimise these 
problems.    
 The basic idea of PSM is to find a group of non-participants who are similar in 
observed characteristics to a group of participants (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). By 
estimating a probit model with SHG membership as the dependent variable, we are 
able to estimate the so-called propensity score for female participation in SHGs. The 
predicted propensity for participation from the probit model can be seen as the 
relevant summary statistic to be balanced between participants and non-partici-
pants in SHGs. The region of the probabilities for which a valid comparison group 
can be formed is termed the region of common support, and only observations in 
this region are used to estimate the impact of the SHG program (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin 1983). Several matching algorithms are available for PSM. Following the advice 
of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we try two different approaches: 1) nearest 
neighbour matching with replacement and 2) kernel matching. In nearest neighbour 
matching the individual from the control group is chosen as a matching partner for 
a treated individual who is closest in terms of propensity score. Allowing for 
replacement could reduce bias, but the variance of our estimates could also increase. 
Because there are only a limited number of control observations in our relatively 
small sample, matching with replacement appears a practical choice. Kernel 
matching uses the weighted averages of all individuals in the comparison group. 
More information is used in this procedure, which reduces the amount of variance in 
our estimates. The danger of this procedure is, however, that bad matches may be 
chosen (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Using both nearest neighbour matching with 
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replacement and kernel matching provides us with a natural robustness check, to 
guard against the disadvantages of the two matching algorithms. 
 There are several reasons for preferring PSM over regression analysis. First, 
because of its non-parametric nature, PSM does not invoke functional forms (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008). Second, it is unclear whether there are valid instrumental variables 
in our sample that could account for bias resulting from reversed causality or 
measurement error. However, PSM is not an adequate solution for the estimation of 
the causal impact of SHG membership, if reversed causality and/or measurement 
error influence the results. 
 There is some indication of reversed causality. In-depth interviews in Puri 
indicate that women with husbands and/or family-in-law with relatively conservative 
values face more constraints to enter SHGs compared to women with relatively 
liberal family members. The relationship between SHG membership and agency 
could thus be spuriously driven by reversed causality, if agency and male attitudes 
towards women’s agency are correlated at the household level. However, reversed 
causality does not necessarily result in an upward bias in our impact estimates. 
SHGs could also be formed with less empowered women (Holvoet 2005). In addition, 
data derived from answers to questions related to autonomy could suffer from 
measurement error in the form of cognitive bias (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), 
which could bias the PSM impact estimates towards zero. 
 The IV method provides a solution to reversed causality and measurement error 
problems, if instruments can be found that are strongly correlated with the 
explanatory variables but not with the dependent variable. By estimating presumably 
exogenous variation in SHG membership in a first stage, and using the predicted 
value of SHG membership as a regressor in a second stage, we should be able to 
derive consistent impact estimates of the effect of SHG membership on autonomy 
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 82). Although it is unclear whether the transaction costs of 
SHG formation fulfil this condition perfectly, Garikipati (2008) makes use of such an 
instrument to estimate the impact of SHG membership on empowerment. 
Therefore, taking into account the different methodological shortcomings of PSM, 
we will also estimate the impact of SHG membership on autonomy using the 
percentage of household heads in the village that is of the same caste as the female 
respondent (henceforth defined as the percentage of the same caste) as an 
instrument for SHG membership. Garikipati (2008) used a dummy variable that is 1 
if the caste of the SHG member is the dominant caste in a village as an instrument 
for SHG membership. We use the percentage of the same caste, however, to prevent 
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losing information. 
 This variable is highly significantly correlated with SHG membership (β=0.23, 
P=0.00) and this correlation does not appear to be driven by the domination of a 
specific caste. The significant correlation between the instrument and SHG 
membership does not disappear when we control for the percentage of scheduled 
caste, scheduled tribe, other backward caste or general caste members in a village. 
Hence, there appear to be lower transaction costs of group formation for same-caste 
than for mixed-caste communities. Additionally, there are only two villages where 
all villagers consist of the same caste. For the other households, the percentage of 
the same caste runs from 0.025 to 0.95 with a mean value of 0.51 and a standard 
deviation of 0.23. Hence there appears to be sufficient variation in the instrument to 
apply the IV regression approach.  
 In this application, we estimate a model, as specified in Equation 5.7, in which FAi 
is the level of autonomy for woman i, SHGi is the predicted value of a variable 
indicating the participation in an SHG by woman i, Xi is a matrix of control variables, 
ei is the residual value, and β1 is the estimate of the impact of SHG membership on 
autonomy.   
 (5.7)
Our results from PSM and IV regression analyses are likely to be conservative 
estimates of the impact of SHG membership on autonomy. Comparing participants 
and non-participants in SHGs in the same village will underestimate the impact of 
SHG membership on empowerment in the presence of empowerment externalities. 
The presentation of the impact estimates nonetheless serves to verify the impact of 
SHG membership on autonomy in Orissa, which in turn allows us to comprehend the 
differences in gender norms between SHG members and non-members. 
 To estimate the impact of SHG membership on SWB, we will mainly focus on 
PSM. There are several arguments in favour of refraining from IV regression analyses 
in the estimation of the impact of SHG membership on SWB. First, bias from 
unobservables through reversed causality is less likely to pose a problem in the 
hypothesis we test for this relationship. Second, it is unclear whether the instrument 
is related to SWB through the number of friends of our respondents, raising doubts 
about the validity of the percentage of the same caste as an instrument to estimate 
the impact of SHG membership on SWB. 
 Third, and most important, IV estimates only identify the Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) which represents the change in SWB for those most affected 
Women’s Autonomy and Subjective Well-Being in India | 173
5
by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Deaton 2010a). When heterogeneity is 
expected, like in our impact estimates of SHG membership on SWB, IV estimates do 
consequently not identify the average treatment effect, which makes the resulting 
IV impact estimates very hard to interpret. For this reason, Deaton (2010a) argues 
that the use of instrumental variables is not advisable when theory predicts that 
there are heterogeneous impacts and the instrument is only sufficiently correlated 
with the treatment variable for a sub-sample. The difference between the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) and the LATE is illustrated empirically by McKenzie and 
Seynabou Sakho (2010). They identify a positive LATE of tax registration on profits in 
Bolivia, but also demonstrate that the effect of tax registration on profits is negative 
for relatively small as well as relatively large firms. The positive LATE on profits 
appears to be only applicable to mid-sized firms.      
 In our case, the instrument is only significantly correlated with SHG membership 
in villages with relatively liberal gender norms, i.e., villages with a mean of the 
indicated level of autonomy to go to the market and see a doctor for female non-SHG 
members at the village level equal to or higher than 0.35 (β=0.27, P=0.00). In villages 
with relatively conservative gender norms the relationship is not significant (β=0.14, 
P=0.13). Using the IV regression approach to estimate the impact of SHG membership 
on SWB will thus be picking up the treatment effect in relatively liberal villages, 
which should result in an overestimation of the impact of SHG membership on SWB 
according to our theoretical framework. Taking into account the potential 
endogeneity of the instrument (which is likely to pose a smaller problem in the IV 
impact estimates on autonomy) and the heterogeneity in the impact estimates 
(which is not likely to pose a large problem in the IV impact estimates on autonomy), 
we should not pay too much attention to the IV impact estimates on SWB. 
Nevertheless, for completeness we report the IV impact estimates on SWB in 
Appendix 5.1. Additionally, we should be careful in extrapolating the IV impact 
estimates on autonomy to the complete survey population. However, for the impact 
estimates on this variable we have not explicitly hypothesised heterogeneous 
impacts, raising fewer doubts about the validity of the instrument.  
 Admittedly, we should incorporate bias from unobservable characteristics in 
our impact estimate on SWB. In the absence of suitable instruments for this 
relationship, we will estimate the sensitivity of our heterogeneous impact estimates 
to bias from unobservables using Rosenbaum bounds. This is an indirect check for 
the robustness of the estimates to heterogeneity from unobservables, by asking the 
question how large the effect of these unobservables needs to be in order to reverse 
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the results found (DiPrete and Gangl  2005; Becker and Caliendo 2007). In this way, 
we estimate the degree of endogeneity that is needed to change our results, an 
approach proposed by Connely et al. (2010) in the absence of suitable instruments.     
5.4.2.  Propensity score matching to estimate the impact on women’s 
autonomy
In our probit model for estimating the propensity score we control for a number of 
presumably exogenous socio-economic characteristics (household size, the size of 
land holdings, a dummy for house ownership and a number of dummy variables 
indicating housing characteristics), personal characteristics (age, dummy variables 
for caste, level of education, language used in daily life and religion), individual trust 
levels (the level of agreement with the statement “Most people can be trusted” on 
a 5-point Likert scale), the number of working days the respondent missed as a result 
of illness (to control for personal health status) and a dummy for male SHG 
membership. In addition, we control for the maximum level of education of adult 
men in the household. We also include a number of village-level characteristics in 
our model: the mean level of generalised trust for men and women, and the mean 
level of trust in women for both men and women, measured by the level of 
agreement with the 5-point Likert-scale statements “Most people can be trusted” 
and “Women can be trusted”, respectively. Observations outside the common 
support are eliminated from our model by imposing a common support condition 
and by eliminating the 5% of the treatment observations at which the propensity 
density of the control observations is the lowest. 
 Table 5.3 presents the probit model we use to estimate the propensity score. Our 
estimated propensity increases significantly with the percentage of the same caste, 
age, trust and living in a house made of permanent material, and is significantly 
lower for respondents whose age is further away from the median age of women at 
the village level. Additionally, male membership in SHGs within the same household 
as the respondent strongly and significantly decreases the propensity. A balancing 
score reveals that significant differences in observables between SHG members and 
non-members are no longer significant after matching, which suggests that the 
balancing condition for PSM has been fulfilled. Our PSM impact estimates indicate 
that the significant differences between SHG members and non-members in 
concrete autonomy cannot be causally linked to SHG membership. We also find no 
causal link between SHG membership and female perceptions of the degree of 
control over their own life. 
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Table 5.3   Propensity	score	matching	to	explain	women’s	autonomy
 (1) Logit Model for Participation in SHG
Bolangir b -0.053
(0.346)
The Percentage of the Same Casteb 1.358***
(0.359)
Difference with  median age in village -0.032***
(0.011)
Land size a 0.036
(0.026)
Ownership house b 0.162
(0.346)
Pucca b, c 0.575*
(0.348)
Semi-pucca  b, d -0.289
(0.245)
Pucca weak-sector housing b, e 0.090
(0.264)
Household size 0.011
 (0.043)
Age 0.022***
(0.008)
Hindu b 0.363
(0.437)
Oriya b -0.087
(0.548)
Scheduled caste b -0.247
(0.363)
Scheduled tribe b -0.653
(0.449)
Backward caste b -0.140
(0.319)
Illiterate b -0.190
(0.390)
No primary schooling b -0.011
(0.410)
Primary schooling b 0.144
(0.369)
Middle schooling b 0.469
(0.386)
Illiterate men b -0.111
(0.370)
No primary schooling men b 0.003
(0.337)
Primary schooling men b -0.022
(0.260)
Middle schooling men b 0.062
(0.242)
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 The positive significant differences in our descriptive statistics discussed earlier 
are thus not necessarily causally linked to SHG membership. However, we should be 
careful in interpreting the conservative impact estimates from PSM. As discussed 
earlier, PSM suffers from a number of methodological shortcomings. We will 
therefore also estimate the impact of SHG membership on autonomy using IV 
Table 5.3   Continued
 (1) Logit Model for Participation in SHG
Number missed days 0.014
(0.027)
Trust 0.173**
(0.073)
Trust men -0.468
(0.459)
Trust  women 0.225
(0.454)
Trust men in women 0.276
(0.291)
Trust women in women -0.135
(0.418)
Happiness man -0.087
(0.073)
Perceived control man 0.099
(0.071)
Male membership b -2.186***
(0.451)
Constant -2.238
(2.177)
Pseudo R2 0.299
N 366
Common Support 359
Matching Algorithm N.N. Kernel
ATT Autonomy Market 0.042
(0.091)
0.071
(0.077)
ATT Autonomy Doctor -0.014
(0.111)
-0.050
(0.079)
ATT Control Over Own Life 0.000
(0.235)
0.049
(0.186)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Size in acres. b) Dummy Variables  c) Pucca house (made of permanent 
material) d) Semi-pucca house (either wall or roof made out of permanent material  e) Pucca house 
(made of permanent material) in weak-sector housing scheme. Notes: N.N. =Nearest Neighbour 
Matching Algorithm. Standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped with 100 replications for the ATT. 
Significance levels based on Bias-Corrected confidence intervals. 
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regression analyses, to get a complete picture of the impact of SHG membership on 
autonomy. 
5.4.3.  Instrumental variable regression analysis to estimate the impact on 
women’s autonomy
In our IV regression analyses we control for a number of presumably exogenous 
variables. However, degree-of-freedom concerns prevent us from controlling for all 
the variables that were used in our PSM procedure. We control for socio-economic 
characteristics (household size, the size of land holdings, a dummy for house 
ownership and a number of dummy variables indicating housing characteristics), 
personal characteristics (age, dummy variables for caste and level of education), 
individual trust levels (the level of agreement with the statement “Most people can 
be trusted” on a 5-point Likert scale) and a dummy for male SHG membership. In 
addition, we control for a variable indicating the number of memberships in other 
organisations of the respondent, to account for a possible correlation between the 
instrument and empowerment through membership in other organisations. Finally, 
we control for the percentage of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe members in 
the village to control for possible differences in gender norms across castes. We 
adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level by 
using the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure for IV regression 
analyses. The results are reported in Table 5.4.80 The instruments have an F-statistic 
close to 10, which alleviates the worry about weak instrument bias. In contrast to 
our findings from PSM, women’s autonomy seems to be strongly affected by female 
SHG membership. The autonomy to go to the market appears to be significantly 
affected by SHG membership at the 1% level, while the relationship between SHG 
membership and the autonomy to go to the doctor is significant at the 5% level. 
Female perceptions of the degree of control over their own life do not seem to be 
causally linked to SHG membership. 
 Additionally, the inclusion of more than one instrumental variable provides us 
with the opportunity to test the validity of the instrumental variable, conditional on 
the validity of the second instrument. We will therefore present some evidence of 
the validity of the instrument to estimate the impact of SHG membership on 
autonomy, by discussing the estimated impact of SHG membership on autonomy 
with two instruments. We use an interaction between the percentage of the same 
caste and another exogenous source of transaction costs of SHG formation as a 
second instrumental variable. 
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 We exploit the fact that SHGs are mainly formed among people of the same age 
that are members of the same caste. The correlation between the percentage of the 
same caste and SHG membership is higher for women for whom the difference 
between their age and the median age of female respondents of their own caste at 
the village level is smaller than or equal to 10 years (β=0.25, P=0.00). We take 
advantage of this relationship by using an interaction between the percentage of 
the same caste and a dummy, which is 1 when the difference between the 
respondent’s age and the median age of female respondents of their own caste at 
the village level is smaller than 10 years, as a second instrument for SHG membership. 
IV regression results with two IVs suggest that the IV results are robust to the 
inclusion of a second IV. The impact of SHG membership on the autonomy to go to 
the doctor remains positive and significant at the 10% level and the impact on the 
autonomy to go to the market remains significant at the 1% level. Additionally, we 
again fail to find a significant relationship between SHG membership and female 
perceptions of the degree of control over their own life when we use a second 
instrument.  Furthermore, Hansen J tests suggest that the percentage of the same 
caste is a valid instrument (or more precisely a valid instrument conditional on the 
validity of the second instrument) for identifying the impact of SHG membership on 
the autonomy to go to the market and the doctor as well as for female perceptions 
of the degree of control over their own life. For all these relationships we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of exogenity at the 10% level. The findings of the IV 
regression analyses with two instrumental variables are reported in table 5.5.  
Table 5.4    GMM	instrumental	variable	regression	analysis	to	explain	women’s	
autonomy
Concrete Women’s Autonomy Abstract 
Women’s 
Autonomy
Autonomy to  
go to the market
Autonomy to  
go to the doctor
Control over  
own life
Female Member b 0.680***
(0.225)
0.897**
(0.427)
-0.489
(0.804)
Bolangir b -0.078
(0.090)
0.205**
(0.081)
-1.142***
(0.145)
Land size b 0.002
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.008)
Owner of house b -0.023
(0.150)
-0.082
(0.177)
-0.074
(0.158)
Women’s Autonomy and Subjective Well-Being in India | 179
5
Table 5.4    Continued
Concrete Women’s Autonomy Abstract 
Women’s 
Autonomy
Autonomy to  
go to the market
Autonomy to  
go to the doctor
Control over  
own life
Percentage Scheduled Caste 0.165
(0.146)
0.109
(0.170)
0.269
(0.281)
Percentage Scheduled Tribe 0.097
(0.217)
0.199
(0.170)
0.067
(0.517)
Scheduled Caste b -0.156*
(0.087)
-0.180
(0.137)
-0.114
(0.355)
Scheduled Tribe b -0.108*
(0.060)
-0.142
(0.199)
0.045
(0.336)
Backward Caste b -0.017
(0.032)
-0.079
(0.067)
-0.089
(0.253)
Illiterate b -0.051
(0.123)
-0.049
(0.121)
-0.312
(0.214)
No primary schooling b -0.203**
(0.100)
-0.012
(0.112)
0.032
(0.247)
Primary Schooling b -0.024
(0.108)
-0.124
 (0.102)
-0.175
(0.247)
 Middle Schooling b -0.119
(0.131)
-0.074
(0.132)
-0.132
(0.243)
Trust -0.017
(0.032)
-0.050*
(0.030)
-0.015
(0.061)
Number of other organizations 0.001
(0.042)
-0.025
(0.072)
-0.094
(0.112)
Male Member b 0.368***
(0.083)
0.460***
(0.167)
-0.302
(0.335)
Endogeneity test for 
endogenous regressors
4.959**
(0.03)
3.525*
(0.06)
0.0408
(0.52)
First-stage F-statistic 9.44***
(0.01)
9.10***
(0.01)
7.96**
N 387 388 385
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 a) Size in acres. b) Dummy Variables. Notes: Within the procedure we partial 
the constant, the household size, age, and dummy variables for Hindus, a pucca house (made of permanent 
material), a pucca house in weaker sector housing schemes, and a semi-pucca house (either wall or roof 
made of permanent material) out of our IV regression analyses, because the number of clusters is 
insufficient to calculate the optimal weighing matrix for GMM estimation. The coefficients corresponding 
to these regressors are not calculated, but by the Frisch-Waugh-Level theorem, in two-step GMM 
estimation the coefficients for the remaining regressors are the same (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). 
Female membership instrumented by the percentage of the same caste. Standard errors in parentheses 
and robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. P-Value of Chi-squared in parentheses 
for endogeneity test and F-statistic. 
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Table 5.5    GMM	instrumental	variable	regression	analysis	to	explain	women’s	
autonomy	with	two	instruments
Concrete Women’s Autonomy Abstract 
Women’s 
Autonomy
Autonomy to  
go to the market
Autonomy to  
go to the doctor
Control over  
own life
Female Member b 0.660***
(0.215)
0.732*
(0.391)
-0.561
(0.755)
Bolangir b -0.074
(0.089)
0.224***
(0.082)
                 -1.138***
                 (0.143)
Land size b 0.002
(0.005)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.001
(0.008)
Owner of house b 0.000
(0.134)
0.023
(0.134)
-0.060
(0.150)
Percentage Scheduled Caste 0.169
(0.142)
0.117
(0.155)
0.271
(0.287)
Percentage Scheduled Tribe 0.068
(0.024)
0.107
(0.142)
0.041
(0.509)
Scheduled Caste b -0.170**
(0.076)
-0.199*
(0.117)
0.091
(0.345)
Scheduled Tribe b -0.116**
(0.055)
-0.175
(0.180)
0.064
(0.328)
Backward Caste b -0.017
(0.031)
-0.102
(0.060)
-0.086
(0.253)
Illiterate b -0.027
(0.108)
-0.059
(0.113)
-0.308
(0.215)
No primary schooling b -0.189**
(0.093)
-0.025
(0.104)
0.042
(0.244)
Primary Schooling b -0.006
(0.083)
-0.113
 (0.100)
-0.100
(0.232)
 Middle Schooling b -0.095
(0.116)
-0.040
(0.126)
-0.118
(0.240)
Trust -0.019
(0.031)
-0.051*
(0.028)
-0.012
(0.060)
Number of other organizations -0.002
(0.039)
-0.044
(0.063)
-0.091
(0.113)
Male Member b 0.365***
(0.081)
0.405***
(0.153)
-0.322
(0.329)
Endogeneity test for 
endogenous regressors
4.774**
(0.03)
1.881
(0.17)
0.555
(0.46)
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 By triangulating the findings from PSM and IV regression analyses, we find 
mixed evidence for our hypothesis that SHG membership is causally linked to 
autonomy. Our qualitative evidence discussed earlier suggests that SHG members 
have become more autonomous as a result of their membership in SHGs. Taking into 
account the conservativeness of our impact estimates, we argue that these findings 
are indicative of a positive causal impact of SHG membership on autonomy. The 
results fit the idea that SHGs legitimise the transgression of gender norms, as 
hypothesised in our analytical framework. However, even if the differences in 
gender norms between SHG members and non-members cannot be causally linked 
to SHG membership, which requires some statistical assumptions, our PSM 
procedure to estimate the heterogeneous impact of SHG membership on SWB 
would still produce reliable evidence of the utility gains and losses of breaking 
gender norms.  
Table 5.5    Continued
Concrete Women’s Autonomy Abstract 
Women’s 
Autonomy
Autonomy to  
go to the market
Autonomy to  
go to the doctor
Control over  
own life
First-stage F-statistic 5.41** 5.23**
(0.02)
5.26**
Hansen J Statistics 0.205
(0.65)
2.108
(0.15)
0.046
(0.83)
N 387 388 385
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 a) Size in acres. b) Dummy Variables. Notes: Within the procedure we partial 
the constant, the household size, age, and dummy variables for Hindus, a pucca house (made of permanent 
material), a pucca house in weaker sector housing schemes, and a semi-pucca house (either wall or roof 
made of permanent material) out of our IV regression analyses, because the number of clusters is 
insufficient to calculate the optimal weighing matrix for GMM estimation. The coefficients corresponding 
to these regressors are not calculated, but by the Frisch-Waugh-Level theorem, in two-step GMM 
estimation the coefficients for the remaining regressors are the same (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). 
Female membership instrumented by the percentage of the same caste and an interaction between the 
percentage of the same caste and a dummy, which is 1 when the difference between the respondent’s age 
and the median age of female respondents of their own caste at the village level is smaller than 10 years. 
Standard errors in parentheses and robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. P-Value 
of Chi-squared in parentheses for endogeneity test and Hansen J test. 
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5.4.4. The impact of SHG membership on subjective well-being
Using the same specifications as in our PSM procedure to estimate the impact of 
SHG membership on autonomy, we find no evidence of a significant ATT of SHG 
membership on SWB, neither for kernel matching (ATT=-0.19, S.E.=0.20) nor for 
nearest-neighbour matching with replacement (ATT=-0.32, S.E.=0.27).81 On average, 
there do not appear to be large differences between utility gains and losses following 
autonomy, as we described them in Equation 5.3 of our theoretical model. We 
predicted, however, that impact estimates could be positive (negative) in villages 
with relatively liberal (conservative) gender norms. Our descriptive statistics already 
provided some evidence of this heterogeneous relationship. 
Heterogeneous impacts of SHG membership on subjective well-being
To test whether identity losses are higher for SHG members in villages with relatively 
conservative gender norms, we divide our sample in two groups: a group of women in 
villages with relatively high and relatively low levels of autonomy for female non-SHG 
members. We present probit models to estimate the propensity for sub-samples of 
women in villages with conservative and liberal gender norms in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5.6, respectively. In our PSM procedure, we follow the advice of Dehejia (2005) to 
estimate different models for each treatment group-comparison group combination, 
to ensure that the balancing condition will be fulfilled in every sub-sample.82 
Admittedly somewhat arbitrarily, we define a village with a conservative gender norm 
as a village in which the mean of the autonomy to go to the market and the autonomy 
to go to the doctor of female non-SHG members at the village level is below 0.35. 
 Our results show that SHG membership has a strong and significant negative 
impact on SWB in villages with relatively conservative gender norms, while the impact 
is far from significant in villages with relatively liberal gender norms. Both nearest 
neighbour and kernel matching in villages with relatively conservative gender norms 
result in negative effects at the 1% significance level. The size of the negative impact 
is remarkably large and consistent across specifications. This finding provides strong 
evidence in support of Equations 5.5 and 5.6 of our theoretical model, which predict 
relatively high levels of agency and relatively low levels of SWB for SHG members in 
villages with relatively conservative gender norms. Using a dynamic analytical 
framework, the result could also be interpreted as an unstable equilibrium with 
reciprocal altruism, resulting in increasing agency and decreasing SWB for SHG 
members in villages with strong sanctioning mechanisms and with few or no 
empowerment spillovers to non-SHG members. 
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Table 5.6   Propensity	score	matching	to	explain	subjective	well-being
(1) Logit Model for 
Conservative  Gender Norm
(2) Logit Model for Liberal  
Gender Norm
Bolangir b -0.062
(0.439)
0.654
 (1.589)
Percentage of the same caste b 1.556**
(0.607)
1.563
(1.367)
Difference with  median age 
in village 
-0.030**
(0.015)
-0.041*
(0.023)
Land size a 0.023
(0.024)
0.069
(0.061)
Ownership house b 0.733
(0.501)
0.427
(0.783)
Pucca b, c -0.115
(0.560)
1.573**
(0.749)
Semi-pucca  b, d -0.552
(0.341)
-0.286
(0.501)
Pucca weak-sector housing b, e 0.397
(0.341)
-0.353
(0.576)
Household size -0.011
(0.052)
0.179*
(0.101)
Age 0.017
(0.012)
0.027*
(0.015)
Hindu b Non-Hindus Outside Common 
Support
-0.264
(0.929)
Oriya b Collinear 1.576
(1.229)
Scheduled caste b -0.487
(0.474)
-0.946
(1.131)
Scheduled tribe b -0.956*
(0.554)
-3.554**
(1.509)
Backward caste b -0.240
(0.432)
-0.118
(0.770)
Illiterate b 0.597
(0.621)
-0.932
(0.768)
No primary schooling b 0.490
(0.648)
-0.699
(0.730)
Primary schooling b 0.690
(0.609)
-0.103
(0.668)
Middle schooling b 1.036*
(0.621)
-0.366
(0.800)
Illiterate men b -0.550
(0.490)
3.016***
(1.130)
No primary schooling men b 0.163
(0.443)
-0.557
(0.705)
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 Using a male-based proxy for conservativeness of gender norms does not result 
in qualitatively different findings. We construct this male-based proxy by estimating 
the mean level of tolerance regarding women’s autonomy of husbands of non-SHG 
members at the village level. Both nearest neighbour (ATT=-0.53, S.E.=0.29) and 
Table 5.6   Continued
(1) Logit Model for 
Conservative  Gender Norm
(2) Logit Model for Liberal  
Gender Norm
Primary schooling men b 0.166
(0.352)
-0.490
(0.532)
Middle schooling men b 0.014
(0.323)
0.093
(0.513)
Number missed days 0.053
(0.036)
-0.211**
(0.085)
Trust 0.072
(0.099)
0.625***
(0.180)
Trust men -0.335
(0.601)
-2.296
(3.109)
Trust  women 0.366
(0.594)
-1.193
(4.707)
Trust men in women 0.268
(0.425)
2.482
(1.819)
Trust women in women -0.124
(0.838)
-0.508
(1.281)
Happiness man -0.141
(0.101)
-0.061
(0.142)
Perceived control man 0.094
(0.093)
0.249
(0.158)
Male membership b -2.268***
(0.489)
Outside Common Support
Constant -2.865
(3.098)
-3.826
(10.900)
Pseudo R2 0.323 0.368
N 233 134
Common Support 226 116
Matching Algorithm N.N. Kernel N.N. Kernel
ATT -0.852***
(0.269)
-0.671***
(0.287)
0.220
(0.456)
0.031
(0.629)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a) Size in acres. b) Dummy Variables c) Pucca house (made of permanent 
material) d) Semi-pucca house (either wall or roof made out of permanent material e) Pucca house (made 
of permanent material) in weak-sector housing scheme. Notes: N.N. =Nearest Neighbour Matching 
Algorithm. Standard errors in parentheses and bootstrapped with 100 replications for the ATT. Significance 
levels based on Bias-Corrected confidence intervals. 
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kernel (ATT=-0.52, S.E.=0.30) matching result in negative impact estimates of SHG 
membership on SWB at the 5% significance level in villages where the mean level of 
male attitudes towards women’s autonomy at the village level is lower than 0.45. In 
villages with mean levels above this threshold, we find positive but non-significant 
effects of SHG membership on SWB. 
5.5. Robustness checks
This section serves to check the robustness of the heterogeneous impact of SHG 
membership on SWB to the assumptions of the empirical model. First, the negative 
heterogeneous impact on SWB could be biased as a result of the cherry picking of 
the “right threshold” for the conservativeness of the gender norm. However, we find 
strong evidence of heterogeneous impacts of SHG membership on SWB using a 
linear propensity-adjusted regression model. The discussed regression model 
includes a dummy for SHG membership, the mean of the indicated level of autonomy 
to go to the market and the doctor of female non-SHG members at the village level, 
an interaction between a dummy for SHG membership and the mean of the 
indicated level of autonomy of female non-SHG members at the village level and the 
estimated propensity from the full model as explanatory variables of SWB and 
excludes the observations outside the common support. As presented in Figure 5.1, 
the estimated marginal effect of SHG membership on SWB is negative and strongly 
significant in villages with relatively conservative gender norms and increases with 
the liberalness of the gender norm, eventually resulting in positive significant 
impacts in villages with very liberal gender norms. The finding indicates that the 
impact of SHG membership on SWB is positive in villages with very liberal gender 
norms.    
  Second, the heterogeneous impact could be biased by a reflection problem, in 
the sense that the attitudes of non-SHG members reflect the attitudes of the SHG 
members themselves. This argument can be countered by including the mean of the 
indicated level of autonomy of female SHG members at the village level and its 
interaction with a dummy for SHG membership in the previously discussed propen-
sity-adjusted regression model. Although the levels of autonomy of SHG members 
and non-members are correlated with each other, the impact of SHG membership 
on SWB only increases significantly with the level of autonomy of non-members, 
which suggests that the possible reflection problem does not bias our results.  
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  Third, so far, we did not include indicators related to male tolerance of women’s 
autonomy as control variables in our matching equation, because they are potentially 
endogenous. However, if women with husbands with relatively liberal values face 
fewer SHG entry constraints, the results of the PSM model could be biased as a 
result of the omission of indicators related to male tolerance of women’s autonomy. 
To account for this possible bias, we include male tolerance of women’s autonomy to 
go to the market, visit the doctor and visit community meetings in our probit model 
for estimating the propensity score. Including these indicators in the matching 
equation should result in conservative impact estimates. After controlling for male 
tolerance of women’s autonomy, both nearest neighbour (ATT=-0.58, S.E. =0.48) 
and kernel matching (ATT=-0.58, S.E. =0.36) estimates are no longer significant in 
villages with relatively conservative gender norms. However, this has to do with a 
loss of statistical power as a result of twelve missing values for male tolerance of 
women’s autonomy. In villages with an indicated level of autonomy of non-SHG 
members below 0.45 both nearest neighbour (ATT=-0.66, S.E. =0.44) and kernel 
matching (ATT=-0.45, S.E. =0.33) result in negative significant impacts of SHG 
membership on SWB at the 5% level when we include indicators of male tolerance of 
women’s autonomy in the model, because of an increase in sample size compared to 
the sample in villages with an indicated level of autonomy of non-SHG members 
below 0.35. In villages with an indicated level of autonomy of non-SHG members 
above 0.45, the estimated impact of SHG membership on SWB is positive but non-
significant. Hence, controlling for male attitudes does not result in qualitatively 
different findings, despite the potential conservatism in the impact estimates.   
 The results of our estimation strategy could also be sensitive to the inclusion of 
other forms of unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore we estimate the sensitivity of 
the heterogeneous negative impact on SWB in villages with a mean of the indicated 
level of freedom to go to the market/doctor of female non-SHG members below 0.35 
to unobserved heterogeneity with the help of the Rosenbaum bounds discussed 
earlier. For this purpose we apply the approach of DiPrete and Gangl (2005) who 
developed a Stata program (rbounds) to estimate the sensitivity of treatment 
effects from PSM to unobservables. The results demonstrate that the significantly 
lower SWB for SHG members in relatively conservative villages is quite robust to the 
inclusion of unobserved heterogeneity for the small sample we use.83 The difference 
between SHG members and non-members remains significant at the 10% level for 
relatively large magnitudes of unobserved heterogeneity. An unobserved variable 
that would cause the odds ratio of SHG membership to differ between SHG members 
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and non-members by a factor of 1.13 would not be powerful enough to undermine a 
significant negative effect of SHG membership on SWB.   
 Additionally, unobserved heterogeneous characteristics should have very 
different effects in villages with relatively conservative than in villages with 
relatively liberal gender norms to explain our research findings. Although we cannot 
rule out this possibility, alternative explanations of a link between SHG membership 
and SWB are either consistent with positive or with negative correlations between 
SHG membership and SWB. First, the economic benefits of SHG membership could 
explain the positive relationship between SHG membership and SWB in villages 
with very liberal gender norms, but not the negative relationship between SHG 
membership and SWB in villages with relatively conservative gender norms. Second, 
overoptimistic expectations regarding economic benefits for SHG members are 
consistent with negative impacts in villages with relatively conservative gender 
norms, but not with positive impacts in villages with relatively liberal gender norms. 
 Finally, the results are mildly robust to the use of a different proxy for the gender 
norm. Equation 5.6 predicts a larger loss of feelings of identity for SHG members in 
villages with relatively strong external sanctioning mechanisms. Therefore we 
perform a sensitivity analysis using a variable that has been shown to be related to 
sanctioning in previous studies. The external sanctioning of violators of gender 
norms is most likely when women are perceived as untrustworthy by non-SHG 
members (Fehr and Falk 2002; Fehr and List 2004). Therefore, we use trust of 
non-SHG members in women at the village level as a proxy for the likelihood that 
autonomous women are sanctioned by other community members. We define the 
threshold below which women are generally perceived as untrustworthy as an 
average level of trust in women of non-SHG members at the village level smaller 
than 3.5. Heterogeneous impacts are derived by performing PSM analyses in villages 
with perceived (un)trustworthy women. In the first instance, the results do not 
point at negative impacts of SHG membership on SWB in villages with relatively low 
trust in women. The impact estimates do not come close to conventional significance 
levels for nearest neighbour (ATT=-0.22, S.E. =0.37) or for kernel matching (ATT=0.01, 
S.E. =0.39) in villages with relatively low trust in women. The impact in villages with 
relatively high trust in women is also far from significant. However, there is some 
evidence that the impact of SHG membership on SWB is negative in villages with 
relatively low trust of men in women. When the average level of trust of male 
non-SHG members in women at the village level is smaller than 3.8, kernel matching 
impact estimates on SWB are negative and significant at the 10% level (ATT=-0.37, 
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S.E. =0.28), while nearest neighbour impact estimates are significant at the 5% 
significance level (ATT=-0.60, S.E. =0.37). This result is in line with our qualitative 
research finding that social sanctioning mechanisms are mainly (but not exclusively) 
executed by men. 
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the literature on empowerment, identity and subjective 
well-being by presenting impact estimates of SHG membership on women’s 
autonomy and SWB in Orissa, India. We relied on attitudinal statements to measure 
women’s autonomy and SWB. Using a triangulation of in-depth interviews, 
propensity score matching and instrumental variable regression analyses, we 
provided mixed evidence of a positive causal impact of SHG membership on 
women’s autonomy. Taking into account the likely underestimation of the impact, 
we argue that the results are indicative for a positive impact of SHG membership on 
women’s autonomy.  
Figure 5.1    Marginal	effect	of	treatment	on	subjective	well-being	as	social	norm	
changes
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 On average, SHG membership in Orissa has no significant impact on SWB. Our 
results nonetheless indicate that there is a significant negative impact on SWB in 
villages with relatively conservative gender norms. Although less convincingly 
demonstrated, the results also provide an indication for positive impacts on SWB in 
villages with relatively liberal gender norms. These results are consistent with a 
model that predicts that identity losses following the transgression of gender norms 
are higher in villages with conservative gender norms. The identity-based 
interpretation of our results is robust to a wide range of specification tests and 
supported by qualitative findings, thus underlining the importance of the 
triangulation of research methods. Our results match other results on the effect of 
social norms on SWB in different contexts, such as the finding that stronger social 
norms to work result in higher losses in subjective well-being for the unemployed 
(Stutzer and Lalive 2004). 
 Enhanced autonomy is not a sufficient condition for increases in women’s SWB 
in the medium run. The utility loss entailed by the failure to conform to the dominant 
gender norm can be so large that agency results in a decline in SWB, particularly if 
gender norms are conservative. In order to ensure that improvements in agency 
coincide with improvements in SWB, village-level investments to change gender 
norms could be more effective than investments at the level of the SHG. From a 
different perspective, Jakimow and Kilby (2006) have also argued that SHG members 
have only limited resources available for the removal of social constraints. It could 
therefore be valuable to integrate SHG programs with gender programs implemented 
at the village level, such as the reservation of seats for women in the village council, 
which has been shown to weaken stereotypes about gender roles (Beaman et al. 
2009).      
 In the long run, the unstable equilibrium with low levels of SWB and high levels 
of agency could also transform the gender norm. Future research could therefore 
focus on the dynamics of gender norms. In addition, future research could also 
concentrate on the estimation of the heterogeneous impact of SHG membership on 
SWB in different contexts and/or through randomised evaluations, to minimise the 
assumptions needed for the impact evaluation.   
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Appendix 5.1
Using the IV regression approach to estimate the impact 
of SHG membership on subjective well-being. 
As discussed in Section 5.4.1, we should not pay too much attention to the IV impact 
estimates on SWB. Taking into account the higher correlation between the 
instrument and SHG membership in relatively liberal villages, the LATE that we 
derive with the IV analysis is likely to be mainly applicable to relatively liberal villages. 
Moreover, the results might be driven by endogeneity of the instruments, because 
of a possible relationship between the instrument and the number of friends of the 
respondents. Nevertheless, for completeness we demonstrate the IV impact 
estimates on SWB using the same specification as for the IV impact estimates on 
autonomy.84 Table 5.7 demonstrates the results. As shown, we find no significant 
LATE of SHG membership on SWB. The relationship appears to be positive but not 
statistically significant. Although we should not pay too much attention to the 
results, they are consistent with the findings from the PSM analyses. In these 
analyses, we also found non-significant but positive relationships between SHG 
membership and SWB in villages with relatively liberal gender norms, to which the 
LATE applies mainly. 
Table 5.7    GMM	instrumental	variable	regression	analysis	to	explain	subjective	
well-being
Happiness
Female Member b 0.519
(0.800)
Bolangir b                  -0.192
                 (0.123)
Land size b 0.003
(0.014)
Owner of house b -0.241
(0.232)
Percentage Scheduled Caste 0.118
(0.356)
Percentage Scheduled Tribe -0.909***
(0.284)
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Table 5.7    Continued
Happiness
Scheduled Caste b -0.129
(0.321)
Scheduled Tribe b 0.386
(0.325)
Backward Caste b 0.035
(0.234)
Illiterate b -0.034
(0.159)
No primary schooling b 0.037
(0.272)
Primary Schooling b -0.380**
(0.181)
 Middle Schooling b -0.405
(0.301)
Trust 0.042
(0.060)
Number of other organizations -0.234*
(0.133)
Male Member b 0.085
(0.366)
Endogeneity test for endogenous regressors 0.750
(0.39)
First-stage F-statistic 7.99**
(0.01)
N 387
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 a) Size in acres. b) Dummy Variables. Notes: Within the procedure we partial 
the constant, the household size, age, and dummy variables for Hindus, a pucca house (made of permanent 
material), a pucca house in weaker sector housing schemes, and a semi-pucca house (either wall or roof 
made of permanent material) out of our IV regression analyses, because the number of clusters is 
insufficient to calculate the optimal weighing matrix for GMM estimation. The coefficients corresponding 
to these regressors are not calculated, but by the Frisch-Waugh-Level theorem, in two-step GMM 
estimation the coefficients for the remaining regressors are the same (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman, 2007). 
Female membership instrumented by percentage of the same caste. Standard errors in parentheses and 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the village level. P-Value of Chi-squared in parentheses for 
endogeneity test and Hansen J test. 

6
Do Cash Transfers Crowd Out Community 
Investment in Public Goods?
Lessons from a Field Experiment on Health Education 1
1  This chapter is written based on the paper De Hoop, Thomas; Luuk van Kempen; and Ricardo Fort. 
Forthcoming. “Do Cash Transfers Crowd Out Community Invest in Public Goods? Lessons from a  
Field Experiment on Health Education.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly  
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6.1. Introduction
Aid distributors have traditionally been reluctant to provide cash to beneficiaries. An 
important motivation behind this reluctance was the belief that beneficiaries would 
spend it on immediate consumption goods (Riddell 2007). The past decade, however, 
has shown a recent expansion in (conditional) cash transfer programs, often supported 
by official aid donors. After the introduction of the large-scale conditional cash 
transfer program PROGRESA (now known as Oportunidades) in Mexico in 1997, other 
cash transfer programs were implemented in, amongst others, Colombia, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Turkey (Attanasio et al. 2010). In cash transfer 
programs, payments are usually conditional on children’s participation in schooling. 
In this way, the short-term benefits of cash are complemented by long-term schooling 
benefits. 
 Despite the recent surge in (conditional) cash transfer schemes in official 
development aid, the ultimate recipients of non-governmental aid often do not 
receive aid in cash. Instead, it typically reaches them in the form of public goods and 
services, such as schools, hospitals, boreholes, etc.85 Recently other types of local 
public goods have also been initiated, which we will label “behaviour-oriented NGO 
services”, whereby NGO donor agencies put effort into changing the behaviour of 
beneficiaries by educating, mobilising and empowering village communities (Swidler 
and Watkins 2009). Participatory components are often included in behaviour-ori-
ented NGO services. By having beneficiaries themselves manage the problems in 
their communities, NGOs seek to bring sustainable benefits (Ibid.). The focus of this 
chapter is on educational services aimed at health promotion and disease prevention, 
which is a prominent example of an area in which responsibilities are increasingly 
transferred to communities themselves.    
 The intended benefits of behaviour-oriented NGO services usually occur in the 
long run. Possibly for this reason aid distributors tend to assume that beneficiaries’ 
voluntary contributions to this type of public goods will be limited: “The poor, 
especially the poorest, are unlikely to access reproductive health education and 
services without the incentives of immediate benefit” (UNFPA and Microcredit 
Summit Campaign 2009, p.15). Free-rider opportunities supposedly add to the 
disincentives for contributing to behaviour-oriented NGO services. In this chapter 
we test the assumption that transferring cash to beneficiaries would result in low 
investment in local public goods with long-term benefits.   
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 In principle, granting decision-making power regarding public good provision to 
beneficiaries is considered a superior strategy, because the public goods selected by 
the beneficiaries should more closely reflect the preferences of the population they 
are meant to serve (Hoddinott 2002; Kilby 2006; Ostrander 2007). Community- 
driven development initiatives in which beneficiary communities have direct control 
over the management of investment funds show that the channelling of decision-
making power to beneficiaries can, under the right circumstances, improve the 
quality of projects (Mansuri and Rao 2004). A contingent valuation study in Nepal, 
moreover, showed that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have a positive 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health promotion programmes (Borghi and Jan 2008). 
Altruism was identified as one of the main motives for willingness to pay (Ibid.), and 
might thus mitigate the negative effect of myopic preferences on voluntary 
contributions to behaviour-oriented NGO services.86 Despite the encouraging WTP 
study in Nepal, it remains to be seen to what extent beneficiaries actually contribute 
in a revealed preference setting. The current chapter presents such a stricter test by 
conducting a field experiment in a severely deprived area of Lima, Peru. 
 Public good games can be used to observe whether people facing free-riding 
opportunities contribute to behaviour-oriented NGO service provision by adding a 
description of the contents of this public good to the game (see Cárdenas 2004, for 
an example). For public goods that are relatively lumpy and cannot be broken down 
into smaller units, the so-called “threshold” public good game could identify 
voluntary contributions. In this game, a public good of pre-determined size is 
provided only if the sum of contributions equals or exceeds a certain threshold 
(Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 1999). 
       Although the public good game integrates revealed preferences in the investment 
decision, it only includes monetary gains for participants, which does not fit well 
with the type of local public goods that ultimate aid recipients normally receive. It is 
therefore unclear whether field referents can overcome confusion in this game, 
which could result in loss of control at a basic level (Harrison and List 2004). 
Moreover, excluding incentives related to time preferences could result in an 
overestimation of investment levels in public goods with long-term benefits. 
Individual discount rates are generally higher for the poor (Carvalho 2008; Tanaka, 
Camerer, and Nguyen 2010), and the exclusion of these incentives could therefore 
result in an even larger upward bias in developing countries.
 We propose an experimental setup that can be changed depending on the 
contents of the local public good and contains both revealed preferences and 
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incentives related to time preferences, to identify voluntary contributions to local 
public goods with long-term benefits. Rather than investing in a common pool of 
money, participants are asked to contribute to a local public good distributed by an 
NGO, to avoid confusion and loss of control. The participants are informed that the 
local public good will only be distributed if the cumulative sum of investment of 
participants exceeds a certain threshold value, as in the threshold public good game. 
 By using this mechanism, contributions of participants determine whether the 
NGO service will actually be provided, which increases the decision-making power 
of beneficiaries. Contribution rates indicate the degree of compatibility of increased 
decision-making power for beneficiaries with investment in local public goods with 
long-term benefits. It should be noted that public goods that are mainly associated 
with long-term benefits may bring certain short-term gains as well. This is clearly 
the case for health education, for instance, where we can make a distinction 
between decisional and non-decisional value. The long-term health benefits could 
be seen as the decisional value of health education (Borghi and Jan 2008). The 
non-decisional value of the same is linked to the learning element and could include 
a decreased concern for disease incidence, increased self-esteem, improved social 
status and an entertainment value, or simply the joy of learning (Drèze and Kingdon 
2001;Borghi and Jan 2008). Hence, non-decisional value represents the value of 
information from health education for its own sake (Borghi and Jan 2008), while 
decisional value can be considered the value of the impact on health of an increase 
in information.  The non-decisional value is likely to be larger, the stronger the 
participatory character of behaviour-oriented NGO services, and should positively 
affect voluntary contributions.  
 In order to be able to distinguish the factors influencing contributions to behav-
iour-oriented NGO services from the factors influencing contributions to similar 
programs without a participatory component, we contrast health education in our 
experiment with a program that finances the distribution of milk to school-age 
children (Vaso de Leche, henceforth abbreviated to VdL). The VdL program is a State-
organised national program, but is run at the local level by women in the community. 
The program provides milk to children and pregnant mothers. Administrative 
committees oversee the procurement and monitor the distribution of milk and 
other food supplies to the beneficiaries of the program (Clark and Laurie 2000). 
Participants in the experiment will also be asked to donate to the VdL program. The 
comparison allows the determination of the relative importance of the non-decisional 
value of health education in the investment decision, since the VdL program contains 
198 | Chapter 6
less non-decisional value due to the lack of short-term learning benefits. The VdL 
program can be considered a public good that solely generates long-term health 
benefits.   
 In our experimental setup we observe that people are willing to contribute a 
positive and substantial amount of money to health education. More than 50% of 
the available money is invested. Although donations to VdL are significantly lower 
than to health education, people also appear to be willing to donate a substantial 
amount of money to the VdL program. Although our experiment provides only a first 
indication, we argue that it appears premature, if not unwarranted, to assume that 
disbursing cash directly to aid beneficiaries will not result in investments in local 
public goods with long-term benefits. The contribution rates in our experiment 
starkly contrast with the pessimistic assumption of aid distributors about voluntary 
contributions to behaviour-oriented NGO services. As discussed before, the UNFPA 
and the Microcredit summit campaign (2009) suggest that beneficiaries need 
incentives of immediate benefit to be interested in participation in health education. 
This pessimism is not exclusive to these organisations. The local NGO that has been 
in close contact with the community where the experiment was conducted for a 
considerable period also did not expect that participants in our experiment would 
make any significant contribution to health education.
  All participants in the experiment were also included in a recent household 
survey. Contribution rates in the experiment could therefore be related to individual 
and household-level characteristics. Time preferences appear to play a role in the 
investment decision, but only for the poorest individuals. Both investment in health 
education and donations to VdL are significantly lower for participants with high 
discount rates, but only if participants’ households have a below-median 
consumption level. The short-term non-decisional value of health education could 
partly explain the lower contributions to VdL. It appears from the analysis that those 
who recognise the short-term benefits of participation are more likely to contribute 
a higher amount to health education than to VdL. In the remainder of the chapter we 
also discuss a number of possible complementary interpretations of our results. 
 The chapter is structured as follows. Literature related to public good provision 
is discussed in Section 6.2. We describe the field experiment in Section 6.3, followed 
by some descriptive statistics about participants and non-participants in Section 
6.4. We then describe and analyse the results of the field experiment in Section 6.5. 
We conclude the chapter with a discussion.     
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6.2.  Preferences in public good provision under 
conditions of poverty
Public good problems are characterised by situations in which individual self interest 
is at odds with group interest. If four participants in a linear public good game are 
each given $5 with the choice to invest some or all in a group project and an 
experimenter doubles the amount of contributions to share equally among the 
participants, game theory predicts that none of the participants will contribute 
anything. This set of strategies (zero contribution rates for each participant) is the 
unique best response to the strategies of all the other players for each participant 
and, therefore, the only Nash equilibrium (Wydick 2008). If this same mechanism 
applies to investment in behaviour-oriented NGO services, game theory would also 
predict zero contribution rates to health education for each beneficiary. Generally, 
linear public good games indicate, however, that total voluntary contributions lie 
between 40 and 60% of the group optimum (Ledyard 1995). These contribution 
rates strongly outbid the game-theoretical solution. However, contribution rates 
still elicit suboptimal provision of the public good.  
 Linear public good games have also been played repeatedly with the same 
participants. Cooper et al. (1996) show that although voluntary contributions of 
college-aged participants in the U.S. are generally positive, they tend to decline over 
time. Repeated public good games generally lead to higher cooperation rates among 
poor participants in Africa and Southeast Asia than among college-aged participants 
in the U.S., however. On the other hand, poor slash-and-burn horticulturalists in 
Peru cooperate less than college-aged participants in the U.S. (Cárdenas and 
Carpenter 2008). It is therefore unclear whether the free-rider problem has stronger 
detrimental effects on investment in public good games in low-income societies.  
 Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker (1989) showed that introducing threshold costs of 
provision of public goods yields multiple Nash equilibria in the public good game. 
With a threshold there is no longer only one best response to the strategies of all the 
other players. Both zero (as in the linear public good game) and positive contributions 
can be Nash equilibria in the threshold public good game. Introducing thresholds in 
public good games could thus result in an increase in voluntary contributions by 
shifting from an equilibrium with zero contributions to one with positive 
contributions. Andreoni (1998) formally shows that zero contributions only strictly 
dominate positive contributions if no person is willing to provide the funds to reach 
the threshold for the public good alone, or if the threshold is too high and there is no 
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private benefit, such as altruism, from contributing. In all other cases, reaching the 
threshold through a contribution of one or more persons can also be a Nash 
equilibrium (Andreoni 1998).    
          Empirical studies on the effect of threshold costs of provision on contributions 
in public good games provide a mixed picture. Croson and Marks (2000) showed 
that the success rate of reaching a threshold varies widely (between 10 and 82%) 
across studies. More recent studies also show inconclusive results. Rondeau and List 
(2008) found higher contributions for higher threshold levels in a fundraising field 
experiment, but the increase in contributions was insignificant. Rauchdobler, 
Sausgruber, and Tyran (2010) showed that imposing thresholds in public good games 
could also result in lower contribution rates. 
 Evidence on the extent of free-rider behaviour in (threshold) public good games is 
clearly inconclusive. Introducing long-term benefits of public goods should, however, 
increase free-riding incentives, especially if players are relatively impatient (high discount 
rates), which is usually the case among poor individuals. People in poorer villages in 
Vietnam were shown to be less patient (Tanaka et al. 2010) and poor households in 
Mexico registered a markedly higher discount rate than relatively rich U.S. households 
(Carvalho 2008). It is also conceivable that myopic preferences matter more to the poor. 
Evidence from Uganda suggests, for example, that poor people invest less in the 
long-term benefits of insecticide-treated bednets, because of liquidity constraints 
(Hoffman, Barrett, and Just 2009). Introducing long-term benefits in public good games 
could therefore result in strong declines in voluntary contributions in developing 
countries. Community-driven development, in which beneficiary communities have 
direct control over the management of investment funds (Mansuri and Rao 2004), 
might thus cause the crowding out of public goods with long-term benefits.  
 Time-inconsistent preferences could also lead to lower investment in long-term 
benefits if self-control is inadequate (Laibson 1997). Evidence of time-inconsistent 
preferences has been gathered in such diverse places as Kenya and India. Farmers in 
Kenya were shown not to save for investing in fertilisers, even if this investment was 
presumed to be highly profitable (Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2008). Small 
time-limited reductions in the cost of purchasing fertiliser at the time of harvest did, 
however, lead to large increases in fertiliser use (Duflo et al. 2011). Mothers in India 
were also shown to be reluctant to have their children vaccinated, despite obvious 
long-term benefits. A complementary food staple gift was nevertheless sufficient 
to cause an increase in the number of vaccinations (Banerjee et al. 2010). Apparently, 
a very small short-term incentive was able to reduce self-control problems significantly. 
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Problems of self-control tend to be more acute for the poor than for the wealthy. The 
wealthy have the possibility to resist the purchase of consumer goods in the presence 
of time-inconsistent preferences, by holding their wealth in non-liquid assets. The 
poor often do not have this option (Mullainathan 2007). 
 As discussed in the introduction, public investment may also induce altruism. 
This holds especially for investment in the health of others. Altruism has been found 
to be paternalistic with respect to health. When participants in an experiment could 
either donate money or nicotine patches to a smoking diabetes patient whose 
willingness to pay for nicotine patches is positive but below the market price, more 
than 90% of the donations were given in kind rather than in cash (Jacobsson, 
Johannesson, and Borgquist 2007). Participants in our experiment who perceive 
others as gaining more from health education might therefore benefit more from 
participation of others in health education than from direct monetary benefits for 
themselves. Paternalistic altruism might thus mitigate the negative effect of myopic 
or time-inconsistent preferences on contributions to health education. 
 Another factor that might mitigate negative effects on voluntary contributions 
is social norm activation. Fehr and Gächter (2000a) argue that the public good game 
could be seen as an approximation of how social norms are maintained and 
established. Participants who do not voluntarily contribute to the public good could 
be seen as violators of the social norm to contribute. The social norm that everybody 
should make a contribution could thus have a positive impact on contributions to 
health education. This social norm could be activated by the explicit mention of a 
choice between consumption of private goods and investment in public goods with 
long-term benefits. Sometimes people do not voluntarily contribute because they 
are not given the choice (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). Our field experiment provides 
insight in the likelihood that cash transfers would be partially allocated to local 
public goods with long-term benefits, when beneficiaries are explicitly told that 
they have the choice to allocate their endowment to this type of public goods. 
 In short, previous studies have shown that voluntary contributions to public 
goods can be substantial under the right circumstances. It still remains unclear, 
however, whether beneficiaries will also contribute substantial amounts of money 
to local public goods with long-term benefits. Factors that could influence voluntary 
contributions to local public goods with long-term benefits are free-rider behaviour, 
threshold costs of provision, liquidity constraints, time preferences, (paternalistic) 
altruism and social norms. These factors will be discussed in the interpretation of 
our results in Section 6.5.3.   
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6.3. The field experiment
6.3.1. Background
Participants in the experiment were selected from a baseline survey we carried out 
one year prior to the experiment among 400 households consisting of 1719 
individuals in Lomo de Corvina, a slum settlement in the district of Villa El Salvador, 
located in the south-western part of Lima. Lomo de Corvina represents an area first 
settled in 1994, but which saw its largest expansion only after 2002. Compared to 
other sectors of Villa El Salvador, which emerged as a consequence of a relocation 
operation from invaded lands in 1971, Lomo de Corvina hosts a number of relatively 
young settlements, which is reflected in poor access to public services, even by local 
standards, for its estimated fifty thousand residents. 
 For example, piped water supply is virtually absent in Lomo de Corvina (although 
its construction is at an advanced stage), while 76% of the households in Villa El 
Salvador were receiving piped water in 2005 and 2004, respectively (INEI 2005). Data 
from 2005 also show that 17.9% of the households in Villa El Salvador obtained water 
from cistern-trucks (Ibid.). This percentage is 81% in Lomo de Corvina, which contrasts 
unfavourably even with the level of dependence on cistern-trucks (68%) of those 
living in conditions of extreme poverty in the whole of Villa El Salvador (Ibid.). 
 Given the lack of a proper water supply, it is not surprising that the incidence of 
water-borne diseases is high. Forty percent of the children under 5 years old in our 
sample had suffered from diarrhea in the last year. In such an environment, 
preventive behaviour (e.g. improved hygiene practices such as hand washing) can be 
an important strategy to improve health. Health education is one of the strategies 
that NGOs use to encourage preventive behaviour. Although health benefits from 
education are long-term and uncertain, it could be an effective strategy in an 
environment such as Villa El Salvador. 
6.3.2. Participant selection
From our database (excluding persons living far away from the primary school 
where we organised the experiment), we selected 163 persons at random and 
invited them for an experiment.87 We only invited one person per household.88 In a 
formal letter we stated that the participants would receive ten Peruvian soles89 for 
their participation in a meeting in which their opinion would be requested, with an 
opportunity to gain additional money during the meeting. The median daily income 
per household member in our sample is equal to 7.5 soles. To gain their trust, 
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participants were invited by the same persons that carried out the survey in 2007. 
The surveyors presented and explained a formal invitation letter personally, and 
came back several times when the person invited was not present at the time of the 
first visit. The experiment was organised on a Sunday, which local residents 
identified as the most appropriate time (church attendance is reportedly low).  
 Out of the 163 selected persons, we were able to invite 108 persons personally 
(67%), 13 persons (8%) had moved and 42 persons (26%) were not found at their 
home. Forty participants were invited for a morning session of the experiment, and 
68 participants were invited for an afternoon session. Persons invited were informed 
that they had been selected to participate in an important community meeting 
regarding health issues. They were not informed about the exact subject of the 
meeting, i.e., education on hygiene practices in relation to water use. 
6.3.3. Experimental design
Out of the 108 invited persons, 50 (46%) showed up for the experiment. The morning 
session counted 16 participants, while the afternoon session involved 34 participants. 
The experiments were scheduled close together to prevent cross-talk. During the 
experiment participants were first updated about an NGO’s request for funds to a 
Dutch organisation, to organise a health education meeting in Villa El Salvador. They 
were informed that this health education meeting would be organised in the week 
after the experiment, in the same primary school where the experiment was 
conducted. The participants were then informed that the NGO would only receive 
money to organise the health education meeting if the people from Villa El Salvador 
showed interest in the program. Subsequently they were told that the NGO decided 
to organise the current meeting to identify the degree of interest in the health 
education meeting. Thereafter, participants were informed about a simple game in 
which they could participate. Next, participants were informed that the health 
education meeting would be about domestic water use to prevent diarrhea. This 
was followed by the announcement that worldwide two million children die from 
diarrhea every year, to inform the participants about the seriousness of the issue. It 
was also mentioned that 40% of the children of 5 years and younger and 20% of the 
adults in Lomo de Corvina had suffered from diarrhea in the last year (a result from 
our survey). Finally, it was reported that health education, in combination with 
nutritional supplements, had led to a reduction of diarrhea by 20% among children 
below five in Mexico (Gertler and Boyce 2001). Although this might be considered 
framing, we believe it could result in more realistic contribution rates in our 
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experiment, as it is common practice for NGOs to provide beneficiaries with 
information about the importance of their projects.
 After having received a participation fee of ten soles, participants were led to a 
central hall in the school. In the central hall, participants were given four envelopes, 
two for the choice on health education and two for the allocation to VdL, and two 
times 20 soles of play money similar to dollars. Each envelope contained the first and 
last name of the participant as recorded from the survey. Participants were given 
the choice of whether and how much of their 20 soles they would invest in the 
health education meeting. Participants in the morning session were informed that 
the health education meeting would continue if 100 soles were collected in total. In 
the afternoon session, the collective price of health education was adjusted to the 
number of participants and was set to 200 soles. Contrary to the experiment of 
Bohm (1972), in which the willingness to pay for a television show was estimated, we 
also would have let people pay if we would not have collected enough money for the 
continuation of the health education meeting. In the experiment of Bohm (1972) the 
goal was to estimate willingness to pay, but without the possibility that participants 
lost money without benefits. The goal of our experiment was to see whether 
contributions to health education are high even when there is a possibility that the 
money is lost. To allow for a comparison, contributions to a different good in the 
form of the VdL program were also requested. Just as in the first experiment, 
participants were given the choice of whether and how much of their 20 soles to 
invest in VdL. Contrary to the first experiment, participants were told that all their 
donations would be transferred to the VdL program. No threshold was introduced in 
this experiment. 
 It was explained that the play money the participants kept would be exchanged 
for real soles after the game in a private room. To prevent wealth effects, the 
decisions in the two experiments were made simultaneously. It was explained that 
only for one of the two decisions would the participants be allowed to keep the 
money they did not invest, and that we would toss a coin in a private room to decide 
for which of the decisions the participants were allowed to keep the money. A 
number of examples were given and a number of questions asked to make sure that 
the participants understood the experiment. After the instruction the participants 
were told to put the respective amounts that they wanted to invest in the health 
education meeting and in VdL in the corresponding envelopes. Envelopes were used 
to guarantee private decision making during the experiment. There were no signs 
that participants misunderstood the procedure (all participants used the correct 
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envelopes, for instance). After the private exchange of play money for soles, 
participants were asked to fill out a small questionnaire. 
6.4. The participants: A particular profile?
Comparing participants with non-participants can give us some idea about the 
likelihood that the low turnout in the experiment presents a bias. Socio-economic 
conditions are slightly worse for the participants in our experiment, which could 
result in a downward bias in the contribution rate in the experiments. At the 
household level, consumption (self-reported sum of expenditures on food and 
non-food items) per capita does not differ significantly for participants and non-
participants in the experiment. Wealth (self-reported sum of the value of durables) 
per capita is, however, significantly lower for participants. Another factor that could 
potentially bias the rate of voluntary contributions is the composition of the 
household. Participants have significantly more children under 6 years old in their 
household, which could result in an upward bias in the contribution rate in the 
experiments. Parents of young children might invest more in health education, 
because of the potential danger of diarrhea for their children. Moreover, we would 
expect a higher contribution to VdL for parents of young children, because the 
eligibility of a household for the VdL program is based on the number of children per 
household (Clark and Laurie 2000).  
 At the individual level our data show that women are overrepresented in the 
experiment and that Catholics and people with Spanish as the first language (as 
compared to an indigenous language) are underrepresented. There are no significant 
differences in age, education and trust (as measured by the level of agreement with 
the statement “Most people can be trusted” on a 5-point Likert scale). With regard 
to health, our results suggest that diarrhea occurrence in the year before the survey 
was significantly lower among participants. There are, however, no significant 
differences in self-reported health (‘1=Very Bad, 5=Very Good’). Descriptive statistics 
of participants and non-participants are presented in Table 6.1. 
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6.5. Results
6.5.1. Investment in health education and Vaso de Leche
Participants in the experiment contributed substantial shares of their endowment 
to health education. Although only 6.25 soles and 5.88 soles were needed for the 
realisation of the health education meeting in the morning session and the 
afternoon session, respectively, participants donated on average 10.8 soles to ensure 
the organisation of the meeting. The lowest individual contribution to health 
education was 3 soles. There were two participants that donated the maximum 
amount of 20 soles. There were no significant differences in investment in health 
education between participants in the morning and afternoon session (z=0.91, 
Table 6.1			Descriptive	statistics
(1)  
Mean
(2)  
Mean 
Participants
(3)  
Mean Non-
Participants
(4)  
t-test/ Chi2 test a
(1) Consumption per capita 2637.9
(1802.3)
2529.6
(2199.0)
2653.1
(1743.0)
-0.45 b
P=0.65
(2) Wealth per capita 603.2
(1068.4)
346.8
(330.8)
639.0
(1129.5)
1.80 b
P=0.07*
(3) Number of children<6 0.70
(0.75)
0.88
(0.73)
0.68
(0.75)
1.78b
P=0.08*
(4) Male 0.46
(0.50)
0.32
(0.47)
0.47
(0.50)
4.20c
P=0.04**
(5) Age 33.33
(10.01)
33.64
(8.31)
33.31
(10.05)
0.22b
P=0.82
(6) Did not finish secondary school 0.45
(0.50)
0.52
(0.50)
0.44
(0.50)
1.22c
P=0.27
(7) Catholic 0.83
(0.38)
0.72
(0.45)
0.84
(0.37)
4.37c
P=0.04
(8) First language Spanish 0.77
(0.42)
0.66
(0.48)
0.78
(0.42)
3.52c
P=0.06*
(9) Trust 2.05
(0.69)
2.02
(0.71)
2.05
(0.69)
-0.28b
P=0.78
(10) Self-Reported Health 3.28
(0.78)
3.22
(0.84)
3.28
(0.78)
-0.53b
P=0.60
(11) Diarrhea Incidence 0.13
(0.34)
0.04
(0.20)
0.14
(0.35)
4.06c
P=0.04**
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 a) T-values or Chi 2-values are reported in these columns, depending on the 
applicable test.  b) t-value reported c) Pearson Chi 2 reported. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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P=0.36). Although contribution levels are slightly concentrated at the mean and 
right-skewed, a normal distribution of the density plot cannot be rejected (χ2=2.83, 
P=0.24). The contributions to health education are significantly different from 0, 
and even a contribution of 9 soles falls outside the 95% confidence interval of 
investment in health education (9.61-11.98 soles). Figure 6.1 shows the distribution 
of contributions to health education. 
 Donations to VdL were 8.64 soles on average. Only one participant abstained 
from a donation to VdL. A normal distribution of the density plot of donations to VdL 
cannot be rejected (χ2=2.11, P=0.35). Contributions to the health education meeting 
are significantly higher than to VdL (z=4.03, P=0.00). Contributions to VdL are, 
however, also substantial and fall within a 95% confidence interval of 7.42-9.86 
soles for the participants in the experiment. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of 
donations to VdL. 
Figure 6.1   Contributions	to	health	education
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Although contributions to health education and VdL are strongly rank-correlated 
(Rho=0.60, P=0.00), only 13 participants contributed the same amount of money to 
health education as to VdL. The difference in investment purpose, therefore, appears 
to have been sufficiently salient to trigger different responses and to regard the two 
experimental tasks as separate ones.  
6.5.2. Voluntary contributions and participants’ characteristics
Household consumption per capita is not significantly related to contributions to 
health education, but donations to VdL are significantly higher for households with 
a higher consumption level. Both contributions to health education and donations 
to VdL show a significant positive relationship with wealth per capita. The relatively 
low wealth status of participants, which we reported in Section 6.4, has thus most 
likely produced a downward bias in voluntary contributions, which gives extra 
reason to be confident about the high willingness to contribute that we observed. 
Figure 6.2   Donations	to	Vaso	de	Leche
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A downward bias in voluntary contributions could also result from the over-
representation of parents with children of 6 years and younger in the experiment. 
As stated in Section 6.4, we expected that households with more children below 6 
years old would contribute more to health education and VdL. Surprisingly, however, 
households with more children under 6 years old contribute significantly less to 
both health education and VdL. We also observe that women contribute significantly 
less to both health education and VdL than men, which is in line with the result from 
Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993), who find higher contributions for men in a 
threshold public good game. We find no significant relationships between voluntary 
contributions and age, education, religion, language used in daily life, trust and 
diarrhea incidence. Self-reported health (‘1=Very Bad, 5=Very Good’) is positively 
related to contributions to health education, but the positive relationship with 
donations to VdL is not significant. Table 6.2 provides an overview of the relationships 
between voluntary contributions and household characteristics.         
Table 6.2				Relationships	 between	 individual	 and	 household	 characteristics	 and	
voluntary	contributions	to	health	education	and	donations	to	Vaso	de	
Leche,	respectively
(1)  
Mean
(2) 
Standard 
Deviation
(3)  
Relationship 
with Voluntary 
Contributions to 
Health Education
(4)  
Relationship  
with Donations 
to VdL
(1) Consumption per capita 2529.62 2199.01 Rho=0.20, P=0.18 Rho=0.25, P=0.09*
(2) Wealth per capita 346.83 330.81 Rho=0.25, P=0.09* Rho=0.29, P=0.04**
(3) Number of children<6 0.88 0.73 Rho=-0.25, P=0.08* Rho=-0.29, P=0.04**
(4) Male 0.32 0.47 z=3.03, P=0.00*** z=2.78, P=0.00***
(5) Age 33.64 8.31 Rho=0.12, P=0.40 Rho=0.11, P=0.46
(6) Did not finish secondary school 0.46 0.54 z=0.37, P=0.75 z=0.45, P=0.65
(7) Catholic 0.72 0.45 Z=-1.03, P=0.30 z=-0.92, P=0.36
(8) First language Spanish 0.66 0.48 Z=-0.35, P=0.73 z=-1.48, P=0.14
(9) Trust 2.02 0.71 Rho=-0.12, P=0.41 Rho=-0.10, P=0.49
(10) Self-Reported Health 3.28 0.78 Rho=0.37, P=0.01** Rho=0.21, P=0.16
(11) Diarrhea Incidence 0.04 0.20 Z=0.08, P=0.94 z=0.40, P=0.69
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: Rho indicates a relationship derived from a Spearman rank correlation and  
z indicates a relationship derived from a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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6.5.3. Explaining donations to health education and Vaso de Leche
Given the predominantly long-term nature of the benefits, the incentives for 
free-rider behaviour and the acute poverty of the participants, the question arises as 
to how the result that beneficiaries are willing to contribute substantial amounts of 
money to health education (and to a lesser extent to VdL as well) can be explained. 
The relatively high voluntary contributions could be related to the participation fee 
and the experimental endowment that participants received at the start of the 
experiment. If this is the case, liquidity constraints to finance local public goods with 
long-term benefits could be partly relaxed by cash transfer programs. There are, 
however, a number of complementary explanations that we will discuss in the 
remainder of this chapter. We will first review some possible explanations for the 
higher contributions to health education than to VdL. 
 First, the higher amount of contributions to health education than to VdL could 
be related to the introduction of threshold costs of provision. As shown in Section 
6.2, imposing a threshold could result in higher voluntary contributions to public 
goods. However, Section 6.2 also showed that empirical evidence about the impact 
of imposing thresholds in public good games is mixed. Moreover, free-rider 
behaviour still limits the ability to reach the aggregate valuation of the public good 
in both experiments. It is therefore unclear whether differences in contributions to 
health education and VdL are related to the introduction of a threshold in the 
experiment related to health education. Our data unfortunately do not allow us to 
test for this relationship. 
 Second, the higher contributions to health education might be related to the 
information that participants received at the outset of the experiment about the 
effectiveness of health education in Mexico. The information has most likely led to 
less ambiguity about the benefits of health education.90 This interpretation is to 
some extent supported by the finding that 44 participants in our experiment (88%) 
agreed or highly agreed with the statement that they liked meetings in the 
community, because they learned a lot from these meetings. 
 Learning benefits, which we labelled as one of the components of the 
non-decisional value of health education in our introduction, could be seen as 
positive returns on investment in health education in the short run and are a 
potential third reason for higher contributions to health education than to VdL. We 
will explore the relationship between learning benefits and the differences in 
investment levels to health education and VdL in subsequent stages of this chapter. 
We first take a closer look at the relationship between time preferences and 
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contributions to health education and VdL. As discussed in Section 6.2, this 
relationship might be stronger for the poor because of liquidity constraints. 
Short-term benefits could, however, result in a relatively weak relationship between 
time preferences and contributions to health education. One would expect a 
stronger relationship between time preferences and donations to VdL, because of 
the lower non-decisional value of the VdL program.      
Voluntary contributions and time preferences
In order to test whether contributions vary systematically with respondents’ degree 
of (im)patience, we inferred stated time preferences in two ways. First, we asked 
participants in the experiment whether they preferred 30 soles today or 39 soles 
tomorrow. Those who preferred 30 soles today (39 soles tomorrow) are considered 
to have a high (low) discount rate. Second, we also tried to distinguish time 
preferences related to health from “financial” time preferences by asking participants 
whether they would prefer a drug against diarrhea today that guaranteed protection 
from diarrhea for one year, or a drug against diarrhea next year that guaranteed 
protection from diarrhea for one year and a half.91 Participants with high discount 
rates related to health would prefer the medicine against diarrhea today.92 These 
questions only provide us with dichotomous data, whereas we would ideally like to 
have more detailed information. We believe, however, that our measures of time 
preferences can give us a reasonable proxy for this exploratory study.    
 Wilcoxon rank sum tests do not show significantly lower investment in health 
education for participants with high “financial” discount rates or high discount rates 
related to health. We also do not find a significant relationship between “financial” 
time preferences and donations to VdL or time preferences related to health and 
donations to VdL. Rows 1 and 2 of Table 6.3 present the relationships between time 
preferences and investment in health education and donations to VdL, respectively. 
As stated in Section 6.2, time preferences could have different implications for the 
poor than for the rich. To test whether time preferences have a differential impact 
on voluntary contributions for participants belonging to the poorest households 
relative to participants in not-so-poor ones, we divide our experimental pool in two 
groups: 1) participants with a per capita consumption level above the median 
consumption level in the complete sample population (n=25), and 2) participants 
with per capita consumption below the median (n=25). 
 Wilcoxon rank sum tests for the two subsamples confirm our hypothesis that 
investment in health education is significantly lower for the participants with high 
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“financial” discount rates in the poorer subsample. Apparently, the short-term 
non-decisional value of health education does not fully mitigate the negative effect 
of impatience on investment in health education among the poorest households. 
However, there appears to be no significant correlation between time preferences 
related to health and investment in health education for the poorest households. 
For participants belonging to the top half of the local income distribution there does 
not appear to be any relationship between contributions to health education and 
“financial” time preferences or time preferences related to health. 
 Results are similar for the relationship between donations to VdL and time 
preferences. Donations are significantly lower for poorer people with high financial 
discount rates, but not for poorer people with a high discount rate regarding health. 
Results are shown in rows 3-6 of Table 6.3.      
Table 6.3				Relationships	between	time	preferences	and	voluntary	contributions	to	
health	education	and	donations	to	Vaso	de	Leche,	respectively
(1)  
Variable
(2)  
Mean
(3)  
Standard 
Deviation
(4)  
Relationship 
with Voluntary 
Contributions to 
Health Education
(5)  
Relationship 
with Donations 
to VdL
(1)  Dummy for high financial 
discount rate
0.5 0.51 z=-1.22, P=0.22 z=-1.63, P=0.10
(2)  Dummy for high discount rate 
related to health
0.64 0.48 z=-0.53, P=0.60 z=-0.24, P=0.81
(3)  Dummy for high financial 
discount rate in relatively poor 
subsample
0.44 0.51 z=-2.23, P=0.02** z=-2.49, P=0.01**
(4)  Dummy for high discount rate 
related to health in relatively 
poor subsample
0.68 0.48 z=-1.03, P=0.31 z=-0.65, P=0.52
(5)  Dummy for high financial 
discount rate in relatively rich 
subsample
0.56 0.51 z=0.28, P=0.78 z=-0.06, P=0.96
(6)  Dummy for high discount rate 
related to health in relatively 
rich subsample
0.60 0.50 z=0.48, P=0.78 z=0.22, P=0.82
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: Z indicates a relationship derived from a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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Short-term benefits of health education
The heterogeneous effect of time preferences on contributions to health education 
and VdL can be interpreted in multiple ways. We already discussed liquidity 
constraints as a possible explanation for the stronger relationship between time 
preferences and voluntary contributions for the poor in Section 6.2. Regarding 
health education, the rather weak relationship between time preferences and 
investment behaviour could also be related to the short-term benefits of health 
education. To analyse this relationship, we relate beliefs about benefits of community 
meetings to the difference between contributions to health education and 
donations to VdL. This difference could be seen as a proxy for the perceived 
importance of the participatory component in health education. Multiple other 
factors could be at play in determining this difference, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter. There is, however, no reason to assume that the positive framing of benefits 
from health education by giving examples from Mexico or a possible threshold 
effect have heterogeneous impacts on the difference between investment in health 
education and donations to VdL. For this reason, we feel that we can meaningfully 
relate beliefs about short-term benefits of health education to the difference 
between investment in health education and donations to VdL, in order to analyse 
the importance of short-term benefits in health education.
 Indicators for beliefs about the short-term benefits of health education were 
operationalised with 5-point Likert scales (‘1=Completely Disagree, 5=Completely 
Agree’). Participants in the experiment were asked for their agreement with the 
following statements: 1) “I like to participate in community meetings because in 
general I learn a lot from these meetings”, 2) “I like to participate in community 
meetings because I meet a lot of people I know during these meetings” and 3) 
“Meetings wherein information is provided could be of more interest to me than for 
the majority of the people in Villa El Salvador”. 
 Spearman rank correlations fail to show any significant relationships between 
on the one hand the difference between investment in health education and 
investment in VdL and on the other the belief in the learning possibilities of meetings, 
the belief in social networking possibilities of meetings and the perception of 
relative benefits of meetings, respectively. Wilcoxon rank sum tests, however, show 
a significantly stronger belief in learning possibilities and a significantly stronger 
perception of relative benefits from meetings for those participants in the 
experiment who contribute at least 1 sol more to health education than to VdL. The 
relationship between a positive difference between investment in health education 
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and donations to VdL and the belief in the social networking possibilities of meetings 
also gravitates towards a positive one. When we define participants with a strong 
belief in the benefits of health education meetings as participants with the 
maximum score of 5 on either the belief in learning possibilities or on the belief in 
social networking possibilities, Wilcoxon rank sum tests show that a strong belief in 
the benefits of health education is even more strongly related to a positive difference 
between investment in health education and donations to VdL. Hence the short-term 
participatory component of the health education appears to play an important role 
in the relatively high contributions to health education. All results are shown in 
Table 6.4.  
Self-control and time-inconsistent preferences
Another potential explanation for the heterogeneous effect of time preferences on 
voluntary contributions concerns the presence of time-inconsistent preferences, 
which may induce problems of self-control. Poverty increases vulnerability in this 
Table 6.4				Relationships	between	beliefs	about	benefits	of	health	education	and	
difference	between	contributions	to	health	education	and	donations	
to	Vaso	de	Leche
(1) Variable (2) 
Mean
(3) 
Standard 
Deviation
(4)  
Spearman Rank 
Correlation  
with 
Contributions  
to Health 
Education – 
Donations  
to VdL
(5)  
Relationship 
with dummy 
for positive 
difference 
between 
Contributions to 
Health Education 
and Donations 
to VdL
(1)  Belief in learning possibilities of 
meetings
3.96 0.95 Rho=0.18, P=0.20 z=1.66, P=0.10*
(2)  Belief in social networking 
possibilities of meetings
3.62 1.07 Rho=0.14, P=0.35 z=1.54, P=0.12
(3)  Perception of relative benefits 
of meetings
3.94 1.16 Rho=0.15, P=0.30 z=1.92, P=0.05*
(4)  Strong belief in benefits of 
health education meetings
0.30 0.46 z=1.25, P=0.21 z=2.49, P=0.01**
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: Rho indicates a relationship derived from a Spearman rank correlation 
and z indicates a relationship derived from a Wilcoxon rank sum test.
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respect, as discussed in Section 6.2. Time-inconsistent preferences could thus have 
a larger negative effect on voluntary contributions for the poorest compared to the 
not-so-poor group.  
 By adding an extra question about time preferences, we were able to distinguish 
between high “financial” discount rates and time-inconsistent “financial” discount 
rates. We asked participants in the experiment whether they preferred 30 soles one 
month after the experiment (36%) or 39 soles one month and one day after the 
experiment (64%). Participants with time-inconsistent preferences (24%) would 
prefer 30 soles today but 39 soles one month and one day after the experiment. If 
the self-control ability of the ‘rich’ is more effective than for the ‘poor’, time-incon-
sistent preferences should have a higher negative impact on investment in public 
goods with long-term benefits for the ‘poor’ than for the ‘rich’. Testing for 
relationships between voluntary contributions with time-inconsistent preferences 
by deriving Wilcoxon rank sum tests, we find weak evidence of lack of self-control 
among the poor as an explanation for the heterogeneous relationship between time 
preferences and voluntary contributions.93 Although relatively poor participants 
with time-inconsistent preferences donate significantly less to VdL than relatively 
poor participants who prefer 30 soles today (z=-2.24, P=0.03), the relationship with 
investment in health education is less clear (z=-1.54, P=0.12). Possibly, the short-term 
non-decisional value of health education mitigated the negative relationship 
between investment in health education and time-inconsistent preferences. 
 
Paternalistic altruism
As discussed in Section 6.2, paternalistic altruism could result in higher contributions 
to health education and VdL, thereby mitigating the negative effect of myopic 
preferences on voluntary contributions to health education and VdL. We use the 
relationship between investment in health education and actual participation in the 
health education meeting organised a week after the experiment to pay closer 
attention to the likelihood that paternalistic altruism resulted in the relatively high 
contributions to health education. Attendees in the health education meeting (46%) 
differ from absentees (54%) in two respects. First, the household consumption level 
of attendees is higher (z=1.94, P=0.05). Second, among attendees, a higher share 
has finished at least secondary school (z=1.77, P=0.08).
 Investment in health education is significantly higher for attendees (z=1.92, 
P=0.06), but a closer look reveals that the relationship is highly non-linear. We 
visualise the non-linear relationship with a non-parametric univariate lowess 
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smooth (see Figure 6.3). It depicts the local relationship between participation and 
investment in health education over parts of their ranges, and shows that attendance 
and investment in health education are only positively correlated for relatively low 
levels of investment in health education. For higher investment levels the 
relationship appears to be negative, as indicated by the inverted U-shape of the 
lowess smooth.   
 Arguably, participants in the experiment with a relatively high investment level 
in health education could be paternalistically altruistic and value future health 
benefits for participants in health education more than monetary benefits for 
themselves. The interpretation of altruism-induced collective action is, however, 
empirically difficult to distinguish from social norm activation. Participants in the 
experiment with a relatively high investment level in health education could also 
have acted for the greater good beyond the individual level to prevent the violation 
of social norms, as discussed in Section 6.2.  
Figure 6.3    Lowess	 smooth	explaining	actual	participation	 in	health	education	
with	voluntary	contributions	to	health	education
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6.6 Discussion
This chapter puts forward a new methodology for the identification of voluntary 
contributions to local public goods with long-term benefits. We incorporated 
revealed preferences in our research design, but rather than playing a traditional 
public good game, we let players contribute to health education offered by an NGO. 
We argue that the experiment is less sensitive to confusion and a lack of control at a 
basic level in developing countries, in which public goods are normally not provided 
in monetary form and often entail long-term benefits. Participants were informed 
that the health education meeting would only materialise if the cumulative sum of 
investment exceeded a certain threshold value. In this way, we were able to 
incorporate long-term health benefits and the bias against matching private money 
with development aid in our experiment. Moreover, we gained a better 
understanding of the possibilities for financing local public goods with long-term 
benefits via cash transfers to beneficiaries. 
 Aid distributors did not expect high voluntary contributions. Pure free-rider 
behaviour is, however, non-existent in our experimental sample and contributions 
to health education are remarkably high. People do not necessarily appear unwilling 
to invest in local public goods with long-term benefits. Results from a complementary 
experiment show that the high contribution rate to health education does not stand 
on its own. Although significantly lower than voluntary contributions to health 
education, donations to the VdL program were positive and substantial.
 The result provides food for thought for aid policy. The relatively high willingness 
to invest in local public goods with long-term benefits invites us to reconsider the 
optimal level of donor control on aid funds. Ostrander (2007) concludes that donor 
control over philanthropy has grown since 1990, which undermines the agency of 
beneficiaries to exercise control over these funds. Our results suggest that a more 
participatory allocation of aid does not inevitably lead to the crowding out of 
projects with long-term benefits by private goods and/or projects generating 
immediate rewards, which would be an additional argument for questioning high 
degrees of donor control over the allocation of philanthropic funds. 
 Only a small fraction of aid is currently given directly to poor people in the form 
of cash (Riddell 2007, p. 407). Cash transfers could reduce liquidity constraints 
considerably for poor people. It might be worthwhile to pilot a program with cash 
transfers, in which beneficiaries are asked to distribute the transfers over private 
goods and different public goods with short-term and/or long-term benefits. So far, 
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poor communities have not often been invited to distribute their resources to public 
goods with long-term benefits. Although community-driven development initiatives 
are growing, they still represent a small proportion of development aid. Our 
experimental results indicate that the poor, when given the choice and without 
liquidity constraints, might invest substantial amounts of money in public goods 
with long-term benefits without losing the agency to exercise control over funds. 
Still, the decision procedure on public goods in our experiment is very different from 
the normal scenario of participatory processes, in which politics might play a larger 
role, introducing the possibility of elite capture by local leaders (Mansuri and Rao 
2004). For this reason, perhaps consideration should be given to increasing the role 
of voting mechanisms in participatory processes. Even if elite capture is not a 
problem, a participatory voting process could still result in significant benefits. 
Olken (2010) shows, for example, that villagers in Indonesia were significantly more 
satisfied with decisions being made through an election in which voters could vote 
for their preferred projects than with decisions being made through representative-
based meetings, while there were hardly any changes in the actual decisions.   
 More generally, our results suggest that a paternalistic attitude of donors 
towards beneficiaries is not without costs. Rather than implementing top-down 
procedures it might be worthwhile to stimulate “choices that are in the best interest 
of beneficiaries” by providing both hard (for example cash to reduce liquidity 
constraints) and soft (nudges to stimulate altruism) incentives as described by 
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) in their essay on libertarian paternalism. Providing small 
incentives is frequently sufficient to induce beneficiaries to make choices that are in 
their best interests (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Using field experiments to identify 
these incentives might be a fruitful research direction for researchers in the domain 
of nonprofit management as well. 
 We have to be cautious in interpreting our results, however. The windfall 
character of the gain for the participants in our experiment could have created an 
upward bias in the sense that the experiment reflects a situation in which 
beneficiaries do not anticipate receiving aid, whereas in fact they often do, and may 
concomitantly raise ex-ante consumption levels. Additionally, strategic behaviour in 
the public good game could have produced a bias in the level of voluntary 
contributions to health education. This bias is, however, not likely to be upward, 
because of possible free-rider behaviour. 
      High discount rates only appear to have detrimental effects on voluntary 
contributions for the most deprived. Arguably, short-term benefits of health 
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education, such as the joy of learning, could be the reason for the relatively weak 
correlation between discount rates and investment in health education. This notion 
is supported by a significant positive relationship between beliefs about short-term 
benefits of health education and a positive difference between contribution to 
health education and donations to VdL. Possibly, long-term benefits of public goods 
should be complemented with short-term benefits, to ensure high levels of 
investment of cash transfers in local public goods with long-term benefits. Several 
complementary interpretations of the behaviour in our experiments can, however, 
be identified, such as time-inconsistent preferences and paternalistic altruism.  
 Independently of the motivation, it remains remarkable that relatively poor 
people are willing to give up a substantial amount of cash income for investment in 
local public goods with long-term benefits. Given the exploratory character of our 
research, more research about the motivations behind this behaviour is clearly 
needed.   

7
Conclusion
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The previous chapters demonstrate how social norms influence the effectiveness of 
development programs and indicate that development programs influence social 
norms through their design. This chapter serves to summarise this evidence and 
discusses the potential academic and policy implications of the research findings.  
 First, we address the main research question, which concerns how social norms 
influence the effectiveness of development programs, followed by an assessment of 
the second research question regarding the direct relationship between the design of 
development programs and social norms. Second, we discuss the main contributions 
of this thesis to the academic literature. For this purpose, we analyse the general 
implications of the findings of this thesis for the debate on the potential trade-off 
between the internal and external validity of rigorous impact evaluations. To what 
extent can we really learn something about development mechanisms from the 
estimation of average and heterogeneous impacts in rigorous impact evaluations? 
 Third, to analyse the policy implications of the findings from this thesis we focus 
on the targeting of development programs. For this purpose we introduce two 
potential new targeting mechanisms related to social norms. We then return to the 
hypothetical villages we described in the introduction to provide context-specific 
policy advice. Within this focus we pay specific attention to the application of the 
most binding constraints framework of Hausmann et al. (2008) at the micro level. 
Finally, we present the limitations of the research findings of this thesis. We 
complement the analyses with some suggestions for future research regarding the 
relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs. 
 
7.1.  Social norms and the effectiveness of  
development programs
This section summarises the findings regarding the relationship between social 
norms and the effectiveness of development programs. Herewith we address the 
first research question of this thesis: 
1)  How do social norms influence the effectiveness of development programs? 
Fehr and Gächter (2000a) define a social norm as “1) a behavioural regularity that is 
2) based on a socially shared belief of how one ought to behave, which triggers 
3) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by informal social sanctions.” 
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We focus on the relationship between the effectiveness of development programs 
and three types of social norms:  1) out-group trust in health providers, 2) in-group 
trust in other community members, and 3) gender norms. Below we summarise the 
hypotheses and findings of this thesis related to these social norms.  
7.1.1. Trust in health providers and the effectiveness of health education
Das and Das (2003) argue that vaccination rates in India are low because of a low 
trust in health providers. Furthermore, evidence from the World Absenteeism Survey 
indicates that health facilities in Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru and 
Uganda are closed 35 percent of the time on average (Chaudhury et al. 2006). This 
relatively high percentage indicates that people sometimes do not trust modern 
health providers for a good reason. Additionally, traditional biomedical beliefs about 
malaria prevention can exacerbate low trust in health providers, especially in 
settings where traditional biomedical beliefs dominate modern biomedical beliefs. 
Adato et al. (2011) demonstrate that traditional biomedical beliefs are negatively 
related to the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programs. This relationship 
could be driven by relatively low trust in health providers for individuals with 
traditional biomedical beliefs. Hence high out-group trust in health providers could 
be regarded as a catalyst for the effectiveness of development programs. 
Nevertheless, until now this hypothesis has not yet been formally tested. To test this 
hypothesis we focus on the specific relationship between trust in health providers 
and the impact of health education on the use of insecticide-treated bednets in the 
setting of rural Ghana, where health education by Catholic hospitals and health 
centres focuses mainly on the prevention of malaria. By testing this hypothesis we 
cover the first sub-question of this thesis:  
1a) How does out-group trust influence the effectiveness of development programs?
In the setting we discuss, several individuals have traditional biomedical beliefs 
about malaria that dominate modern biomedical beliefs. We demonstrate that 
health education is more effective for those individuals with relatively high trust in 
modern health providers. Hence we find evidence in support of the idea that 
participants in health education in Ghana only update their traditional beliefs about 
malaria when their trust in health providers is relatively high. We also find evidence 
of threshold effects. This implies that information asymmetries regarding the 
effectiveness of insecticide-treated bednets can only be solved when trust in health 
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providers exceeds a minimum threshold level. However, we also find an exception to 
this rule. Health education is highly effective for the Kassena-Nankana in the Upper 
East region even though trust in health providers is very low for this ethnic group. 
Apart from this exception, we find strong evidence that social norms, in the form of 
high out-group trust in health providers, can be considered a catalyst for the 
effectiveness of health education. 
7.1.2. In-group trust and the effectiveness of farmer federations
In Tanzania only kinship-related networks generate social effects that result in 
positive externalities in agricultural output (Van den Broeck and Dercon 
forthcoming). Supposedly, these social networks consist of perceivably more 
trustworthy individuals than large distance networks. Moreover, theoretical results 
demonstrate faster social learning in networks with perceivably trustworthy 
network members (Golub and Jackson 2010). Hence there is sufficient reason to 
argue that the dissemination of information by social networks is more effective 
when social network members are perceived as trustworthy. Trust could thus be 
perceived as a catalyst for the effectiveness of development programs. Nevertheless, 
until now this hypothesis has not yet been formally tested. To test this hypothesis 
we focus on the relationship between in-group trust (trust in other community 
members) and the impact of farmer federations in the Indian Himalaya, Uttarakhand. 
This covers the second sub-question of this thesis:  
 1b) How does in-group trust influence the effectiveness of development programs? 
Both tomatoes and French beans can be considered new cash crops in the setting 
we discuss and both crops are promoted by the members of the federation, which 
consists of local community residents. We demonstrate that the federations create 
social networks that disseminate information about tomatoes and French beans, 
resulting in peer effects in crop adoption. 
 Furthermore, we show that the impact of the federation on the adoption of 
French beans increases with household level in-group trust. Hence we provide 
evidence that social networks are more effective when network members are 
perceived as trustworthy. However, we find no relationship between in-group trust 
and the adoption of tomatoes. We also demonstrate that the impact of the 
federation on the adoption of French beans increases with village-level generalised 
trust. Hence both household and community characteristics appear to influence the 
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effectiveness of the federation in the dissemination of information about French 
beans. However, we find no relationship between village-level generalised trust and 
the adoption of tomatoes. 
 The lack of a relationship between trust and the adoption of tomatoes presents 
a puzzle as to why farmers would consider the trustworthiness of their fellow 
community residents in their decision to adopt French beans but not in their decision 
to adopt tomatoes. To explain this finding we put forward an explanation that is 
related to the concepts of risk and ambiguity aversion. In the setting we discuss, the 
prospects for French bean adoption can be considered more ambiguous than the 
prospects for tomato adoption. This ambiguity could strengthen the relationship 
between trust, social networks and crop adoption (Engle-Warnick et al. 2007).94 
Moreover, the demand risks for French beans can also be considered as higher than 
the demand risks for tomatoes, taking into account that tomatoes can be marketed 
in wholesale and local markets. The prospects of French beans on the local market 
are less positive. Hence household-level in-group and village-level generalised trust 
can be considered catalysts for the effectiveness of development programs, but 
only for development programs that stimulate choices with highly risky and 
uncertain (albeit, on average, also more profitable) outcomes.         
7.1.3. Gender norms and the effectiveness of self-help groups
Previous findings from Bangladesh demonstrate that norms concerned with fertility 
changed gradually due to peer effects following a program to stimulate modern 
anti-conception methods (Munshi and Myaux 2006). Hence there exists empirical 
evidence in support of the idea that in the very long term development programs 
can influence gender norms. However, in the short or medium term the challenging 
of gender norms could create anxiety and discomfort for those who break the 
gender norm (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), especially in settings where gender norms 
are relatively conservative. 
 The third hypothesis we assessed covers the relationship between gender norms 
and the effectiveness of self-help groups in Orissa, India. Self-help groups are groups 
of 10 to 20 women initiated by a development agency, which are usually involved in 
saving and credit programs and/or advancing group members’ claims or rights 
(Thorp et al. 2005). Self-help groups can result in the challenging of gender norms 
(e.g. Deininger and Liu 2009a; Bali Swain and Varghese 2009). Nevertheless, in the 
short or medium term self-help groups are unlikely to change the gender norm in 
the wider community. This is confirmed by qualitative accounts in the area of 
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intervention demonstrating that the violation of gender norms by the members of 
self-help groups results in internal sanctioning mechanisms as well as in external 
sanctions by non-members (Van der Velde 2009; Temmink 2009). This could create 
identity losses for members of self-help groups who transgress gender norms. 
Hence we hypothesise that the impact of self-help groups on the subjective 
well-being of their members is negatively related to the conservativeness of the 
gender norm. Conservative gender norms could act as a constraint on the 
effectiveness of development programs. This would be consistent with the findings 
from qualitative analyses of Adato et al. (2011), who demonstrate that conservative 
gender norms are negatively related to the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer 
programs. By testing the hypothesis regarding the relationship between gender 
norms and the effectiveness of self-help groups we treat the third sub-question of 
this thesis:  
1c) How do gender norms influence the effectiveness of development programs?    
Findings from instrumental variable regression analysis suggest that membership in 
self-help groups has a positive impact on women’s autonomy. These findings are 
confirmed by qualitative analyses. The results are mixed, however, since findings 
from propensity score matching indicate that membership of self-help groups and 
women’s autonomy are not related after controlling for observable characteristics. 
Taking into account the very likely underestimation of the impact as derived from 
propensity score matching, we argue that the results still present strong evidence of 
a positive impact of self-help group membership on women’s autonomy. 
 We also find that self-help group membership results in a lower level of 
subjective well-being for women in villages where self-help group non-members 
have relatively conservative values. Hence the chapter demonstrates that 
conservative gender norms can act as a constraint on the effectiveness of self-help 
groups. The results further suggest that self-help group membership engenders 
higher levels of subjective well-being in villages where non-members have relatively 
liberal values. However, these results are less convincingly demonstrated than the 
negative impacts in villages with relatively conservative gender norms. Summarising 
the results discussed above, we find strong evidence in support of the idea that in 
the medium term conservative gender norms can be considered a constraint on the 
effectiveness of development programs, or more specifically the effectiveness of 
self-help groups.  
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 In the long term the village-level gender norm might also be affected by self-help 
groups. In this case, the long-term impact of self-help groups on subjective 
well-being might also be positive in villages with relatively conservative gender 
norms, since the norm might change as a result of the self-help group. However, 
women that transgress the gender norm by enhancing their autonomy could also 
return to their former level of autonomy because social sanctioning mechanisms are 
so severe that the women prefer to behave less autonomously in exchange for 
reduced social sanctions. The empirics of the long-term effects of self-help groups 
on women’s autonomy and subjective well-being are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, Section 7.3 briefly discusses several hypotheses regarding the 
long-term relationship between self-help groups, women’s autonomy and subjective 
well-being.  
7.2.  The design of development programs  
and social norms
This thesis does not merely serve to estimate the relationship between the 
effectiveness of development programs and social norms; we also focus on the 
direct relationship between the design of development programs and social norms. 
Herewith we address the second research question of this thesis:  
2) Does the design of development programs influence social norms in the wider 
community?
For this research question we focus on the relationship between the design of 
development programs and the social norm to cooperate in the wider community in 
a slum area close to Lima, Peru (Villa el Salvador). We hypothesised that the 
introduction of small short-term benefits within the design of health programs is 
positively related to the social norm to cooperate in the provision of health programs 
with supposed long-term benefits. This hypothesis is consistent with the empirical 
finding that small short-term benefits increase the demand for preventive health 
care with supposed long-term benefits in India (Banerjee et al. 2010). 
 To test the hypothesis concerned with small short-term benefits and the social 
norm to cooperate, we designed a framed field experiment to estimate voluntary 
contributions from cash transfers to health education and a program that finances 
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distribution of milk to children of school age. Health education can be considered a 
local public good with supposed long-term health benefits as well as short-term 
learning benefits, while the program that finances distribution of milk to children of 
school age can be considered a public good that solely generates long-term health 
benefits. The findings suggest that, contrary to the beliefs of aid distributors, the 
beneficiaries of development programs are willing to voluntarily contribute a 
substantial amount to health education. Hence substituting top-down development 
programs with cash transfers does not necessarily result in a crowding-out of 
investment in public goods.   
 The results from the field experiment further suggest that short-term learning 
benefits from health education play an important role in the decision of the 
beneficiaries. Although individuals appear to be willing to donate a substantial 
amount of money to the program that finances distribution of milk to children of 
school age, the donations to health education are significantly higher. We argue that 
this difference can be partly explained by the short-term learning benefits of health 
education. 
7.3. Contribution to the literature
7.3.1. Learning about external validity
The results from Chapters 3-5 demonstrate that development programs have a 
higher impact if relevant social norms are conducive, i.e. high trust in health 
providers, high in-group trust or liberal gender norms, at least in the medium term. 
Additionally, the findings from Chapter 6 suggest that the design of development 
programs influences social norms. The question remains as to what we can learn 
about development mechanisms from these findings. Are the findings from the 
different chapters just scattered pieces of context-specific evidence or are we able 
to identify general lessons about the effectiveness of development programs from 
the different case studies we present in this thesis?  
 To answer this question, we need to resume the discussion of the external 
validity of the findings from the impact evaluations. In the introduction, external 
validity was defined as “the validity of inferences about whether a causal relationship 
holds over variations in persons, settings, treatment variables, and measurement 
variables” (Shadish et al. 2002). Internal validity can be defined as “the validity of 
inferences about whether the relationship between two variables is causal” (Ibid.). A 
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number of scholars argue that there is a trade-off between internal and external 
validity and that the weakness of rigorous impact evaluations lies in their external 
validity (e.g., Barrett and Carter 2010; Deaton 2010a; Posner, 2011). At the core, this 
criticism rests on the claim that context matters (Posner, 2011).
 The main contribution made to the literature by this thesis consists of the 
estimation of heterogeneous impacts and their relation with contextual character-
istics in the form of social norms. Deaton (2010a) argues that the estimation of 
heterogeneous impacts from development programs could contribute considerably 
to knowledge about development mechanisms, but only when the heterogeneity in 
the impact estimates is derived from a clear theoretical framework. Additionally, 
Deaton (2010a) recommends the use of theory as derived from behavioural 
economics to explain the findings from impact evaluations. This thesis demonstrates 
the potential of behavioural economics in the estimation of heterogeneous impacts 
and highlights the importance of going beyond the obvious but relatively vague 
notion that context matters. We show that community-level characteristics and 
household-level characteristics that are related to contextual characteristics are 
strongly related to the effectiveness of development programs. With this approach 
we move to the core of the criticism of most rigorous impact evaluations (Posner 
2011), by demonstrating that the estimation of heterogeneous impacts can be 
combined with a focus on contextual characteristics, such as social norms. 
 We show that the findings from impact evaluations are not always externally 
valid and cannot easily be extrapolated to different settings. Nevertheless, by 
combining impact evaluations with the measurement of social norms, the 
heterogeneity in the impact estimates that is related to contextual characteristics 
becomes partly – and, for some projects, to a great extent – predictable. We can 
thus learn something about the external validity of impact estimates from the 
derivation of heterogeneous impacts in a single setting only. It is likely that self-help 
group programs are typically more effective in areas with relatively liberal gender 
norms, at least in the medium term. The findings further suggest that development 
programs aimed at technology adoption will typically have a greater impact in areas 
with relatively high trust. 
 The findings also demonstrate that similar social norms matter for the 
effectiveness of development programs in different geographic areas. We 
demonstrate that two different types of trust are similarly associated with the 
effectiveness of two types of development programs that both aim for the adoption 
of technology (insecticide-treated bednets and new commercial crops) in two very 
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different geographic areas: rural Ghana and the Indian Himalaya. These findings are 
encouraging for the predictive power of trust for the effectiveness of development 
programs aimed at technology adoption. Nevertheless, the type of trust also 
matters for the effectiveness of development programs. To predict the type of trust 
that matters for development effectiveness, institutional knowledge about the 
design of development programs should thus be used carefully.   
7.3.2. Learning about impact trajectories
The results also contribute to the debate about the shape of impact trajectories of 
development programs. For example, we find a non-linear relationship between 
trust in health providers and the effectiveness of health education. Supposedly, 
health education only becomes effective when trust exceeds a certain threshold 
value. This finding contributes empirically to the theoretical discussion of impact 
trajectories of Woolcock (2009), who claims that we know “next to nothing” about 
the impact trajectories of development programs. Arguably, this implies that the 
building of trust in health providers is only complementary to health education 
after trust in health providers has reached a certain threshold level. 
 Similarly, the theoretical results concerned with the long-term relationship 
between self-help group membership, women’s autonomy and the gender norm 
provide some ideas for the shape of the impact trajectories of women empowerment 
programs. The findings we present demonstrate that the gradual change of gender 
norms due to peer effects, as in Bangladesh (Munshi and Myaux 2006), is only one 
possible scenario in the Indian setting we discuss. The theory we present suggests 
that there are two possible long-term equilibria. First, self-help group members 
might respond in a hostile manner to the social sanctioning mechanisms by further 
enhancing their autonomy in relatively conservative villages. Following this process, 
the costs of external sanctioning increase for the sanctioners. Subsequently, 
self-help group non-members will either join self-help groups and become more 
autonomous as a result of their membership or become more autonomous through 
peer effects, as discussed in the studies by Munshi and Myaux (2006) and Deininger 
and Liu (2009a, 2009b). This scenario, in which sanctioning mechanisms are 
followed by hostile responses of autonomous women, would be consistent with the 
behavioural economics model of reciprocal altruism, as discussed by Rabin (1993).     
 Second, initial decreases in subjective well-being for self-help group members 
could also result in a return to the traditional conservative gender norm. Under this 
scenario, women who transgress the gender norm by enhancing their autonomy 
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eventually return to the original level of autonomy because the social sanctioning 
mechanisms are so severe that the women prefer to behave less autonomously in 
exchange for reduced social sanctions. Hence the proposed impact trajectory by 
Woolcock (2009) for social projects with initial negative effects and long-term 
positive effects on women’s autonomy could also turn out differently with 
short-term positive and long-term neutral effects of social projects on women’s 
autonomy. This scenario, in which initially optimistic women become disappointed 
with the severity of sanctioning mechanisms, would be consistent with a model 
with imperfect information about sanctioning mechanisms and overoptimistic 
economic agents, as discussed by Van den Steen (2004). More empirical research 
will be needed to derive the long-term dynamic relationship between self-help 
groups, women’s autonomy and subjective well-being. We argue that the two 
scenarios we present can be useful in deriving the hypotheses for these future 
empirical studies.  
 7.3.3. Methodological contribution
Concerning the perspective on impact evaluation, the findings we present suggest 
that reduced-form approaches to impact evaluation can contribute to the resolution 
of two policy evaluation questions, as posed by Heckman (2010): 1): “evaluating the 
impacts of implemented interventions on outcomes including their impacts on the 
well-being of the treated and the society at large”, and 2) “forecasting the impacts 
(constructing counterfactual states) of interventions implemented in one 
environment in other environments, including impacts on well-being” (pp. 361-362). 
We combine descriptive and single-model studies (Card et al. 2011) with the 
estimation of heterogeneous impacts and relate these to contextual characteristics. 
For this purpose, we apply quasi-experimental methods, which contribute both to 
evaluating the impact of implemented interventions and to forecasting the impact 
of interventions implemented in one environment in other environments. Hence the 
findings we present contribute to solutions to policy evaluation problems related to 
internal and to external validity. Structural approaches to impact evaluation might 
generate more precise estimates of the impact of interventions across environments. 
However, they also suffer from restrictive assumptions, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
These assumptions are likely to be less restrictive when using a reduced-form 
approach to impact evaluation.    
 With regard to the measurement of social norms, we demonstrate that 
attitudinal questions are a meaningful proxy for the actual behaviour of respondents. 
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Trust in health providers and in-group trust appear related to the adoption of insec-
ticide-treated bednets following health education and new crops following 
interaction with fellow farmers, respectively. The research findings also show that it 
is important to make a distinction between different forms of social capital to 
understand the impact of development programs aimed at behavioural change. This 
result points to a comparative advantage for studies that investigate the relationship 
between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs at the micro 
level. At the macro level we would not have been able to distinguish between the 
impact of in-group trust, out-group trust and gender norms on the effectiveness of 
different development programs. Attitudinal questions are, nonetheless, not the 
only way to measure social norms. We show that field experiments are also capable 
of measuring the social norm to cooperate in the provision of local public goods. 
7.4. Policy implications
7.4.1. Scaling up and targeting
Duflo (2004) argues that impact evaluations could play a useful role in the scaling up 
of development programs at the national or international level. Examples of decisions 
on the scaling up of development programs that are based on impact evaluations 
come from India and Mexico. Duflo (2004) reports that hiring second teachers for 
non-formal education centres in India, which typically only have one teacher, did not 
have an effect on test scores. Based on these findings, the implementing NGO 
decided not to scale up the program. In sharp contrast, the Mexican government 
decided to scale up the conditional cash transfer program PROGRESA after the initial 
results were found to be favourable (Duflo 2004; Gaarder 2010). 
 However, when general equilibrium effects are expected after the scaling up of 
development programs, it remains questionable whether findings from small-scale 
impact evaluations can be generalised to the national or international level. Most 
small-scale impact evaluations estimate impacts based on partial equilibria, in 
which prices do not adjust as a result of the program. However, large-scale programs 
could result in changes in prices and wages, as discussed in the study by Attanasio 
et al. (forthcoming) on the impact of PROGRESA on the wages of child labourers. 
Additionally, many other things can change when a program is scaled up, such as 
levels of corruption and the quality of pro-poor targeting (Ravallion 2004; Deaton 
2006).95    
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 Moreover, and most importantly for the research questions in this thesis, Duflo 
(2004, p. 342) also argues that “the very idea of scaling up implies that the same 
programs can work in different environments.” By contrast, the findings from this 
thesis indicate that it is questionable whether the findings from one impact evaluation 
can be extrapolated to different settings, given that contextual characteristics can be 
directly linked to the impact of development programs. This implies that international 
agencies should exercise caution with the scaling up of development programs based 
on average impacts. However, when impact estimates are not likely to be strongly 
related to contextual characteristics and general equilibrium effects are not likely to 
bias impact estimates strongly, findings from impact evaluations of small-scale 
programs could be useful in the decision to scale up development programs. For 
example, impact evaluations of deworming programs in Kenya and India both suggest 
high average positive impacts of deworming, with little evidence of heterogeneous 
impacts related to contextual characteristics (Miguel and Kremer 2004; Bobonis et al. 
2006). Following these results, policy makers became convinced that deworming 
should be scaled up in the developing world.  
 By contrast, when heterogeneous impact estimates strongly depend on 
contextual characteristics, such as in the impact evaluations from this thesis, we 
argue that findings from impact evaluations could play a more useful role in the 
targeting of development programs than in decisions about the scaling up of 
development programs. In this case, scaling up development programs at the 
national or international level is not likely to result in the most effective development 
programs. When there exists evidence of heterogeneous impacts, policy makers 
could decide to use this information to target specific development programs to 
those individuals, households or geographic areas that benefit most from the 
development program. 
 This thesis demonstrates that, of those contextual characteristics that might be 
related to the impact of development programs, social norms are likely to be one of 
the most important. Hence information on prevailing social norms could be very 
useful for decisions about the targeting of development programs. Policy makers 
may well increase the effectiveness of development programs by targeting health 
education to beneficiaries with relatively high trust in health providers. Similarly, the 
impact of programs aimed at agricultural innovation is likely to be maximised by 
targeting the programs to villages with a relatively high level of generalised trust. 
Finally, in the medium term it might be more effective to target self-help group 
programs to villages with relatively liberal gender norms.
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 For example, both the World Value Survey (WVS) and the Demographic and 
Health survey (DHS) include data that can proxy for (or are associated with) the data 
concerned with social norms that we present in this thesis.96,97 So far, the WVS and 
DHS have been administered in 42 and 89 developing countries, respectively. Since 
survey data usually allow the precise estimation of poverty at the state or province 
level when they are representative at the national level and contain sufficient 
observations (Tarozzi 2011), both the DHS and the WVS could be used to derive 
estimates of generalised and in-group trust as well as gender norms at the province 
or state level, given that most of the WVSs and DHSs are representative at the 
national level and contain sufficient observations.   
 However, the findings from this thesis demonstrate that the impacts of 
development programs could even differ strongly across villages that are relatively 
close to each other. Hence data regarding social norms should be more useful at a 
lower level of aggregation. The targeting of development programs should ideally 
take place at a very low level of aggregation, i.e. the district, town or village level. 
However, for the estimation of poverty at this level there are usually too few 
observations to arrive at reliable estimates of welfare indicators using survey data 
alone (Elbers, Lanjouw, and Lanjouw 2003; Elbers et al. 2007; Tarozzi 2011). To obtain 
reliable estimates of social norms at a lower level of aggregation, we propose two 
possible solutions: 1) estimating social norms from existing data, in the spirit of the 
current literature regarding poverty mapping, and 2) drawing on local expertise to 
derive the existing social norms in a certain village or district. 
 To obtain more disaggregate levels of poverty it is common practice to merge 
household-level survey data with census data, which usually do not contain 
questions about income or consumption, but which include data concerned with 
occupation, schooling, housing characteristics and the availability of amenities at 
the local level. A simulation-based imputation procedure for this practice was 
developed by Elbers et al. (2003) and is currently referred to as poverty mapping. By 
using poverty mapping it is possible to recover precise estimates of welfare for 
relatively small areas using a combination of census and survey data. The 
methodology has been applied to several countries and the estimates of poverty 
and inequality come with high reported precision for areas as small as 1,000 
households, suggesting that poverty estimates are possible at the district or town 
level but not at the village level (Elbers et al. 2007). Additionally, Tarozzi (2011) 
demonstrates that similar methods can be used to construct maps of indicators that 
are typically collected in censuses, such as literacy and sanitation. 
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 We argue that it would be very useful to experiment with similar exercises to 
estimate social norms at a very low level of aggregation. Hundreds of millions of 
dollars have been distributed based on the estimates from poverty mapping (Tarozzi 
2011). The World Bank (2007) considers data from poverty mapping very useful for 
targeting purposes, since it tends to believe that the marginal benefit of cash 
transfers are higher in areas with high poverty rates and high inequality. However, 
this is a very narrow view of targeting for achieving high marginal benefits from 
development programs. The objective of targeting is to reduce poverty and better 
targeting should not be considered desirable in its own right. Ravallion (2009b) 
demonstrates that concentrating benefits on the poor, as measured by consumption 
or income, does not necessarily result in enhancing a project’s impact on poverty. 
Although there certainly exist examples where targeting the poorest of the poor 
does improve development effectiveness (Alatas et al. 2010), the findings of this 
thesis demonstrate that the impacts of development programs are also often 
dependent on social norms. Hence it should be possible to increase the marginal 
benefit of development programs by targeting development programs to those 
areas with social norms that are conducive to high impacts.   
 When census data are predictive of social norms, poverty mapping exercises 
could certainly be complemented with “social norm mapping” exercises to analyse 
the optimal targeting of development programs. With this information, policy 
makers could get a more accurate idea about the extent to which social norms in an 
area are conducive to the targeting of development programs. Several studies show 
that some census data are predictive of trust as well as gender norms. 
 For example, Friedman et al. (2011) demonstrate that a girls’ scholarship 
programme in Kenya results in fewer arranged marriages and less acceptance of 
domestic violence among women. Hence it is very likely that education is strongly 
positively correlated with relatively liberal gender norms. Although the same 
program was not significantly associated with levels of generalised trust, several 
other studies demonstrate strong evidence of a significant correlation between 
trust and education (e.g. Coleman 1988; Glaeser et al. 2000; Papagapitos and Riley 
2009). Similar relationships can be discerned for data concerned with occupation 
and housing characteristics. For example, Glaeser et al. (2000) demonstrate that 
social capital rises in occupations with greater returns to social skills and that social 
capital is higher among home owners. Although these results should be interpreted 
with caution, because they emanate from developed countries, it is very likely that 
trust is also associated with occupation and housing characteristics in developing 
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countries, if only because these are often associated with socio-economic charac-
teristics. For example, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) demonstrate that trust is 
significantly related to socio-economic characteristics. Hence it is likely that specific 
social norms could be partly predicted by occupation and housing characteristics.    
 The relationships discussed above suggest that social norm mapping could be 
an attractive option for the improvement of the targeting of development programs. 
Nevertheless, it might also be expensive, and it is unclear whether it would result in 
precise estimates of social norms in small areas. Recent evidence indicates that 
although poverty maps could certainly provide useful information for policy makers, 
methodologies for the construction of poverty mapping also assume a substantial 
degree of homogeneity within geographic areas in the relationship between income 
and its predictors (Tarozzi 2011). The performance of current methodologies for 
poverty mapping could thus give a misleading idea about precision. Similar 
heterogeneity issues could cause problems with social norm mapping. Hence it 
would be unwise to argue at this time that social norm mapping exercises could 
result in accurate estimates of social norms in small areas. Moreover, results from 
current poverty mapping exercises indicate that it will only be possible to create 
maps with social norms at the district or the town level and not at the village level. 
Nevertheless, it could be interesting to experiment with social norm mapping 
exercises.       
 Drawing on local expertise might be less ambitious but it is also likely to be a 
cheaper option than social norm mapping. Additionally, by using local expertise it 
should also be possible to derive social norms at the village level. One could, for 
example, ask local NGOs or community representatives about the norms that exist 
in certain villages or districts. Proper use of this information, even though it 
introduces subjectivity, should improve the targeting performance of aid 
distributors. 
7.4.2. A focus on villages with adverse social norms
As described in the previous sections, in the short term policy makers could target 
individuals, households or communities with relatively high in-group or out-group 
trust, or geographic areas with relatively liberal gender norms, as this raises the 
effectiveness of development programs. This section focuses on those areas where 
these conditions do not apply, i.e. villages with inadequate levels of in-group or 
out-group trust and villages with conservative gender norms. These areas might 
also be most prone to poverty and policy makers would not be inclined to stray from 
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these types of villages on equity grounds. This would result in differential access to 
programs aimed at behavioural change between villages with relatively favourable 
and those with unfavourable social norms. Additionally, the endogeneity of social 
norms calls into question the sole focus on targeting geographic areas with social 
norms that are conducive to the effectiveness of development programs. Instead it 
might be more beneficial to target geographic areas with unfavourable social norms 
with development programs that aim to challenge them. The findings from Chapter 
Six demonstrate that it is possible to challenge social norms by design changes in 
development programs. 
 The challenging of social norms does not necessarily ensure effectiveness in all 
cases, however. Although social norms could be considered important constraints on 
development effectiveness on some occasions, one could think of many different 
constraints on development effectiveness. The previous chapters brought up several 
instances of these, namely, a lack of self-control, time-inconsistent preferences, 
ineffective social networks, liquidity constraints, etc. The importance of these 
constraints on development effectiveness cannot be denied. Hence, targeting 
procedures could also look beyond social norm constraints and aim at individuals, 
households and/or communities where the additional constraints are less problematic. 
 This section does not aim to provide an exhaustive review of constraints on 
development effectiveness. Instead, we would like to guide policy makers on their 
quest to learn about development effectiveness from studies that focus on 
heterogeneous impacts of development programs. We focus on social norms as 
catalysts and constraints on development effectiveness. This limitation mainly serves 
to keep the result tractable and does not exclude the use of other constraints on 
development effectiveness in the conceptual framework. We argue that the section 
could provide policy makers with a first idea about how to apply findings from impact 
evaluations that are related to contextual characteristics in order to learn about 
development in a systematic way. The section focuses on the targeting of geographic 
areas for development programs that aim to influence social norms. 
 In a way, the section serves to make the macro-economic conceptual framework 
of “growth diagnostics” of Hausmann et al. (2008) applicable at the micro level. 
Hausmann et al. (2008) argue that what should be prioritised in development policy 
to achieve economic growth is likely to vary by country and that context specificity 
should play a major role in deciding which policies should be applied in a specific 
country. They label the procedure to determine the priorities in a specific country as 
growth diagnostics: “a systematic process for identifying binding constraints and 
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prioritising policy reforms in multilateral agencies and bilateral donors.” Priorities are 
needed because “not all binding constraints bind equally, and a sensible and practical 
strategy consists of identifying the most serious constraint(s) at work” (Rodrik 2010, p. 
35). The admittedly narrow focus of growth diagnostics on economic growth could be 
broadened to multidimensional poverty (Van Kempen, Schulpen and Habraken 2011). 
We go one step further by arguing that context specificity is not the same as country 
specificity and that the approach to identify the most binding constraints on 
development could also be applied at the micro level by using disaggregated indicators 
from poverty mapping, social norm mapping and/or drawing on local expertise. It 
should be possible here to identify some of the most binding constraints on 
development. Hence we bring the perspectives from micro and macro economists in 
the field of development closer together by applying the conceptual framework 
concerned with “development diagnostics” at the micro level. 
7.4.3. Identifying the most binding constraints at the micro level
Areas with adverse social norms could suffer multiple problems, i.e. high malaria 
incidence, low agricultural productivity or low school enrolment for girls. Many 
more problems could be added, but we focus on these three problems for illustrative 
purposes only. To identify geographic areas with adverse social norms we can make 
use of the methods discussed earlier related to social norm mapping and/or the 
drawing on local expertise. In the remainder of this section we assume that it is 
possible to identify these areas with these methods, even though this should not be 
taken for granted. The section merely serves to discuss the idea that targeting on 
the basis of social norms can increase the marginal benefits of development 
programs. We leave it to future studies to work out the practicalities of the ideas 
discussed in this section.     
  We now return to the first village described in the introduction. As stated the 
village suffers from serious malaria problems, conservative gender norms and low 
in-group and out-group trust. The question is what policy makers should do in this 
village now that they have decided to target health education programs to prevent 
malaria only to villages with a relatively high trust in health providers. According to 
Hausmann et al. (2008), development policies should tackle the most binding 
constraint. From this perspective the most binding constraint on the prevention of 
malaria through health education in this village is the relatively low trust in health 
providers. Policy makers should thus aim for the building of trust in health providers 
before they aim for malaria prevention in this village. Policy makers could, for 
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example, stimulate trust in health providers by improving the attendance rate of 
nurses in hospitals. Improving attendance might be the first step to improve trust in 
health providers (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). 
 Policy makers should also keep in mind the probable non-linear relationship 
between trust in health providers and the effectiveness of health education. When 
trust in health providers is very low it is improbable that a small investment to 
improve the attendance rate of nurses can improve the effectiveness of health 
education, since health education only becomes effective after a certain threshold 
level of trust in health providers has been surpassed. Moreover, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011) suggest that achieving an increase in the attendance rate of nurses might be 
rather difficult in practice. When tightening the rules for nurse attendance, recorded 
absence among nurses became low, but “exempt days” (days when there was some 
reason, the nurses claimed, that excused them from coming) went up dramatically. 
Attendance in the monitored centres ultimately ended up even lower than in the 
unmonitored centres (Banerjee and Duflo 2011).  
 Nevertheless, one could also think of an additional argument for focusing on 
trust in health providers prior to rolling out a health education program, particularly 
in villages with low original use of insecticide-treated bednets. Even when health 
education is mildly effective in the short term, we would not expect a large decline 
in malaria cases, because incomplete coverage of villages with bednets does not 
appear to result in large decreases in malaria prevalence (Tarozzi et al. 2011). When 
expectations regarding the prevention of malaria are not fulfilled, disappointment 
with the effectiveness of bednet use might follow, which could result in an even 
lower trust in health providers.    
 Similar policy dilemmas can be outlined in villages with the same social norm 
characteristics, i.e. low in-group trust, low trust in health providers and relatively 
conservative gender norms, but facing different problems. In a village with low 
agricultural productivity the most binding constraint on development might be low 
generalised trust. In this village policy makers could aim to build trust prior to the 
implementation of development programs that stimulate the adoption of 
technology to enhance agricultural productivity. As stated in the introduction, com-
munity-based development programs can sometimes result in improvements in 
trust (e.g. Rao and Ibañez 2005; Labonne and Chase 2011). However, caution should 
be exercised in the implementation of these policies, since Mansuri and Rao (2004) 
claim that the impact of community-based and -driven development programs is 
not yet well understood.  
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 Finally, in villages with low school enrolment of girls, the most binding constraint 
on development could be the relatively conservative gender norm. Women’s 
autonomy is often positively correlated with school enrolment of girls (Emerson and 
Portela Souza 2007). Policy makers should thus strive for the relaxation of gender 
norms in a context with low school enrolment of girls to be able to effectively 
stimulate women’s empowerment. For example, Beaman et al. (2009) show that 
positive discrimination by assigning gender quotas to Indian village councils could 
result in a relaxation of gender norms at the village level. Nevertheless, as discussed 
earlier, changing gender norms is a time-consuming affair that is not likely to result 
in quick impacts. 
 The foregoing outlines of policy recommendations in villages in the developing 
world could be criticised for being a gross oversimplification of reality. Moreover, the 
examples demonstrate that changing social norms is far from an easy task. However, 
the policy prescriptions that follow from this study are rather different from the 
general perception regarding the desirable policies of aid distributors. Currently, 
most development programs that focus on malaria education pay attention to 
knowledge constraints. However, when trust in health providers is the constraint on 
the effectiveness of health education, programs that aim for knowledge creation 
would normally not be very effective in stimulating the use of insecticide-treated 
bednets. The findings from this thesis suggest that the low use of bednets might 
also be a symptom of relatively low trust in health providers and not only from a lack 
of knowledge about the effectiveness of insecticide-treated bednets. Health 
education regarding the use of insecticide-treated bednets might not be productive 
in such a context. 
 Another policy implication that follows from the analysis in Chapter 5 is that 
self-help group programs should be targeted to women living in villages with 
relatively liberal gender norms. Currently, the conventional wisdom holds that 
self-help groups can achieve the biggest ‘bang for the buck’ in villages with relatively 
conservative gender norms. However, this view might run counter to the negative 
effect of self-help group membership on subjective well-being in villages with 
relatively conservative gender norms. At least in the medium term, self-help groups 
might thus lead to declines in welfare instead of improvements. 
 Finally, the need for technology adoption might be most urgent in villages with 
relatively low agricultural productivity. However, low agricultural productivity might 
also be caused by low in-group trust, which hampers the adoption of new agricultural 
techniques. In this case policy makers should not aim for technology adoption 
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through federations, but for development programs to stimulate in-group trust 
before the start-up of farmer federations. Hence efforts should first be directed at 
“getting the context right”.  
 These examples demonstrate that it is very important for policy makers to know 
the cause of development problems before decisions are taken about the sequencing 
of development programs. While it might appear attractive and most effective to 
target development programs that aim for behavioural change to the areas with the 
most severe development problems, such a strategy might backfire when social 
norms are not conducive to the generation of a high impact from development 
programs aimed at behavioural change. Although this might be an excessively 
simplistic account of reality, aid distributors currently do not pay enough attention 
to the sequencing of development programs and its relationship with context-spe-
cific social norms. Aid distributors should not assume that development programs 
will offer the highest impact per dollar invested in geographic areas with the most 
acute problems. Therefore it is very important to collect and analyse data regarding 
social norms systematically.       
    
7.4.4. Redesigning development programs
The targeting of specific development programs to areas with specific social norms 
is not the only possible solution to increase the marginal benefits of development 
programs. When social norms are not conducive to achieving the effectiveness of 
specific development programs, changing the design of the development program 
can also be an option to consider. While this section does not aim for an exhaustive 
review of the possibilities to change the design of development programs, we will 
give some examples of how this could make development programs more conducive 
to the context in which they operate. These policies should be seen as a substitute 
for the targeting policies discussed in the previous sections.      
 First, when trust in modern health providers is relatively low but trust in 
traditional healers is relatively high and malaria incidence is a widespread problem, 
it might be possible to stimulate cooperation between modern health providers and 
traditional healers in the provision of health education. For example, an HIV/AIDS 
prevention programme in South Africa that involved traditional healers resulted in 
the advice of traditional healers to use condoms (Green, Zokwe, and Dupree 1995). 
When traditional healers are trusted more than modern health providers, it is likely 
that the advice of traditional healers regarding the use of condoms is more effective 
than the advice from modern health providers. Similarly, a malaria prevention 
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programme involving traditional healers could prove more effective than a 
conventional programme.
 Second, when village-level generalised trust and agricultural productivity are 
relatively low, it might be possible to reduce the risks and uncertainties related to 
crop adoption by introducing crop insurance in the area of intervention 
complementary to the dissemination of information about new crops. The evidence 
we present regarding the relationship between generalised trust, social networks 
and crop adoption indicates that generalised trust is only a constraint on the 
effective dissemination of information about new cash crops when network 
members have to make choices with highly risky and/or ambiguous (albeit, on 
average, also more profitable) outcomes. Hence crop insurance could mitigate the 
negative relationship between generalised trust and crop adoption.
 Third, when gender norms are relatively conservative, self-help groups could 
focus on the inclusion of men to mitigate the effects of external sanctions on 
subjective well-being. The qualitative results we present indicate that men are 
closely involved in the external sanctions of women that break the gender norm. If 
men also receive benefits from self-help groups they might be less prone to 
participation in external sanctioning mechanisms. 
7.5. Limitations of the research
Our research regarding the relationship between social norms, development 
programs and their effectiveness faces a number of limitations, the most obvious 
one being that we only focus on development programs that aim for behavioural 
change. The conclusions we draw from the case studies we present in this thesis 
cannot be extrapolated in a straightforward fashion to development programs that 
aim for the creation of physical or human capital. More research will be needed to 
identify the relationship between social norms and (the effectiveness of) these 
types of development programs. 
 Nevertheless, Adato et al. (2011) demonstrate that social norms also influence 
the effectiveness of conditional cash transfer programs. Moreover, Fafchamps et al. 
(2011) and De Mel et al. (2008) present different results of the impact of the transfer 
of equipment or inventories for businesses on the profits of female-owned micro-
enterprises in Ghana and Sri Lanka, respectively. The transfer results in positive 
impacts on profits of female-owned micro-enterprises in Ghana (Fafchamps et al. 
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2011), while there appears to be no relationship between the transfer and the profits 
of female-owned micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka (De Mel et al. 2008). Fafchamps et 
al. (2011) argue that the differential findings could be linked to the lower participation 
of women in the labour market in Sri Lanka, which is likely to be related to the gender 
norm. Hence the results from different studies demonstrate that social norms tend 
to matter for the effectiveness of development programs that are not linked to 
behavioural change as well. 
 The issues of cost effectiveness and internal validity present more acute 
shortcomings. Although we present the benefits from specific development 
programs, we do not discuss the costs involved. Therefore we are not able to make 
any statements regarding the cost effectiveness of the development programs 
under study.98 Additionally, as stated in Chapter 2, the findings of the studies we 
present in this thesis are conditional on a number of statistical assumptions. 
Randomistas might object to some of the claims regarding causality we lay down in 
this thesis, because of the statistical assumptions that must be satisfied. However, 
in Chapter 2 we demonstrated that randomised evaluations themselves are also 
subject to statistical assumptions, although admittedly less stringent ones. 
 We acknowledge the fact that our findings might be vulnerable to the statistical 
assumptions we have to make. The results are nevertheless indicative of causal 
relationships, given that they show different impacts for individuals, households 
and communities with different social norms. These relationships are difficult, if not 
impossible, to explain with self-selection mechanisms. Even when the results are 
not quantitatively very accurate, learning from qualitative relationships concerned 
with well-defined development mechanisms should certainly be possible with the 
quasi-experimentally derived relationships from this thesis.  Finally, it remains 
important to present evidence from quasi-experimental studies. The importance of 
the research question should guide development research, and not the potential to 
do a randomised evaluation (Ravallion 2009a; Woolcock 2009). 
 It might nonetheless be very interesting to design one or more randomised 
evaluations to test the predictions regarding the relationship between social norms 
and the effectiveness of development programs from this thesis. Ideally, these 
randomised evaluations should be supplemented with a clear theoretical framework, 
which could be framed in a structural model. However, although it might be 
interesting to estimate the deep structural parameters for the relationship between 
social norms and the effectiveness of development programs, it should be taken 
into account that this exact relationship is usually not very interesting for policy 
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makers. In this case, a mechanism experiment to test directly the causal mechanism 
underlying a relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of a 
development program might be an interesting alternative. For example, it should be 
possible to test the hypothesis of whether the inclusion of men in self-help groups 
results in fewer external sanctioning mechanisms towards women who break the 
gender norm using a mechanism experiment.     
 Finally, we did not discuss the costs of impact evaluations in this thesis. We 
acknowledge the fact that rigorous impact evaluations are an expensive method with 
which to identify the impact of development programs. However, this is all the more 
reason to use impact evaluations in a strategic way. Many impact evaluations are 
conducted in an ad hoc fashion, without strategic purposes. We believe that the 
learning potential from impact evaluations could improve tremendously if impact 
evaluations are implemented in areas where one can distinguish between different 
social norms. This would allow a greater learning curve from impact evaluations, since 
we would learn about the impact of development programs in different contexts. In 
this way, fewer impact evaluations will be needed to learn about causal development 
mechanisms in different contexts. Focusing on the constraints on development 
effectiveness could thus reduce the costs of impact evaluations in the longer term. 
7.6. Concluding thoughts
This thesis has shown evidence that context matters for the effectiveness of 
development programs. However, this does not mean that everything goes and that 
we cannot say anything about the effectiveness of development programs in different 
settings. Instead, we argue that the effectiveness of development programs is often 
norm-specific. This means that we should expect to find similar effects of development 
programs in settings with similar social norms. We could thus learn about more 
general development mechanisms from the estimation of heterogeneous impacts of 
development programs in settings with different social norms. The main criticism of 
rigorous impact evaluations lies in their external validity. At the core this comes down 
to the claim that context matters. This is correct. However, by making context explicit, 
we should be able to learn far more from development mechanisms than by stating 
the fairly obvious but vague notion that context matters for the effectiveness of 
development programs without further analysing why and how context matters for 
the impact of development programs.  
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Annex 1   Map	of	Ghana
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Annex: Table 1.1   Surveyed	villages	in	Ghana
Village Number of Surveyed Households
Brong-Ahafo Region
Apenamuadi 16
Woramamuso 15
Obengkrom 17
Amanfrom 11
Ata-Ne-Ata 5
Mmampehia 4
Nkrankrom 38
Nkaseim 94
Upper East Region
Zoko 65
Logre 68
Aka Yonga 60
Piitanga 60
Nakolo 68
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Annex 2   Map	of	India
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Annex: Table 2.1   Surveyed	villages	in	the	Devrana	Valley
Village Number of Surveyed Households
Bajladi 20
Bhaunti 20
Bijori 15
Chhudi 12
Chopda 56
Gair 23
Garh 28
Himrol 26
Jarda 39
Kafnaul 22
Kalogi 18
Kaslana 42
Kuwa 23
Mapa 7
Nudi 16
Paluka 22
Teda 20
Annex: Table 2.2   Surveyed	villages	in	Orissa
Village Number of Surveyed Households
Puri
Alanda 40
Manijanga 20
Bhataband 20
Ghodasalia 20
Kanpur 20
Hansapada 20
Talapataka 20
Srimukh 20
Chhatarbeg 20
Balangir
Ambapali 20
Chantimunda 20
Janakapur 20
Kermeli 20
Naiken Pali 20
Nuapali 20
Paradiapali 20
Prataprudrapur 20
Sibatala 20
Barapudugia 20
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Annex 3   Map	of	Peru
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Hoe Context de Effectiviteit van 
Ontwikkelingsprogramma's beïnvloedt 
Een Onderzoek naar Sociale Normen en Heterogene Effecten 
Wat moet een beleidsmaker in Ghana doen wanneer hij hoort dat een malaria 
preventie programma in India zeer effectief is in het stimuleren van het gebruik 
van geïmpregneerde klamboes en het reduceren van kindersterfte? Kunnen de 
resultaten van impact evaluaties worden geëxtrapoleerd naar geografische gebieden 
waar de evaluatie niet heeft plaatsgevonden? Het antwoord op deze vragen wordt 
pas duidelijk wanneer we meer te weten komen over de relatie tussen de effectiviteit 
van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s en de context waarin deze plaatsvinden. Veel weten- 
schappers schenken aandacht aan deze relatie (bv. Pawson en Tilley 1997, Rodrik 
2008; Deaton 2010a, Posner 2011; Banerjee en Duflo 2011). De betekenis van sociale 
context is echter vaak onduidelijk wanneer wetenschappers de relatie tussen 
context en de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s bespreken of wanneer 
beleidsmakers stellen dat een blauwdruk-benadering van ontwikkeling zorgt voor 
minder effectieve ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Er is momenteel te weinig kennis over 
hoe context de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s beinvloedt. Om deze 
reden besteedt dit proefschrift aandacht aan de vraag hoe context en de effectiviteit 
van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s samenhangen. 
 De focus van het proefschrift ligt voornamelijk op de relatie tussen sociale 
normen als contextfactor en de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Sociale 
normen kunnen worden gedefinieerd als “1) routinematig gedrag dat 2) gebaseerd is 
op een gedeelde maatschappelijke overtuiging over hoe men zich zou moeten 
gedragen en dat opgeroepen wordt door 3) de handhaving van informele sociale 
sancties” (Fehr and Gächter 2000a). Sociale normen kunnen worden beschouwd als 
een obstakel voor de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s wanneer ze 
positieve effecten verminderen of voorkomen en kunnen worden beschouwd als 
katalysator wanneer ze noodzakelijk zijn voor de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingspro-
gramma’s of deze vergroten. 
 Van de vele contextuele karakteristieken die gerelateerd kunnen  worden aan de 
effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s, valt te verwachten dat sociale normen 
een van de belangrijkste is. We streven naar een antwoord op twee onderzoeksvra-
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gen: 1) Hoe beinvloeden sociale normen de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogram-
ma’s?, en 2) Hebben ontwikkelingsprogramma’s invloed op sociale normen in de 
gemeenschap? Door het beantwoorden van deze vragen dragen we bij aan de kennis 
over de relatie tussen expliciet gedefinieerde contextuele kenmerken en de effectiviteit 
van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s.
  We tonen aan dat sociale normen sterk gerelateerd zijn aan de impact van ont-
wikkelingsprogramma’s. In Ghana laten we zien dat voorlichting over de preventie 
van malaria effectiever is in het stimuleren van het gebruik van geïmpregneerde 
klamboes voor mensen met een groot vertrouwen in moderne zorgaanbieders. 
Resultaten uit de Indiase Himalaya laten zien dat de verspreiding van informatie 
over de vooruitzichten van nieuwe gewassen effectiever is wanneer het vertrouwen 
van huishoudens in andere leden van de gemeenschap en het algemene vertrouwen 
op dorpsniveau hoog is. Daarnaast laten we zien dat het lidmaatschap van zelf-help 
groepen in Orissa, India, leidt tot een afname van geluk voor vrouwen in dorpen met 
relatief conservatieve man-vrouw verhoudingen (gender normen). Deze afname in 
geluk is gerelateerd aan het overtreden van de sociale gender norm door zelf-help 
groep leden via een volgens de heersende sociale norm ongewenste vergroting van 
de autonomie voor deze vrouwen. Het overtreden van deze sociale norm door een 
vergroting van de autonomie leidt tot sociale sancties in dorpen met relatief 
conservatieve gender normen. In dorpen met relatief liberale gender normen leidt 
het lidmaatschap van zelf-help groepen juist tot een toename van het geluk voor 
vrouwen.      
 Resultaten van impact evaluaties kunnen dus niet zomaar geëxtrapoleerd 
worden naar andere settings. De resultaten van impact evaluaties in India kunnen 
echter nog steeds nuttige kennis verschaffen aan beleidsmakers in Ghana wanneer 
deze impact evaluaties ook inzicht verschaffen in de relatie tussen heterogene 
effecten van programma’s en contextuele kenmerken. Onder deze voorwaarde 
kunnen de resultaten van impact evaluaties in verschillende gebieden in India 
inzicht verschaffen in de mogelijke impact van vergellijkbare programma’s in 
verschillende gebieden in Ghana. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat dezelfde sociale 
normen van belang zijn voor de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s in 
verschillende geografische gebieden.    
 Het is waarschijnlijk dat ontwikkelingsprogramma’s die streven naar de 
empowerment van vrouwen doorgaans effectiever zijn in gebieden met relatief 
liberale gendernormen, zowel in Ghana als in India, althans op de korte termijn. 
Bovendien zijn ontwikkelingsprogramma’s die zich richten op de adoptie van 
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technologie waarschijnlijk effectiever in gebieden waar mensen relatief veel 
vertrouwen in elkaar hebben, zowel in India als in Ghana.
 Het ontwerp van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s lijkt ook invloed te hebben op 
sociale normen in de gemeenschap. In tegenstelling tot de verwachtingen van hulp-
organisaties zijn krottenwijkbewoners in Peru aan wie een gering bedrag in cash 
wordt verstrekt bereid om een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid van het ontvangen geld te 
investeren in de organisatie van onderwijs over gezondheid; een publiek goed met 
vermeende lange-termijn voordelen. Coöperatief gedrag is een noodzakelijke 
voorwaarde voor deze hoge investeringen en lijkt samen te hangen met relatief 
geringe voordelen uit ontwikkelingsprogramma’s in de vorm van cash en kennis. Het 
lijkt dus mogelijk om sociale normen te transformeren door kleine veranderingen in 
het ontwerp van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s.     
 
Overzicht van de hoofdstukken
In hoofdstuk 1 wordt  de relatie tussen de impact van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s en 
contextuele karakteristieken ingeleid. Daarnaast introduceren we de focus die we 
leggen op de relatie tussen sociale normen en de effectiviteit van ontwikkelings-
programma’s. We koppelen deze relatie aan het conventionele idee onder micro- 
ontwikkelingseconomen dat impact evaluaties nodig zijn om te leren over causale 
ontwikkelingsmechanismen (Banerjee 2007). Impact evaluaties zijn studies die het 
attributieprobleem proberen op te lossen middels het identificeren van de counter-
factual waarde van de uitkomsten voor de begunstigden van een ontwikkelings-
programma op een statistische valide manier (White 2010). Deze counterfactual 
waarde kan worden gezien als de uitkomst voor de begunstigden wanneer zij geen 
begunstigde waren geweest van het ontwikkelingsprogramma. Door het gebruik 
van impact evaluaties dragen micro-ontwikkelingseconomen bij aan de kennis over 
de vraag of specifieke ontwikkelingsprogramma’s werken in een specifieke context. 
Voor beleidsmakers is het echter niet alleen van belang dat  ontwikkelingsprogramma’s 
werken. Het is ook belangrijk om te weten voor wie ontwikkelingsprogramma’s 
werken en waarom. Om deze reden pleiten enkele onderzoekers voor een vergroting 
van de focus op heterogene effecten van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s die afgeleid 
zijn uit een theoretisch kader (Deaton 2010a). In de kern is deze kritiek gebaseerd 
op het idee dat context van belang is voor de effectiviteit van ontwikkelings-
programma’s (Posner 2011). Door sociale normen expliciet te relateren aan de 
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heterogene effecten van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s raken we dus de kern van de 
kritiek op impact evaluaties.    
 In hoofdstuk twee gaan we in op methodologische vraagstukken die gerelateerd 
zijn aan de schatting van de gemiddelde en heterogene effecten van ontwikkelings-
programma’s. Hiervoor bespreken we het gebruik van experimentele en quasi-expe-
rimentele evaluaties. Daarnaast besteden we aandacht aan het gebruik van 
resultaten van experimentele en quasi-experimentele evaluaties voor beleidsdoel-
einden. Zowel experimentele als quasi-experimentele evaluaties worden meestal 
gezien als impact evaluaties wanneer zij een sterke nadruk leggen op het analyseren 
van de counterfactual. In experimentele studies wordt een specifiek ontwikkelings-
programma toegewezen aan een willekeurig gekozen groep van actoren, waarna de 
gemiddelde impact kan worden gemeten door het vergelijken van de gemiddelde 
uitkomst onder begunstigden met die onder niet-begunstigden van het ontwikke-
lingsprogramma. In quasi-experimentele evaluaties worden de uitkomsten van de 
begunstigden van een programma vergeleken met de uitkomsten van een vergelijkbare 
maar niet willekeurig gekozen groep van niet-begunstigden. Verschillende statistische 
technieken kunnen worden gebruikt voor de identificatie van de impact van een 
programma in een quasi-experimentele onderzoeksopzet. In hoofdstuk drie, vier en 
vijf passen we quasi-experimentele methoden toe om in Ghana, India en Peru de 
heterogene impact van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s te meten.  
 In hoofdstuk drie tonen we aan dat het effect van malaria-voorlichting door 
ziekenhuizen en gezondheidscentra in Ghana op het gebruik van geïmpregneerde 
klamboes in de rurale gebieden van de Brong-Ahafo en Upper-East regio’s in Ghana 
groter is voor huishoudens met een relatief groot vertrouwen in moderne 
zorgaanbieders. In deze context hebben veel huishoudens ideeën over malaria die 
meer in overeenstemming zijn met traditionele dan met moderne biomedische 
denkbeelden. Klaarblijkelijk evolueren traditionele biomedische opvattingen alleen 
wanneer begunstigden een relatief groot vertrouwen hebben in moderne 
zorgaanbieders. Er lijkt ook sprake te zijn van drempeleffecten. Informatie-asymme-
trie met betrekking tot de effectiviteit van klamboes kan alleen worden opgelost 
wanneer het vertrouwen in moderne zorgaanbieders een zeker minimum-niveau 
overschrijdt. Er is ook een uitzondering op deze regel. Voorlichting over het gebruik 
van geïmpregneerde klamboes is zeer effectief voor de Kassena-Nankana. Deze 
ethnische groepering heeft een zeer laag vertrouwen in moderne zorgaanbieders.    
 In hoofdstuk vier tonen we aan dat de verspreiding van informatie over potentiële 
rendementen op de productie van tomaten en sperziebonen door boeren federaties in 
Samenvatting | 257
de Indiase Himalaya, die gevormd worden door leden van de lokale gemeenschap, 
resulteert in netwerk-effecten in de adoptie van deze gewassen. Deze netwerk-ef-
fecten lijken te worden gegenereerd door de boeren federaties. De bevindingen 
laten ook zien dat de netwerk-effecten voor sperziebonen alleen optreden wanneer 
het vertrouwen van een huishouden in andere leden van de gemeenschap relatief 
groot is of wanneer het algemene vertrouwen op dorpsniveau relatief hoog is. We 
vinden echter geen relatie tussen de mate van vertrouwen en de adoptie van 
tomaten. Deze discrepantie in de resultaten kan wellicht worden verklaard door 
aversie jegens risico en/of ambiguïteit. In de Indiase Himalaya zijn de vooruitzichten 
voor de productie van sperziebonen relatief ongewis ten opzichte van die voor de 
productie van tomaten. Deze ambiguiteit zou de relatie tussen vertrouwen, sociale 
netwerken en de adoptie van sperziebonen kunnen versterken.   
 In hoofdstuk vijf bespreken we de relatie tussen het lidmaatschap van zelf-help 
groepen, autonomie en geluk in Orissa, India. Zelf-help groepen proberen de 
autonomie van vrouwen te stimuleren door middel van leningen aan groepen van 
vrouwen en door de organisatie van aanvullende opleidingen. De resultaten die we 
presenteren zijn indicatief voor het idee dat zelf-help groepen een positieve impact 
hebben op de autonomie van vrouwen. Kwalitatief onderzoek laat echter zien dat 
verhoogde autonomie van vrouwen samengaat met het schenden van de sociale 
gender norm in Orissa, India. Het overtreden van gender normen door leden van 
zelf-help groepen leidt tot interne sancties en tot externe sancties door niet-leden. 
In lijn met het kwalitatieve onderzoek laten we zien dat het lidmaatschap van 
zelf-help groepen resulteert in een lager niveau van geluk voor vrouwen, maar alleen 
in dorpen met relatief conservatieve gender normen. Het lidmaatschap van zelf-help 
groepen resulteert in een hoger niveau van geluk voor vrouwen in dorpen met 
relatief liberale gender normen. Verbeterde autonomie van vrouwen houdt blijkbaar 
een grotere schending in van de gender normen in dorpen met relatief conservatieve 
als in dorpen met relatief liberale normen.  
 In hoofdstuk zes laten we zien dat sociale normen in de gemeenschap gerelateerd 
zijn aan het ontwerp van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. In tegenstelling tot de 
verwachtingen van hulporganisaties zijn cash-ontvangende begunstigden in Peru 
bereid om een aanzienlijke hoeveelheid geld te investeren in de organisatie van een 
voorlichtingsbijeenkomst  over persoonlijke hygiëne en waterverbruik; een publiek 
goed waarvan verwacht mag worden dat het lange-termijn voordelen heeft. 
Coöperatief gedrag om deze bijeenkomst te organiseren lijkt sterk gerelateerd te 
zijn aan zowel monetaire als niet-monetaire prikkels. Beperkte korte-termijn 
258 | Samenvatting
voordelen kunnen dus leiden tot aanzienlijke investeringen in publieke goederen 
met lange-termijn voordelen. Investeringen in deze publieke goederen lijken ook 
samen te hangen met percepties over de kennis die men kan opdoen door voor - 
lichting over gezondheid.       
 Hoofdstuk zeven dient om de relatie tussen sociale normen en de effectiviteit 
van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s samen te vatten. We laten zien dat de resultaten 
van impact evaluaties niet gemakkelijk geëxtrapoleerd kunnen worden naar andere 
settings. Het is echter wel mogelijk om de heterogeniteit in de effecten van ontwik-
kelingsprogramma’s deels –en voor sommige programma’s voor een groot deel- 
voorspelbaar te maken door te focussen op contextuele kenmerken zoals sociale 
normen. Het is dus mogelijk om kennis te verkrijgen over de relatie tussen contextuele 
kenmerken en de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s door heterogene 
effecten van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s te identificeren. Het is waarschijnlijk dat 
zelf-help groepen effectiever zijn in gebieden met relatief liberale gender normen, 
althans op de korte termijn, en dat programma’s die zich richten op de adoptie van 
technologie doorgaans een grotere invloed hebben in gebieden waar mensen een 
relatief groot vertrouwen in elkaar hebben. Het identificeren van heterogene 
effecten en de relatie met context karakteristieken kan dus tot gevolg hebben dat er 
sneller kennis kan worden verkregen over welke ontwikkelingsprogramma’s werken 
onder welke omstandigheden. Replicaties van impact evaluaties in andere settings 
kunnen ook bijdragen aan deze kennis. Deze twee processen kunnen worden gezien 
als complementair aan elkaar. 
 Vanuit een methodologisch perspectief tonen we aan dat impact evaluaties 
kunnen bijdragen aan antwoorden op beleidsvragen die gerelateerd zijn aan interne 
en externe validiteit, zelfs wanneer er geen structureel model geschat wordt. 
Interne validiteit kan worden gedefinieerd als “de geldigheid van conclusies over de 
vraag of twee variabelen causaal aan elkaar gerelateerd zijn” (Shadish et al. 2002), 
terwijl externe validiteit kan worden gedefinieerd als “de geldigheid van conclusies 
over de vraag of een causaal verband geldig blijft voor andere personen, groepen, 
instituties, variabelen en meeteenheden”. (Shadish et al. 2002). De resultaten van de 
impact evaluaties die we presenteren dragen bij aan de evaluatie van de impact van 
ontwikkelingsprogramma’s in een specifieke context en aan het voorspellen van de 
impact van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s in andere settings.    
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Beleidsimplicaties
De heterogene effecten in de impact evaluaties die we presenteren tonen aan dat 
internationale organisaties voorzichtig moeten zijn met conclusies over de 
wenselijkheid van de opschaling van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s op basis van 
gemiddelde effecten. Bevindingen van impact evaluaties van kleinschalige 
programma’s zijn slechts bruikbaar voor de beslissing of een ontwikkelingsprogram-
ma al dan niet opgeschaald moet worden wanneer algemene evenwichtseffecten 
beperkt zijn en er geen sterke relatie bestaat tussen de effectiviteit van ontwikke-
lingsprogramma’s en contextuele karakteristieken. In plaats daarvan kan het nuttig 
zijn om resultaten van impact evaluaties te gebruiken voor beslissingen over de 
selectie van begunstigden van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s wanneer heterogene 
effecten van programma’s sterk gerelateerd zijn aan contextuele karakteristieken. 
Sociale normen zijn zeer waarschijnlijk een van de belangrijkste contextuele karak-
teristieken die gerelateerd zijn aan de impact van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s.  Het 
verzamelen van data over sociale normen kan dus zeer nuttig zijn voor beslissingen 
over de selectie van begunstigden van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Beleidsmakers 
kunnen de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s vergroten door zich te 
richten op de gebieden met sociale normen die bevordelijk zijn voor het genereren 
van impact van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. In hoofdstuk zeven bespreken we twee 
tools (het in kaart brengen van sociale normen en het betrekken van lokale expertise 
bij beslissingen) die nuttig kunnen zijn bij het toewijzen van ontwikkelingsprogram-
ma’s aan gebieden met gunstige sociale normen.  
 De vraag blijft wat beleidsmakers zouden moeten doen in gebieden waar sociale 
normen ongunstig zijn voor effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Wellicht is 
het verstandig om in deze gebieden  programma’s op te zetten die sociale normen in 
de gemeenschap kunnen veranderen. Hiervoor besteden we aandacht aan de 
ontwikkeling van mechanismen om op micro-niveau te diagnosticeren waar de 
bottleneck zit en vervolgens te bedenken wat doeltreffende middelen zouden zijn 
om deze op te heffen (Hausmann et al. 2008). In gebieden waar sociale normen 
ongunstig zijn voor effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s kunnen deze 
diagnostiek en bijbehorende interventies  plaatsvinden voordat andere ontwikke-
lingsprogramma’s kunnen worden opgezet. Voordat ontwikkelingsprogramma’s 
zich richten op malaria preventie via onderwijs over gezondheid, het stimuleren van 
nieuwe gewassen door boerenfederaties en het stimuleren van de autonomie van 
vrouwen door zelf-help groepen is het belangrijk om eerst conservatieve normen en 
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laag vertrouwen aan te pakken in gebieden waar sociale normen ongunstig zijn voor 
effectiviteit van ontwikkelingsprogramma’s. Het is echter ook mogelijk om  een 
hogere effectiviteit te bewerkstelligen door relatief kleine aanpassingen te plegen 
op bestaande ontwikkelingsprogramma’s in gebieden met conservatieve gender 
normen en/of laag vertrouwen.
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Summary
How Context Matters for Development Effectiveness
A Study into Social Norms and Heterogeneous Impacts 
What should a policy maker in Ghana do when he hears that a malaria prevention 
program in India is highly effective in stimulating the use of insecticide-treated 
bednets and decreasing child mortality? Can the findings from impact evaluations 
be extrapolated to different geographic areas? The answer to these questions 
remains unclear unless we find out more about the relationship between the impact 
of development programs and contextual characteristics. Many scholars draw 
attention to this relationship (e.g., Pawson and Tilley 1997; Rodrik 2008; Deaton 
2010a; Posner 2011; Banerjee and Duflo 2011). However, the meaning of the concept 
of social context often remains vague when scholars argue that context matters for 
the effectiveness of development programs or that blueprint approaches are a 
constraint to development effectiveness. There is currently too little understanding 
of how context matters for development effectiveness. This thesis goes beyond the 
obvious but relatively vague notion that context matters for development 
effectiveness by making context explicit and analysing how context matters for the 
impact of development programs. 
 Within this terrain we mainly pay attention to the relationship between social 
norms and the effectiveness of development programs. A social norm can be defined 
as “1) a behavioural regularity that is 2) based on a socially shared belief of how one 
ought to behave, which triggers 3) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviour by 
informal social sanctions” (Fehr and Gächter 2000a). We consider social norms to be 
constraints on the effectiveness of development programs when they reduce or 
prevent positive impacts, while we consider them catalysts for development 
effectiveness if they are necessary for, or increase, positive impacts of development 
programs. 
 We argue that social norms should be one of the most straightforward 
components of context to be linked with the effectiveness of development programs 
and aim for an answer to two main research questions: 1) How do social norms 
influence the effectiveness of development programs?, and 2) Does the design of 
development programs influence social norms in the wider community?  By 
answering these questions we contribute to the knowledge base on the relationship 
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between explicitly defined contextual characteristics and the effectiveness of 
development programs. 
 We show that social norms are strongly related to the impact of development 
programs. In Ghana, we demonstrate that health education is more effective in 
stimulating the use of insecticide-treated bednets for those individuals with a 
relatively high trust in health providers. Similarly, evidence from the Indian Himalaya 
indicates that the dissemination of information about the prospects of new cash 
crops with ambiguous outcomes is more effective when household-level trust in 
other community members and village-level generalized trust are relatively high. 
Furthermore, we present evidence that self-help group membership in Orissa, India, 
results in decreases in subjective well-being for women in villages with relatively 
conservative gender norms because women’s enhanced autonomy violates the 
conservative gender norm and results in social sanctions, while self-help group 
membership engenders higher levels of subjective well-being for women in villages 
where non-members have relatively liberal values.     
 Findings from impact evaluations can thus not easily be extrapolated to 
different settings. Nevertheless, a policy maker in Ghana can still learn from the 
derivation of heterogeneous impacts (different causal relationships for subgroups) 
in geographic areas with contextual characteristics that are different from Ghana, 
such as India. We provide evidence that similar social norms appear to matter for the 
effectiveness of development programs in different geographic areas. As 
demonstrated by the impact evaluations we present, it is likely that development 
programs aiming for women’s empowerment are typically more effective in areas 
with relatively liberal gender norms in both Ghana and India, at least in the short 
term. Additionally, development programs aimed at technology adoption are likely 
to typically have a greater impact in areas with relatively high trust, in both India and 
Ghana. 
 The design of development programs also appears to influence social norms in 
the wider community. We show that, contrary to the belief of aid agencies, 
beneficiaries of cash transfers in Peru are willing to voluntarily contribute a 
substantial amount of money to health education; a public good with alleged 
long-term benefits. The social norm to cooperate in the provision of public goods 
with long-term benefits in Peru is positively related to the introduction of small, 
short-term benefits in the form of cash transfers and learning benefits. Hence, it 
appears possible to challenge social norms by design changes in development 
programs. 
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Overview of chapters
In Chapter One, we present a short introduction to the discussion on the relationship 
between contextual characteristics and the impact of development programs. 
Within this discussion we introduce our focus on the relationship between social 
norms and the effectiveness of development programs. Additionally, we link the 
relationship between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs 
to the conventional view among micro-development economists that rigorous 
impact evaluations are necessary to learn about causal development mechanisms 
(Banerjee 2007). Rigorous impact evaluations are studies that tackle the attribution 
problem by identifying the counterfactual value of the outcomes for beneficiaries in 
a statistically sound manner (White 2010). By using rigorous impact evaluations 
micro-development economists contribute to the knowledge base of whether a 
specific development program works in a particular context. However, not only does 
it matter for policy makers whether development programs work but also for whom 
and why. Therefore scholars argue for an increased focus on heterogeneous impacts 
that are derived from theory (Deaton 2010a). The core of this criticism rests on the 
claim that context matters for the effectiveness of development programs (Posner 
2011). By making social norms explicit and relating them to heterogeneous impacts 
of development programs we thus move to the core of the critique on rigorous 
impact evaluations.       
 In Chapter Two we discuss methodological issues related to the estimation of 
average and heterogeneous impacts of development programs by the use of 
randomised control trials and quasi-experimental evaluations. Additionally, we 
discuss the use of findings of randomised control trials and quasi-experimental 
evaluations for policy purposes. Both randomised control trials and quasi-experi-
mental evaluations usually qualify as rigorous impact evaluations when placing a lot 
of emphasis on counterfactual analyses. In randomised control trials a certain 
development program is allocated to a randomly chosen group of actors, after 
which the estimate of the average impact can be obtained by comparing the mean 
outcome of the beneficiaries with the mean outcome of a group of actors that was 
not allocated the development program. In quasi-experimental evaluations the aim 
is to compare the outcomes of the beneficiaries of a development program with the 
outcomes of a comparable, but not randomly chosen, control group. Different 
statistical techniques can be used to obtain the impact estimates of a development 
program using a quasi-experimental research design. In Chapters Three, Four and 
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Five we apply quasi-experimental methods to estimate heterogeneous impacts of 
development programs in Ghana and India. 
 In Chapter Three, we demonstrate that health education is more effective in 
stimulating the use of insecticide-treated bednets for individuals with a relatively 
high trust in health providers in the Brong-Ahafo and the Upper East Region in rural 
Ghana. By organizing public health education meetings on malaria prevention, 
hospitals and health centres try to prevent an overload of malaria patients. In the 
setting we discuss, several individuals have traditional biomedical beliefs about 
malaria that dominate modern biomedical beliefs. Traditional beliefs about malaria 
are supposedly only replaced with modern beliefs following health education if 
trust in health providers is sufficiently strong. We also find evidence of threshold 
effects. This implies that information asymmetries regarding the effectiveness of 
insecticide-treated bednets can only be solved when trust in health providers 
exceeds a minimum threshold level. However, we also find an exception to this rule. 
Health education is highly effective for the Kassena-Nankana in the Upper East 
region even though trust in health providers is very low for this ethnic group.  
 In Chapter Four, we demonstrate that farmer federations in the Indian Himalaya, 
which consist of local community residents, create social networks that disseminate 
information about the prospects of producing tomatoes and French beans, resulting 
in peer effects in cash crop adoption. Furthermore, we show that the impact of the 
federation on the adoption of French beans increases with household-level trust in 
other community members and village-level generalized trust. Hence both 
household and community characteristics appear to influence the effectiveness of 
the federation in the dissemination of information about French beans.  However, 
we find no relationship between trust and the adoption of tomatoes. To explain the 
differential findings for tomatoes and French beans we put forward an explanation 
that is related to ambiguity or uncertainty aversion. In the setting we discuss, the 
prospects for French bean adoption can be considered more ambiguous than the 
prospects for tomato adoption, which could strengthen the relationship between 
trust, social networks and crop adoption for French beans. 
 In Chapter Five, we discuss the relationship between women’s self-help group 
membership, women's autonomy and women's siubjective well-being in Orissa, 
India. Through group lending schemes and the organisation of supplementary 
trainings, self-help groups stimulate women’s autonomy. The evidence we present 
is indicative for the idea that self-help groups have a positive impact on women’s 
autonomy. However, qualitative accounts in the area of intervention suggest that 
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the enhanced autonomy of members of self-help groups is not in line with gender 
norms in the wider community. The violation of gender norms by self-help group 
members results in internal sanctioning mechanisms and in external sanctions by 
non-members. In line with this qualitative evidence we find that self-help group 
membership results in lower levels of subjective well-being for women in villages 
where non-members have relatively conservative values. The results further suggest 
that self-help group membership engenders higher levels of subjective well-being 
for women where non-members have relatively liberal values. Arguably, women’s 
enhanced autonomy implies a stronger violation of gender norms at the community 
level in villages with relatively conservative gender norms.   
 In Chapter Six, we present evidence indicating that the design of development 
programs is related to social norms in the wider community. We show that, contrary 
to the belief of aid agencies, beneficiaries of cash transfers in Villa El Salvador, Peru, 
are willing to voluntarily contribute a substantial amount of money to health 
education; a public good with alleged long-term benefits. The social norm to 
cooperate in the provision of health education appears to be related to both 
monetary and non-monetary incentives. We argue that the introduction of small 
short-term benefits in the form of cash transfers could substantially increase 
voluntary contributions to public goods with long-term benefits. Additionally, we 
provide evidence indicating that learning benefits also contribute to the relatively 
high voluntary contributions to health education. 
 In Chapter Seven, we summarise the evidence regarding the relationship 
between social norms and the effectiveness of development programs. The 
relationship between contextual characteristics and the heterogeneity in the 
impact estimates we present suggests that findings from impact evaluations cannot 
easily be extrapolated to different settings. Nevertheless, the heterogeneity in the 
impact of development programs that relates to contextual characteristics is partly 
– and for some programs, to a great extent – predictable. We can thus learn 
something about the relationships between contextual characteristics and the 
effectiveness of development programs from the derivation of heterogeneous 
impacts in a single setting only. It is likely that self-help group programs are typically 
more effective in areas with relatively liberal gender norms, at least in the short 
term, and that development programs aimed at technology adoption typically have 
a greater impact in areas with relatively high trust. The estimation of heterogeneous 
impacts and their relation with contextual characteristics can result in faster 
learning about what development programs work under which circumstances. 
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Additionally, we can also learn about the relationship between contextual charac-
teristics and development programs by the replication of studies in different 
contexts. These two learning processes should be seen as complements to each 
other. 
 From a methodological point of view, we demonstrate that rigorous impact 
evaluations can contribute to the resolution of policy evaluation questions related 
to internal as well as external validity, even in the absence of a structural model. 
Internal validity can be defined as “the validity of inferences about whether the 
relationship between two variables is causal” (Shadish et al. 2002), while external 
validity can be defined as “the validity of inferences about whether a causal 
relationship holds over variations in persons, settings, treatment variables, and 
measurement variables.” (Shadish et al. 2002) The impact evaluations we present 
contribute both to evaluating the impact of implemented development programs 
and to forecasting the impact of development programs in other environments. 
Policy Implications
With regard to policy implications, we argue that international agencies should 
exercise caution with the scaling up of development programs based on average 
impacts. Findings from impact evaluations of small-scale programs are only useful 
in the decision to scale up development programs when contextual characteristics 
and general equilibrium effects are not likely to bias impact estimates strongly. We 
argue that findings from impact evaluations could play a more useful role in the 
targeting of development programs than in decisions about the scaling up of 
development programs when heterogeneous impact estimates strongly depend on 
contextual characteristics. Of those contextual characteristics that might be related 
to the impact of development programs, social norms are likely to be one of the 
most important. Information on prevailing social norms could thus be very useful 
for decisions about the targeting of development programs. Policy makers may well 
increase development effectiveness by targeting development programs to those 
areas with social norms that are conducive to high impacts. In Chapter Seven, we 
discuss two tools (social norm mapping and drawing on local expertise) to target 
development programs to those areas with social norms that are conducive to high 
impacts.  
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 The question remains as to which development programs policy makers should 
implement in those areas where social norms are unfavourable for achieving high 
impacts. It might be most beneficial to target geographic areas with adverse social 
norms with development programs that aim to challenge these norms. To provide a 
first idea about these targeting procedures to policy makers, we pay attention to 
development mechanisms that are related to the most binding constraints on 
development at the micro-level (Hausmann et al. 2008). These constraints have to 
be tackled before development programs can achieve development effectiveness 
and context-specificity should play a major role in deciding which development 
programs should be applied in a specific setting.  From this perspective it could be 
most effective to first tackle conservative gender norms and/or low trust, prior to 
the implementation of development programs that aim for malaria prevention 
through health education, cash crop adoption through farmer federations or 
women’s autonomy through self-help groups in villages that suffer from these 
unfavourable social norms. Alternatively, changing the design of a development 
program can also be an option to achieve development effectiveness in areas with 
conservative gender norms and/or low trust.   
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Notes
 
 1. Introduction.
1 As noted by White (2009), the distinction between types of impact evaluations is a purely semantic 
discussion. Neither side is wrong. Nonetheless, it should be made clear at the outset which definition 
of impact evaluation we refer to in this thesis. 
2  Proponents of randomised evaluations sometimes argue that findings from quasi-experimental 
evaluations are also not sufficiently rigorous to demonstrate causal relationships between 
development programs and development outcomes. There exists mixed evidence in support of this 
idea. Using non-experimental data, LaLonde (1986) fails to find impact estimates that are close to the 
benchmark impact as derived from a randomised evaluation. However, Dehejia and Wahba (2002) are 
able to find impact estimates with very low biases using the same non-experimental data and the 
same benchmark impact estimates. More recently, McKenzie, Stillman and Gibson (2010) fail to find 
unbiased impact estimates using non-experimental data and impact estimates from experimental 
data as a benchmark, although some non-experimental impact estimates come close to the impact 
estimates as derived from a randomised evaluation. We pay further attention to this issue in Chapter 
Two of this thesis.    
3 We only focus on the differences between randomised and quasi-experimental evaluations from 
Chapter Two onwards. This chapter mainly pays attention to the similarities between randomised and 
quasi-experimental evaluations. 
4 Imbens (2010), nevertheless, argues that he has not heard of a single example of someone having the 
chance to do a randomised evaluation and choosing to work with a different methodology.
5 We do not discuss all findings from the impact evaluations of the selected programs in this thesis. The 
impact evaluation of a water and sanitation program in Huasao, Peru, falls outside the scope of this 
thesis because the program mainly aims for health benefits through the supply of piped water. The 
part of the program that aims for behavioural change is only a small component of this development 
program. 
6 Transfer payments to beneficiaries in the Mexican PROGRESA (currently known as OPORTUNIDADES) 
program are conditional on children’s school enrolment and regular visits to health clinics (Gertler 
and Boyce 2001). 
7 The misallocation of funds for impact evaluations could be explained by the global public good 
character of impact evaluations (Duflo and Kremer 2005; Center for Global Development 2006). 
Additionally, there exists a trade-off between the short-term costs of impact evaluations and the 
long-term benefits that could be obtained by using the knowledge created through rigorous impact 
evaluations (Center for Global Development 2006). 
8 White (2011) estimates that since the study of the Center for Global Development (2006), some 800 
evaluations of social interventions have been completed or are in progress in developing countries. 
9 The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab reports that school-based deworming has been scaled up 
across 26 countries where over 7 million children have been dewormed since 2009 ( www.povertyac-
tionlab.org/scale-ups/school-based-deworming). However, the scaling up has not been a complete 
success. When it was revealed that $63 million U.S. dollar was missing from a 5-year aid-package 
delivered by DFID, the World Bank and other donors to Kenya, the education minister of Kenya was 
sacked.  Support for the national education plan was cut off by the new government, resulting in a 
scaling down of deworming programs in 2010. The evidence suggests that weak links to project 
implementation may hinder the successful scaling up of proven effective development programs 
such as deworming (Sandefur 2011). Earlier it was suggested that transparency could dramatically 
improve these weak links to project implementation in development aid (Reinikka and Svensson 
2005). 
10 This thesis does not aim for an exhaustive review of the differences between the sociological and 
economic interpretations of social capital and social norms, or for a review of the history of the 
conceptual basis of social capital and social norms. For a general overview of the history of the 
conceptual basis of social capital and social norms, we point the reader to Woolcock (1998). 
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Additionally, Woolcock (1998), as well as Rauhut and Winter (2010), present an overview of the major 
differences between the sociological and economic interpretations of social capital and social norms. 
11 Social norms can also be considered a component of informal institutions. Douglas North (1990), 
perhaps the most famous representative of the new institutional economics school, strongly 
underlines the crucial role of informal social norms. The literature regarding social capital is 
nevertheless more rigorous and more empirically oriented than the literature regarding new 
institutional economics. For this reason, we mainly pay attention to social norms as a component of 
social capital in this thesis. Occasionally, however, we also pay attention to the conceptual framework 
as derived from the perspective of the new institutional economics school. Whereas the new 
institutional economics school mainly focuses on repeated games and formal institutions, the 
literature regarding social capital also focuses on the dynamics of social ostracism and participation 
in dense horizontal networks (Keefer and Knack 2008).  
12 Putnam (2001) suggests that this characteristic of social capital is shared by physical and human 
capital, because all forms of capital can be used for destructive purposes. However, we consider the 
destructive purposes  more common for social than for physical and human capital, if only because 
there are numerous empirical examples that demonstrate the negative effects of bonding social 
capital (based on strong rather than weak ties) on development outcomes (e.g. Narayan 2002; 
Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2003).   
13 Physical and human capital could be obtained through development programs or through other 
means. In this thesis we exclusively focus on the complementary effects of social capital and physical 
and/or human capital that was obtained through development programs. 
14 Rather than income, we will mainly pay attention to non-monetary outcomes. 
15 Admittedly, the limited attention given to the relationship between networks and the effectiveness 
of development programs does not allow for making grand statements regarding the role of social 
capital for the effectiveness of development programs on the basis of this thesis. To conclude 
something about this relationship requires an incremental research approach in which separate 
studies are conducted to assess the relationship between social norms, networks and the 
effectiveness of development programs. 
16 Social norms that we consider as constraints to development effectiveness might nonetheless (under 
certain conditions) act as catalysts if we consider different development programs, and vice versa.   
17 Although there has been a visible convergence between economists and sociologists towards the 
definition of social norms, there is also a lot of discussion. We realise that we use an “economic 
definition” of social norms. Sociologists might reject the dichotomous nature of the definition we use 
(Rauhut and Winter 2010). Generally, sociological research emphasises four additional aspects of 
social norms: “1) polarity – whether a norm is prescriptive, proscriptive or bipolar; 2) conditionality – 
whether a norm holds under all circumstances; 3) intensity – the degree to which individuals subscribe 
to the norm; and 4) consensus – the extent to which members of a society share a norm” (Jasso and 
Opp 1997; p. 948). Although this thesis mainly focuses on the economic definition of social norms, we 
will not lose track of the additional aspects of social norms that sociologists emphasise.        
18 This thesis serves partially to test the assumption that attitudinal surveys yield accurate data about 
behaviour and we present evidence in support of this in Chapters Three, Four and Five of this thesis.  
19 We will come back to the contents of experiments in economics from Section 1.3.1. 
20 Rauhut and Winter (2010) argue that the strategy method (Selten 1967) might be better able to deal 
with the complexity of social norms. In the strategy method subjects can condition their decision on 
every possible action of the other subject. Although this approach could certainly be helpful in 
measuring complex social norms, the findings from the strategy method remain sensitive to the 
potential biases of findings from lab experiments as presented by Levitt and List (2007). 
21 One alternative might be to measure trust through the trust game controlling for risk-taking 
behaviour and altruism by conducting trust, risk and dictator games simultaneously. This 
methodology was used by Ashraf et al. (2005b) and Schechter (2007). Still, the question remains 
whether the risk game controls adequately for the influence of risk-taking behaviour and the dictator 
game controls adequately for the role of altruism in the trust game. Moreover, such a methodology 
limits the research in a practical way, because it is logistically very complex to conduct trust, dictator 
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and risk games using large samples in developing countries. Additionally, the approach could also be 
very costly.   
22 These trade-offs can only be taken into account when there is not too much correlation between the 
different explanatory variables. Otherwise, factor analyses should be used to construct latent 
variables to prevent multicollinearity problems. 
23 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) argue that norms and prescriptions are not the same, because 
prescriptions are followed to maintain self-concepts while norms are followed to prevent sanctioning 
or punishment. Elster (1989) nonetheless argues that norms can be sustained by strong feelings of 
embarrassment, anxiety and guilt suffered from them. We follow Elster (1989) in this thesis, defining 
norms as equal to prescriptions. However, we make a distinction between internal and external 
sanctioning mechanisms. Internal sanctioning mechanisms refer to discomfort with one’s 
self-concept, while external sanctioning mechanisms refer to sanctioning by others.  
24 It should be noted that even among the Khaasi, women do not participate in politics, defence or 
justice. As such, it would not be correct to say that the Khaasi society is a female-dominated society 
(Gneezy et al. 2009).  However, the matrilineal system clearly assures different gender norms than 
under a patriarchal system.  
25 No differences between men and women were found in the ability to toss tennis balls into the bucket 
(Gneezy et al. 2009). 
26 Hyperbolic discount rates can be defined as discount rates that decline hyperbolically for decisions that 
are further away in the future (Laibson 1997). In experiments hyperbolic discounters are usually identified 
by asking two questions: 1) “Would you prefer $100 today or $110 tomorrow” and 2) “Would you prefer 
$100 thirty days from now or $110 thirty-one days from now?” Hyperbolic discounters can be classified as 
those individuals who prefer $100 today and $110 thirty-one days from now (Ashraf et al. 2006)
 2. Impact Evaluation for Estimating Heterogeneous Effects.
27 Alternatively, Heckman (2010) refers to the ‘attribution problem’ as the ‘evaluation problem’. 
28 Del Felice (Forthcoming) presents an example of an evaluation of a lobby activity. 
29 Aid distributors who choose different evaluation methods to determine the impact of their programs 
should bear in mind that these methods are no substitute for rigorous impact evaluations. Evaluation 
methods in which no use is made of a control group cannot replace counterfactual analyses when 
organisations want to learn about the attribution of their interventions to development outcomes. 
Similarly, counterfactual analyses should not be regarded as the only way to do development 
research. Instead, impact evaluations should be seen as a complement to different strands of research 
in the field of development and vice versa. Burdensome processes to monitor inputs and activities 
could, nonetheless, be replaced with counterfactual analyses (Barder 2011).   
30 Learning about development can, for example, also take place by applying the most significant 
change technique. Using this approach, programs can be improved by collecting stories and selecting 
the most significant of these stories, to work towards explicitly valued directions and away from less 
valued directions (Dart and Davies 2003). This technique can also be used to derive hypotheses about 
the impact of development programs. However, counterfactual situations in the absence of a 
development program cannot be estimated with the most significant change technique. Several 
other approaches allow us to learn about development mechanisms. Nevertheless, we do not aim for 
an exhaustive review of these alternative approaches in this thesis (see e.g. Chambers et al. (2009) or 
http://www.3ieimpact.org for suggestions in this respect).
31 Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) discuss a number of randomization methods (e.g. pure randomisation, 
pairwise matching, stratification, re-randomisation if balance is not achieved) to limit the vulnerability 
of randomised evaluations to small sample properties. Under stratification, units are randomly 
assigned to treatment and control within strata are defined by a number of baseline characteristics. 
When using pair-wise matching, one attempts to balance on multiple variables, thus going one step 
further than under stratification. When using re-randomisation one carries out an allocation to 
treatment and control and then uses a statistical threshold or ad-hoc procedure to decide whether to 
redraw the allocation. Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) demonstrate that the use of stratification or 
pair-wise matching results in a higher statistical power to reject the null hypothesis of zero impact. By 
contrast, re-randomisation does not appear to result in a higher statistical power.    
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32 For an exhaustive review of the limitations of findings from randomised evaluations we refer to 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a). 
33 Much of the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of randomised control trials in medical 
science is comparable to the discussion in economics. Several studies in medicine also highlight the 
external validity problems of randomised control trials (e.g., Steckler and McLeroy 2008; Crosby et al. 
2010).  However, to the best of our knowledge, no economic meta-analysis exists that compares the 
findings from randomised control trials with the findings from quasi-experimental evaluations.
34 This statement carries the assumption that most aid distributors do not have the capacity to control 
the randomised allocation of development programs. Our experience shows that this is likely to be 
the case. 
35 This is not to say that a randomised evaluation shortly after the start of a women’s empowerment 
program could not be useful. In fact, a great deal about the empirics regarding impact trajectories 
can be learned from evaluating at multiple points in time, both shortly and long after the 
implementation of a development program.  Consequently, it might sometimes be advisable to use 
multiple follow-up surveys to estimate impacts at different points in time after the intervention. We 
pay some attention to this issue in Chapter Five, in which we discuss the medium-term impact of 
women’s self-help groups on women’s autonomy in Orissa, India.  
36 A potential problem is that researchers usually have little incentive to conduct replication studies 
because of the publication bias mentioned earlier. 
37 Both Chetty (2009) and Heckman (2010) present alternatives for combining the advantages of 
structural and reduced-form approaches to impact evaluations. Applications concerned with these 
approaches are mostly outside the scope of this thesis, because behavioural economics mechanisms 
are usually rather difficult to model in the approaches favoured by Chetty (2009) and Heckman 
(2010). Nevertheless, Chetty (2009) discusses a number of applications in which he uses his so-called 
“sufficient statistic” approach to model the implications of taxes when economic agents are not 
perfectly rational.    
38 Heckman (2010) also refers to a third policy evaluation problem: “forecasting the impacts of 
interventions (constructing counterfactual states associated with interventions) never historically 
experienced, including their impacts on well-being.” Solutions to this problem fall mostly outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
39 There are multiple weighing methods to account for the propensity score using PSM. We pay further 
attention to these weighing methods in Chapter Five. Furthermore, we also pay specific attention to the 
variable choice for the model to derive an estimate of the propensity score in Chapters Three and Five. 
40 We pay further attention to the use of panel data in Section 2.4.4.
41 For this purpose, the Hansen J test is a useful device. We pay further attention to the testing for the 
exclusion restriction with the Hansen J test in Chapter Five of this thesis.
42 When externalities are expected it might be advisable to estimate the so-called intention-to-treat 
effect. Here one estimates the impact as if everybody complied with the randomised intervention by 
estimating the average impact of the initial treatment intent. This approach results in a weighted 
average treatment effect for those who comply and those who do not (Ashraf, Giné, and Karlan 
2009). Both compliers and non-compliers might benefit from the development program when 
positive externalities are expected and a weighted average treatment effect for these groups might 
thus be most informative about the effectiveness of the development program. 
43 Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b) present an alternative for the LATE in the form of the marginal 
treatment effect. This is the “mean gain to units that are indifferent between participating or not” 
(Ravallion 2009a, p. 38) and can also be defined as “a choice-parametric parameter that can be 
interpreted as a willingness to pay parameter for persons at a margin of indifference between 
participating in an activity or not” (Heckman and Vytlacil 2007b, p. 4878). All valid instrumental 
variables result in different estimates of the LATE and the marginal treatment effect can be identified 
by a weighted average of the LATEs (Heckman 2010). However, for this purpose we would need 
multiple valid instruments, when in practice it is already very difficult to identify one such variable. 
We thus conclude that although the marginal treatment effect could have favourable theoretical 
traits, it also is very difficult to estimate the marginal treatment effect in practice.
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44 Admittedly, however, this can also not be guaranteed in our case study of Chapter Four. Although the 
use of panel data could certainly improve the quality of the analyses, the pre-baseline activities of the 
evaluated NGO could have affected the baseline household and community characteristics.  
 3. Trust in Health Providers as a Catalyst for Malaria Prevention. 
 Heterogeneous Impacts of Health Education in Rural Ghana.
45 One example of distinct beliefs in the Kassena-Nankana district is that eating sweet fruits could 
result in malaria (Adongo et al. 2005). Similar beliefs could also be present in other traditional 
settings, but the strength and spread of the beliefs are likely to be lower elsewhere. The survey we 
discuss in this chapter does not contain direct questions about beliefs regarding the origin of malaria. 
Nevertheless, that traditional beliefs about malaria are persistent is illustrated by data from a 
follow-up survey in 2009 among the same households that were interviewed in 2007 (this survey is 
discussed at length in Section 3). For example, the data indicate that in the UER 89% of the 
respondents belief that malaria can be caused by eating sweets, while 53% of the respondents in the 
BAR believe that malaria can be caused by eating sweets.   
46 Generalised trust has also been measured with trust games (Glaeser et al. 2000), but Karlan (2005) 
argues that this trust measure is more compatible with risk-taking than with trust. Answers to 
questions about trust from the General Social Survey did, however, have predictive power in 
explaining trustworthiness in the trust game in Peru (Karlan 2005).    
47 If there were missing values for these wealth categories because of non-response, they were imputed 
with the help of the multiple imputation strategy with matching as described by Wood, White and 
Royston (2008) and programmed in the STATA program ice (Royston 2007). We control separately for 
all different self-reported forms of consumption and wealth to arrive at our final estimates of 
self-reported land wealth, livestock wealth and housing wealth.  
48 The floods were caused by heavy rainfall and the opening of the Bagre dam in Burkina Faso. An 
estimate of the Ghanaian government suggests that the floods affected 332,600 people in total 
(UNICEF 2007). Extra variables added were income loss or extra expenses as a result of crop loss, 
property loss and loss of animals in the 2 months before the survey. We see these variables as a 
measure of vulnerability to shocks. Households might have changed their behaviour regarding health 
education as a result of this vulnerability. Additionally, the variables might have had an impact on 
fever incidence in the previous week. 
49 The Akaike information criterion (Akaike 1974) and the number of observations in our model are our 
main indicators for choosing whether or not to include variables in our model. Variables are included 
whenever the Akaike Information Criterion decreases as a result of adding the variable and the 
number of observations does not decrease, or when the variable has a significant effect at the 5% 
significance level and the number of observations does not decrease by more than 50. We, however, 
always include some variables from the first four categories in our probit model. The Akaike 
Information Criterion and the number of observations left are only used to make a selection of 
variables in the first four categories.  
50 Propensity-adjusted regression is discussed in Wooldridge (2002, p. 617), who reports that including 
the predicted propensity p(xi) as an additional regressor next to the treatment dummy results in 
consistent estimates of the average treatment effect and avoids endogeneity problems from omit-
ted-variable bias, if the estimated propensity contains all the information in the covariates that is 
relevant for estimating the treatment effect, and under the assumption that there is a linear 
relationship between the treatment dummy and the outcome of interest. According to our hypothesis, 
however, the average treatment effect is dependent on trust in health providers. The assumption of 
linearity should, therefore, be relaxed by including an interaction between trust in health providers 
and health education, resulting in consistent estimates of treatment effects conditional on the level 
of trust in health providers. 
51 Not including the individuals for whom the households own at least one bednet, but for whom it is 
not certain whether they slept under an ITN or bednet in the night before the survey, can result in an 
unbalanced sample. For this reason, we also estimated our model with a proxy for bednet use that is 
available for all household members: the number of bednets per household divided by the number of 
household members. Using this proxy does not lead to different results. 
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52 In our probit model we exclude households that walk to the hospital, for reasons of common support. 
Among households with health education participants, there are no households that walk to the 
catholic hospital. This leaves us with 1289 observations.
53 In our probit model, we exclude households that travel to the Catholic health centres by taxi, for 
reasons of common support. None of the households with health education participants travels to 
the faith-based health centres by taxi. This leaves us with 1971 observations.
54  Controlling for these variables in later stages of this chapter does not lead to qualitatively different 
results.
55 We experimented with different measures of trust in doctors of the catholic hospital. Men and women 
can have different preferences for ITN and/or bednet use, although research from Ethiopia shows that 
preferences for bednet use can be treated as identical for husbands and wives (Lampietti 1999). Under 
assumptions of collective household decisions, trust in doctors of the catholic hospital of husbands and 
wives will have the same impact on returns to health education. The model of collective household 
decisions can, however, be rejected in many cases (Duflo and Udry 2004). Qualitative results are, 
however, robust to different weights for trust levels in health providers of men and women.   
56 We use the inteff command in STATA to estimate the marginal effect over different predicted values 
of owning or using a bednet (Norton, Wang, and Ai 2004).
57 In our specifications we adjust standard errors for clustering at the household level. Due to the 
relatively low sample size it was not possible to bootstrap standard errors in most of our econometric 
specifications. This might be worrisome, since we use an estimated explanatory variable in our model 
(the propensity). However, in none of our models did the exclusion of the propensity score result in 
qualitatively different findings, which suggests that the use of bootstrapped standard errors in the 
testing of our hypotheses would be overly restrictive.  
 4. How Does Trust Matter for Cash Crop Adoption? 
 Evidence from the Indian Himalaya.
58 Although we pay some attention to the use of chemical and organic fertilisers and pesticides in the 
descriptive statistics we present, the link between trust, social networks and the adoption of 
fertilisers and pesticides is outside the scope of this thesis.  
59 Recent decreases in tomato prices, nonetheless, suggest that the adoption of tomatoes could result 
in important price risks as well. Hence it remains ambiguous whether it is more risky to adopt French 
beans than tomatoes.  
60 By contrast, this chapter does not aim for a distinction between social learning and peer effects that 
are not associated with learning. 
61 The supply chain was introduced at different times in the villages where household survey data were 
collected. However, each of the villages that we discuss and that benefits from the supply chain had 
access to the supply chain during both the baseline and the follow-up survey.  
62 Arguably, had we collected data concerned with the current population size in all villages, we would 
have been able to construct survey weights based on the current population size. However, current 
population size data are not available for all villages. Hence we decided to use survey weights based 
on the census of 2000.  
63 We use a regression approach with lagged explanatory variables because we are not able to guarantee 
non-diverging trends across treatment and control villages. A difference-in-difference approach 
requires the assumption that there are no diverging trends for the treatment and the control group. 
The use of an approach with lagged explanatory variables could result in omitted-variable bias. 
However, when controlling for the lagged dependent variable, this potential omitted-variable bias 
can be reduced substantially. Controlling for the lagged dependent variable should typically result in 
a conservative estimate of the relationship between the federation and the adoption of new crops 
(Angrist and Pischke 2008).   
64 Generalised trust has also been measured with trust games (Glaeser et al. 2000), but Karlan (2005) 
argues that this trust measure is more compatible with risk-taking than with trust. 
65 Surveyors were instructed to come back at least two times when one of the preferred respondents 
was not available at the time of the interview. However, even with this approach we were not able to 
talk to the preferred male respondent on many occasions. 
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66 The correlation coefficient between the level of generalised trust and trust in other community 
members for the cases in which we have two values in the household (n=223) are 0.68 in both cases. 
We consider these relatively high correlations as evidence in support of the idea that trust is highly 
correlated across household members. Hence we argue that we can safely use the mean value of 
generalised and in-group trust at the household level as household-level proxies for generalised and 
in-group trust, respectively.   
67 Some households also report the production of capsicum in 2010 and not in 2008. However, the 
number of households producing capsicum is too limited (47) for an advanced data analysis concerned 
with the determinants of capsicum adoption. Moreover, there are also several households (148) that 
do not report land used for the production of apples in 2008 but a large apple production in 2010. 
Nevertheless, the recall data consistently demonstrate that apples were already adopted before the 
baseline survey in 2008 for all the farmers that did not report land used for the production of apples 
during the baseline survey. Arguably, farmers did not report the land used for the production of apple 
trees in 2008, because there was no production of apples yet. Since the recall data consistently report 
non-adoption of apples and because apple trees need approximately six years before the production 
of apples, we do not focus on the adoption of apples in this thesis.  
68 We only consider the recall data for the choice to focus on the adoption of French beans and tomatoes, 
because the measurement error in the recall data will most probably be much higher than the 
measurement error in the survey data from 2008 and 2010. We do not consider the recall data 
sufficiently reliable to be used in the multivariate empirical analyses.  
69 Trust in family and friends were measured in the same way (with 5-point Likert scales) as generalised 
and in-group trust. 
70 One alternative would be to discuss adoption and disadoption decisions jointly in a multinomial logit 
model. However, the multinomial logit model requires an assumption of independence between the 
observations (Hey et al. 2004). Hence, since we explicitly hypothesise peer effects in the theoretical 
framework, it is not possible to analyse adoption and disadoption decisions jointly in a multinomial 
logit model. To analyse disadoption decisions we estimated the relationship between trust, social 
networks and crop disadoption for farmers who already adopted tomatoes or French beans in 2008. 
We find no evidence of disadoption decisions that are associated with the interactions between trust 
and the federation. Given the low sample size, we should not attach too much weight to these results. 
However, future research could focus on the relationship between trust, social networks and 
disadoption decisions as well.
71 We also estimated the model with separate dummy variables for members of the federation and 
farmers that are not members of the federation but live in villages with a federation. We do not find 
significant differences between these two groups, or when we separately interact these variables 
with trust indicators. Arguably, farmers who are not members of the federation, but live in villages 
with a federation, strongly benefit from the federation as a result of the network externalities that 
the federation generates.   
72 We use the inteff command in STATA to estimate the marginal effect over different likelihoods of 
French bean adoption (Norton et al. 2004).
73 There is a strong bivariate correlation (β=1.01, P=0.00) between tomato adoption in 2010 and 2008. 
However, this relationship disappears after controlling for the influence of the federation. For French 
beans we find no significant bivariate correlation between adoption decisions in 2010 and 2008 
(β=0.27, P=0.27). 
74 Unfortunately, for tomatoes we are not able to conduct this test by using survey weights unless we 
delete a number of observations. Hence we decided to analyse tomato adoption decisions between 
2008 and 2010 without survey weights.   
 5. Women’s Autonomy and Subjective Well-Being in India.
 How Village Norms Shape the Impact of Self-Help Groups. 
75 Men also participate in SHGs in certain villages of our sample. We will discuss the participation of 
men in SHGs in the presentation of our data. 
76 Unless otherwise stated, the concepts of empowerment, agency, autonomy, utility, SHG membership 
and subjective well-being refer to female-related characteristics.    
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77 We report male-female ratios in the age group of 0-6 years.   
78 Below-poverty-line households were identified by asking households for a so-called below-poverty-
line card before the start of the interview. This card is distributed by the Indian government and 
serves as a threshold to identify poor households.  
79 Unfortunately, individual-level data are not available for all ‘resource’ categories. To avoid inconsistent 
reporting across categories, we report household-level data in Table 5.1. Individual-level data on 
savings result in similar qualitative observations. Apart from data on land, individual-level data are 
not available for loans and asset ownership. However, we can safely assume that individual SHG or 
saving group members are responsible for loans from SHGs or saving groups. The significant 
difference in the household level of loans from SHGs and saving groups between SHG members and 
non-members is thus a reflection of a significant difference between SHG members and non-members 
at the individual level.    
80 We refrain from presenting probit models for the binary dependent variables for ease of tractability, 
but instrumental variable probit models lead to the same qualitative interpretation of our results.
81 As in Table 5.3 the significance levels we report in the text are based on Bias-Corrected confidence 
intervals.  
82 Balancing scores suggest that balancing score conditions are fulfilled for each of the discussed PSM 
models in the rest of this chapter. 
83 In this specification we do not control for indicators regarding male tolerance of women’s autonomy, 
because of the missing values for these variables. 
84 We present the results with one instrument, but the findings are robust to the inclusion of the second 
instrumental variable. 
 6. Do Cash Transfers Crowd Out Community Investment in Public Goods?
 Lessons from a Field Experiment on Health Education.
85 These public goods are sometimes also provided in the form of official development aid. However, 
unlike non-governmental aid organisations, official development aid organisations complement the 
financing of the provision of these public goods with cash transfer programs.    
86 We define altruism as the sum of ‘warm glow’ (cf. Andreoni1990) and pure altruism in this chapter. 
87 Two respondents per household answered questions about attitudes in our survey. Only these 
persons were invited for our experiment. Generally, the household head and his/her spouse answered 
these questions, but whenever these persons were not available, other adult persons in the same 
household from the same gender replaced them.
88 We were not able to prevent one household from participating with two persons in the experiment. 
All results are robust to exclusion of these subjects from our analysis. 
89 At the time of the experiment $1 was equal to 3.23 soles. 
90 Stifel and Alderman (2006) do not find evidence of impact of the VdL program on nutritional 
outcomes of young children. People might, however, consider the benefits of VdL to be more 
self-evident and certain because of the perceived direct nutritional impact. 
91 The disadvantage of hypothetical rewards is the uncertainty about whether people are sufficiently 
motivated to engage in serious introspection concerning what they would do if outcomes were real 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue 2002). With real rewards, however, we would not have 
been able to infer time preferences regarding health. Moreover, real rewards would have resulted in 
transaction costs for collecting the money, which could result in a bias in the estimated discount rate, 
given the fact that some participants live closer to the school where the experiment was conducted 
than others. With hypothetical rewards respondents might still take transaction costs into account, 
but this is likely to be less salient in respondents’ minds, because any mention of where the stakes 
would have to be collected is avoided in a hypothetical setting. 
92 One factor that could potentially bias the discount rate with regard to health is the fact that diarrhea 
is usually more dangerous, in the sense that it is sometimes life-threatening, for young children. 
Parents with young children might, therefore, prefer the drug against diarrhea today because of the 
danger of diarrhea for their children. We find no evidence of this relationship, however. Time 
preferences with regard to health are not significantly related to the number of children below 6 
years old in the household of the participant (z=0.13, P=0.90). 
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93 Five respondents (10%) produced unintelligible answers to the time preferences questions and were 
consequently excluded from further analysis.  
 7. Conclusion. 
94 Ambiguity or uncertainty aversion is not the same as risk aversion. Risk can be considered as imperfect 
knowledge where the probabilities of the possible outcomes are known, while uncertainty refers to 
the case where probabilities are unknown (Engle-Warnick et al. 2007).
95 Accounting for general equilibrium effects, corruption and pro-poor targeting is, nonetheless, mostly 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
96 In the WVS statements are included about generalised trust (“Generally speaking would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people”), in-group trust 
(“People in my neighbourhood can be trusted”). Other statements in the WVS are likely to be 
associated with gender norms (e.g. “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women 
do”, “A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl”, and “On the whole, men make 
better business executives than women do”).     
97 The DHS contains questions that are associated with gender norms. Respondents are asked, amongst 
other questions, who usually decides how the money you earn will be used, who usually makes 
decisions about health care, and who usually makes decisions about making major household 
purchases, using the following answer categories: 1) the husband, 2) the wife, or 3) the husband and 
the wife jointly. Additionally, female respondents are also asked whether a husband is justified in 
hitting or beating his wife in various situations. 
98 Ravallion (2009a) argues that many impact evaluations do not take into account issues related to cost 
effectiveness. He argues that several impact evaluations claim successes, even though these 
“successful” interventions cannot be considered cost-effective. 
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